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‘The Story Stays the Same’?  
Refugees in Europe from the ‘Forty  
Years’ Crisis’ to the Present
Jessica Reinisch and Matthew Frank
1
In the time it has taken us to put this book together, refugees have forced themselves 
back into European consciousness. In the last three years, barely a day has gone by 
without our screens and newspapers being filled with pictures of refugees and migrants 
seeking sanctuary in Europe, and with the accompanying talk of ‘crisis’. The largest 
numbers of refugees are coming from Syria. Estimates from summer 2016 suggest that 
to date at least 11 million Syrians have left their homes since the beginning of the 
civil war in March 2011. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the international refugee agency, has registered 4.8 million Syrian 
refugees, while another 6.6 million are internally displaced within the country. The 
vast majority of those who left Syria sought refuge in neighbouring countries. Turkey 
has taken in 2.5 million; tiny Lebanon 1.1 million. Just over one million Syrians have to 
date applied for asylum in Europe.1 They are joined by people leaving Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Pakistan, among other places. Though still only a fraction of the record estimate of 
currently over 65.3 million displaced people globally,2 the growing number of arrivals 
at European borders has put refugees and migrants back on the political agenda.3 
European governments on the whole have responded slowly and warily. Far-right 
protest parties standing on anti-immigration platforms have significantly increased their 
share of the votes across the continent since 2014. A series of EU conferences on ‘burden 
sharing’ have come and gone, largely without any noteworthy results. However, these 
intergovernmental discussions and the wider public debate on refugees revealed deep 
divisions between and within European countries about how to respond to the ‘migrant 
crisis’, the political consequences of which have been profound and are ongoing. While 
we were putting the final touches to the manuscript, yet another diplomatic conference 
came to an end, and with it yet another attempt to put the ‘solution’ of current refugee 
crises on the political agenda. On 19 September 2016, the UN General Assembly and the 
outgoing UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon hosted a high-level Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants at the UN Headquarters in New York.4 The following day, the outgoing 
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US president Barack Obama convened a Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, which focused 
on specific international pledges on and commitments to refugees.5 The meetings began 
to fade into historical oblivion even before the assembled guests had left New York. The 
summits failed to generate any clear or binding commitments; they merely launched 
two years of further negotiations. Accompanying publicity stunts, like the display in 
London’s Parliament Square of 2,500 life jackets worn by those who had attempted to 
cross the seas to Europe, were quickly forgotten.
Forgettable, too, was the accompanying hype about ‘watershed moments’. Ban 
Ki-moon reportedly hailed the meeting as ‘historic’ and a ‘breakthrough’.6 The summit 
was a ‘unique opportunity for creating a more responsible, predictable system for 
responding to large movements of refugees and migrants’, gushed the New York-
based International Business Times.7 UNHCR press releases were just as upbeat. In 
the run-up to the meetings, a UNHCR spokesperson declared that there was ‘huge 
momentum towards trying to make the 19th of September a really meaningful summit 
that will be a game changer for refugee protection and for migrants who are on the 
move’. Concretely, the summit was on target ‘to adopt key commitments to enhance 
protection’.8 On the day, Volker Türk, UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for 
Protection, thought the talks were ‘the beginning of an exciting process’ and had 
helpfully produced ‘a response framework that consolidates the nuts and bolts of what 
is needed if a country is faced with a large-scale [refugee] situation’.9 After a month of 
reflection, Türk added that ‘at a time when borders are being fortified to keep refugees 
out and when refugees are accused wrongly of being terrorists, it is nothing short of a 
miracle that the United Nations unanimously adopted the New York Declaration which 
affirms and strengthens the protection of refugees’. Facing criticism over the absence 
of concrete commitments and boldness, Türk argued that ‘in the real and imperfect 
world in which we struggle to advance the rights of refugees’, the declaration provided 
‘a strong endorsement of the basic principles of refugee protection’ and offered ‘the 
possibility for further progress in the coming two years’.10 ‘We’re not disappointed in 
any way,’ agreed Leonard Doyle, chief spokesman of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM).11
By contrast, plenty of NGOs and refugee activists were highly critical of the lack 
of any concrete agreements or outcomes of the New York summits. David Miliband, 
president of the International Rescue Committee, noted that ‘any refugee reading the 
conclusions of Monday’s summit is bound to say “what is going to change?” and the 
answer they would have to be given is “very little”.’12 Salil Shetty, Amnesty International’s 
secretary general, thought that ‘we already know the U.N. summit is doomed to abject 
failure’, and ‘the Obama summit looks unlikely to pick up the pieces.’13 Amnesty’s 
Advisor on Refugee and Migrants’ Rights, Charlotte Philips, was just as scathing. 
‘Faced with the worst refugee crisis in seventy years,’ she declared, ‘world leaders have 
failed to bear the weight of responsibility.’ They had ‘delayed any chance of a deal until 
2018, procrastinating over crucial decisions even as refugees drown at sea and languish 
in camps with no hopes for the future’.14 Perhaps the only memorable moment of the 
summit concerned the public announcement that the celebrity couple Angelina Jolie 
(who is a UNHCR ‘Special Envoy’) and Brad Pitt had split up, which overshadowed the 
meeting’s final hours and aftermath.
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If nothing else, the summits in New York remind us just how strangely cyclical and 
ahistorical the debate about refugees in Europe has become, where, on the surface at 
least, nothing ever seems to change. We are by now familiar with timeless images of 
bedraggled men, women and children, carrying a few bags of possessions, cramming 
into whatever transport is available, tired, hungry and sick from the disasters they 
left behind and the long journeys they endured, sleeping rough on the way, herded 
into reception centres or camps, receiving blankets or food from a handful of 
volunteers, and causing fear and panic wherever they arrive. Just as commonplace is 
the accompanying imagery of statesmen and stateswomen in suits, watched over by the 
world’s media as they sign non-binding gestures of goodwill. It is no coincidence that 
matters of international refugee policy are usually championed, as they were at the two 
New York summits, by lame duck politicians, who have little political capital to lose 
and a last wish to make inroads on an entrenched humanitarian problem they have 
failed to confront during their tenure of office. 
Just as familiar is the polarized, binary nature of public debate about migration and 
potential solutions to refugee crises. Recent arguments advanced by the north-western 
European governments against taking in more refugees and migrants do not sound 
substantially different from those put forward by their predecessors seventy or 
eighty years ago, nor do those of their opponents. It is a long-established dance, and 
everyone knows the moves. While one side talks about the dangers of ‘uncontrolled 
migration’ and the primacy of national interests,15 the other points to moral duties and 
humanitarian responsibilities, and condemns responses that are ‘too slow, too low and 
too narrow’.16 While one side paints pictures of anonymous masses breaking through 
European borders,17 the other makes reference to the plight of innocent victims – such 
as Omran Daqneesh, the young Syrian boy injured in an airstrike on Aleppo on 17 
August 2016, who became known as ‘the boy in the ambulance’;18 or Alan Kurdi, the 
three-year-old Syrian boy of Kurdish descent who washed up dead on a Turkish beach 
in September 2015.19 While one side tries to narrow and limit the pool of legitimate 
candidates for inclusion in the category of people on the move who qualify for 
international protection, the other attempts to broaden it. 
The contributors to this book highlight the familiarity of these features in their own 
case studies drawn from ‘the forty years’ crisis’ of Europe’s encounters with refugees 
during the interwar and immediate post-war decades of the twentieth century. The 
chapters also identify significant history and assumptions shared by both sides of 
this polarized debate. Importantly, this common ground goes far beyond shared pat 
phrases about ‘great global challenges’ that have to be dealt with ‘as an international 
community’ in the form of a ‘truly global response to the mass movement of people 
across the world’ – vacuous language that is difficult to take offence at, but that offers 
nothing.20 Ultimately, both sides often reinforce the distinction between so-called 
‘legitimate’ political refugees and ‘illegitimate’ economic migrants, even if some 
rightly point out that the lines between these categories can be blurred in practice. 
The International Refugee Organization (IRO), founded in 1946, was the first to make 
explicit reference in its legal statute to ‘genuine’ and ‘bona fide refugees and displaced 
persons’, thereby making clear that there were others who were neither ‘genuine’ nor 
‘bona fide’.21 The distinction was then enshrined in law by the 1951 Convention Relating 
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to the Status of Refugees, which remains, along with the 1967 amending Protocol, the 
fundamental legal document that defines who a refugee is (and is not) and the kind of 
legal and political protection refugees are entitled to.22 It defined a refugee as a person 
outside of his or her country of birth because of ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’, 
to whom the host state is obliged to provide asylum. Persecution as the main pillar of 
the refugee status was adopted in 1951 by Western states to privilege those migrants 
who were fleeing communist regimes. That such a specific historical moment as 1951 
produced a framework of refugee protection which has long outlived the context of its 
creation has had important lasting consequences. The most significant legacy concerns 
its separation of political ‘push’ factors from economic ‘pull’ factors – which have 
become more blurred since the end of the Cold War than ever before. Every political 
refugee is seeking a better life, and every economic migrant is fleeing a number of 
explicit or implicit threats or disasters. Whether any particular country grants them 
asylum is often more a result of its political priorities than the ‘genuineness’ of the 
asylum seekers.23 As a result, UNHCR, the UN agency created as guardian of the 1951 
Convention, is a peculiar and desperate kind of anachronism, charged with protecting 
‘refugees’ as defined in 1951, in a world where this definition has become impossible 
to sustain, let alone enforce, in practice. The organization’s lack of institutional or 
financial autonomy and methods of sanction further add to its predicament.24
It is therefore both significant and deceptive that many people on both sides of 
today’s debate about refugees and migrants agree that the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol have to stay, in spite of their obsolete priorities and unintended consequences, 
because without them we would be a lot worse off. Even British prime minister Theresa 
May, known for her tough stance against immigration, declared at New York that the 
Convention and Protocol ‘must remain the bedrock of our response’, even if ‘the context 
in which they must be applied has dramatically changed’.25 To date, although there 
have been a series of local and national attempts to ‘reinterpret’ or simply disregard 
key provisions of the Convention and Protocol, there have been surprisingly few calls 
from countries to free themselves from the shackles and obligations of these treaties 
altogether.26 Even the United States is, at the point of writing, still formally bound 
by this legislation, despite the desire of the Trump administration to undermine and 
disregard it in practice. Perhaps this zero-sum game of refugee policy is one of the 
most enduring features of modern refugee crises. Although governments perpetually 
resist the external imposition of obligations for refugees and migrants, they consider it 
to be even more dangerous to be out of the loop altogether.
2
The striking similarities and familiar iconography of refugee crises throughout time 
have presented public commentators and historians with a peculiar conundrum, which 
this book necessarily grapples with: what, if anything, can we learn from previous 
refugee crises? What can history tell us about current population movements? In 
recent coverage, commentators have revelled in the apparent timelessness of refugee 
crises – concerning the plight of refugees as much as the processes that make people 
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flee their homes and turn them into refugees in the first place. As a result, they see 
themselves powerless in the face of seemingly unstoppable and ever-repeating history. 
As a post on Ghost Boat, a blog that investigates the disappearance of 243 migrants on 
a boat in the Mediterranean Sea in June 2014, put it: ‘Everything changes, but nothing 
changes at all. Refugees and migrants keep searching for an escape, and Europe keeps 
closing the doors. But underneath it all, the story stays the same.’27 
Journalists, politicians and other contemporary observers have also gone in search 
of historical yardsticks, often in the explicit hope that they can help them to identify, 
justify and encourage particular kinds of responses in the present. One supposed 
historical ‘precedent’ – the so-called Kindertransport (children’s transport) – has given 
comfort and encouragement to those arguing for greater compassion and more generous 
policies towards refugees arriving in Europe today. The term refers to the rescue efforts 
which brought around 10,000 mostly Jewish children from central Europe to the UK in 
late 1938 and 1939.28 In recent British parliamentary debates, these rescue efforts have 
been regularly evoked as evidence of Britain’s ‘proud tradition’ of support for ‘those 
fleeing persecution and seeking sanctuary’,29 often in conjunction with the argument 
that the UK should take responsibility for more new arrivals. The Kindertransport has 
also become a ‘teachable moment’ in the British history curriculum.30
Earlier this year, this ‘precedent’ was directly invoked in support of a proposal 
by Labour peer Lord Alfred Dubs, himself a former Kindertransport survivor, to 
allow unaccompanied child refugees already in Europe to come to Britain. Dubs’ 
Amendment 87 to the Immigration Bill proposed that the UK was to take in 3,000 of 
them. Although Dubs himself said he did not want to overstate the similarities between 
his own experiences as a child refugee and those of current unaccompanied children in 
Europe, he did not shy away from identifying a clear historical precedent for political 
purposes: ‘It was important, politically, to remember that Britain had set a strong 
humanitarian example in 1938, which undoubtedly saved the lives of many people 
who would otherwise have ended up in the gas chambers,’ he explained in a recent 
Guardian interview.31 Other child survivors from the Kindertransport, such as Aryeh 
Neier, co-founder of monitoring group Human Rights Watch, also lent their name to 
Dubs’ initiative. ‘During the Second World War, Britain did more than lead the way,’ 
Neier argued. ‘It accepted far more refugees than any other country. The British saw the 
danger. They saved my life, the life of my sister and the life of my family.’32
Evoking history here becomes a bargaining tool, an attempt to give moral weight 
to a contemporary project. As Labour MP Keir Starmer put it, ‘Lord Dubs arrived in 
this country in 1939 as an unaccompanied child under the Kindertransport system, 
so he speaks with particular authority.’33 However, the chapters in this book show that 
a strong moral case alone does not make for good history. The Kindertransport has 
been cemented as a ‘beacon’ in British consciousness largely as a result of selective 
memory; the reality was more complex and far less flattering. The Kindertransport 
was a rescue operation organized by a number of private, philanthropic and religious 
organizations, not an official state programme. Under pressure from these groups, 
Neville Chamberlain’s Conservative government temporarily waived immigration 
visa requirements for a limited number of unaccompanied children from central 
Europe. The organizations had to fund the operation and find sponsors and homes 
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for the children themselves; they stopped when their money ran out, and when the 
outbreak of war made their task impossible. Those children who were granted entry 
were admitted on the condition that their sponsors would bear all expenses of their 
accommodation, living and education, and guaranteed their emigration from Britain 
as soon as they could return to their families. Parents were not allowed to accompany 
the children. Many of those children later wrote about personal experiences of British 
anti-Semitism. In 1940, around 1,000 of these children were interned by the British 
authorities as so-called ‘enemy aliens’.34 
As Lyndsey Stonebridge recently argued, ‘We’re on shaky ground indeed if we think 
we simply need to retrieve a lost humanitarian impulse.’35 As a number of chapters in 
this book spell out, no European country in a position to offer shelter has reason to be 
proud of its history of rescue. Countries such as Britain and the United States did much 
to prevent immigration by turning desperate people away. In 1938, at a conference 
in the French spa town of Evian, delegations from thirty-two participating nations 
– Britain among them – failed to come to any agreement about accepting the Jewish 
refugees fleeing the Third Reich. Delegates were sympathetic to their plight, they said, 
and urged others to find a long-term solution, but were unwilling to ease their own 
immigration restrictions. The outbreak of war then made any joint agreement even 
more unlikely. Throughout this time, most European borders remained tightly shut, 
and millions of people were turned away, often to certain death. Comparisons of 1938 
with today might be justified, but are hardly a cause for celebration; for millions, much 
worse was to come. Nor was this wishful memory enough to win the argument in 
2016, as Lord Dubs’ amendment was initially defeated by a House of Commons vote. 
Eventually, an amended version was passed, but this no longer specified a number 
of unaccompanied children to be resettled in the UK, and instead provided for long 
consultations with local authorities who were to determine the final number. With 
limited funding available, few councils were keen to start a process of welcoming these 
children. By September 2016 still no child had arrived in the UK under the scheme.36
The Kindertransport is only one of the several popular ‘feel good’ historical 
precedents for the current migrants and refugee crisis. In recent years, commentators 
and refugee activists have identified and utilized other examples of past refugees 
receiving warm welcomes in the UK or other Western countries, such as the refugees 
leaving Hungary in the wake of the uprising of 1956; those fleeing the war in Vietnam 
in the course of the 1970s; the Ugandan Asians leaving after the Ugandan president 
Idi Amin expelled all Asians from the country in 1972; and the Bosnian refugees 
escaping the civil war following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The 
numbers of refugees taken in by various host countries, and the contexts in which their 
resettlements were agreed, varied widely in each of those cases, as did the strength of 
claims for a successful and emulatable ‘precedent’. Stripping historical yardsticks of 
their context renders them misleading and ultimately meaningless. 
In recent months, notably less upbeat historical precedents have gained currency, as 
examples from history are increasingly paraded not as an inspiration but as a cautionary 
tale. Comparisons with the 1930s abound and reflect the general gloom of 2016 – the 
year that saw a failed coup in Turkey, a worsening war in Syria, a British referendum 
vote to exit the European Union, the election of the anti-establishment, anti-liberal 
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Donald Trump as president of the United States, and accompanying economic turmoil. 
‘We think that the current macroeconomic environment has a number of significant 
similarities with the 1930s,’ a Bloomberg piece maintained in June 2016, ‘and the 
experiences then are particularly relevant for today.’37 A Forbes contributor agreed that 
there were a number of ‘scary similarities between now and the 1930s’, particularly as 
far as economic and geopolitical factors were concerned.38 An even bleaker reference 
to history was made by the president of the European Council and former Polish prime 
minister, Donald Tusk, in a speech at the European Policy Centre in August. Tusk 
referred to the 1930s as a great warning to liberals in the present about the spread of 
the ‘anti-liberal virus’ and the impending ‘disintegration of Europe, in a liberal and 
ideological sense’. ‘We remember from the past,’ Tusk went on, 
that in the most dramatic moment of our history, in the 1930s, the advocates of a 
liberal order gave up virtually without a fight, even though they had all the cards 
in their hands. Ordinary people turned their backs on them, seeing how weak and 
hesitant they were. People didn’t turn away from freedom because they were fed up 
with it. No, they simply lost faith that the freedom camp was able to put a stop to 
evil, however they understood it. They no longer believed that the moderate centre 
was a guarantee of security. And I am sure you remember who took their place.39
Refugees are playing a central role in these comparisons with the 1930s. For example, 
in October the Washington Post declared that Russian president Vladimir Putin was 
‘bringing back the 1930s’, and the migrant crisis was a crucial part of this. Europe has 
been ‘politically destabilized and socially convulsed by the arrival of a million Syrian 
migrants seeking asylum’, the argument went, with the consequence of ‘undermining 
the West’s confident sense of itself ’, and thereby directly playing into Putin’s hand. 
As a result, it concluded, in ‘many worrisome ways, the 1930s are being reprised. In 
Europe, Russia is playing the role of Germany in fomenting anti-democratic factions. 
In inward-turning, distracted America, the role of Charles Lindbergh is played by a 
presidential candidate smitten by Putin and too ignorant to know the pedigree of his 
slogan “America First”. ’40 In another Washington Post article, Ishaan Tharoor juxtaposed 
British tabloid coverage of the flight of tens of thousands of stateless people and Jews 
in the 1930s with more recent discussions about the influx of Muslim refugees. ‘It’s 
important to recognize that this is hardly the first time the West has warily eyed masses 
of refugees,’ Tharoor explained. ‘The xenophobia of the present carries direct echoes 
of a very different moment: The years before World War II, when tens of thousands of 
German Jews were compelled to flee Nazi Germany.’41 Daniel Victor in the New York 
Times identified similar historical parallels, and concluded that although the groups of 
today’s Syrians and the Jews of the 1930s were not identical, there was a clear ‘moral 
connection’ and crucial ‘lessons to be drawn’.42
So it is clear that commentators regularly invoke history to explain current 
developments. They also frequently look to historians to provide answers and make 
explicit links between past and present, and the migrant crisis is no exception. During 
our preparations in 2012 for a special issue on ‘Refugees and the Nation-State in Europe’, 
we were asked whether it was ‘possible for historians to suffer from refugee fatigue’43 – 
notably, that question has not come up again since. But what do historians have to offer 
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in the current search for historical yardsticks that can explain the present? History 
matters; that seems a truism. And indeed, a number of the historical comparisons 
currently circulating seem very apt: the 1930s was the last time that globalization 
was in retreat, and refugee crises were an important part of those developments, as 
they are now. However, the process of using history to explain what is going on today 
is a complicated and often very unsatisfactory one; it is a road full of potholes and 
diversions. Examples from history can suggest alternatives (both better and worse) to 
the status quo. But every historical precedent has a particular context, without which 
it becomes ambiguous and inaccurate. Historians have to identify both the particular 
and the ways in which the particular can be transcended. As Jane Caplan has argued in 
a blog post about the election of Donald Trump: 
Anyone who studies modern history always has at least one corner of one eye 
trained on the present; and there are moments when the encounter between 
present and past suddenly forces itself to the centre of our field of vision. The 
moment of Trump is one of these. But this eruption does not mean simply that we 
should paste bits of the past onto the present and see if they fit. The point is how 
the history we already know can be used to make sense of the present.44
The migrant crisis and unravelling of familiar national and international structures 
is all around us. Nonetheless, the contributors in this book deliberately shy away 
from a facile reading of the present into the past, and instead set out to identify and 
understand broader patterns and dynamics of the refugee crises of the early and mid-
twentieth century. Some of those patterns and dynamics will undoubtedly be useful for 
understanding our present world.
3
History matters, perhaps, but do academic historians? Traditionally, historians have 
made only a scant contribution to the wider field of refugee and forced migration studies 
that emerged in the 1980s. Historians of Europe have been particularly absent. Reasons 
include the fact that the main sites of displacement and reception have for some time 
now been outside of Europe. There has also been an overwhelming presentism within 
the field of refugee studies, which tends to focus on current policy and practice at the 
expense of understanding past migrations. These factors help explain why, despite its 
origins in Europe and the centrality of the continent to the early history of refugees, 
the labels ‘Europe(an)’ and ‘refugees’ had largely become uncoupled by the 1980s. 
But they also point to the reasons why academic historians have not played a more 
prominent role in narrating the bigger picture of how and why refugees become a 
matter of international politics over the course of the twentieth century – of how, in 
other words, we got to where we are now. Tellingly, in a 2007 overview of sixty years of 
scholarship that led to the emergence of the field of refugee studies, only a handful of 
historians were included among the dozens of scholars surveyed.45 Until quite recently, 
the flagship academic journals in refugee studies – a diverse field that traverses 
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international relations, political science, law, sociology and anthropology, as well as 
other disciplines – contained very few articles on ‘historical issues’, and almost none 
by historians.46 Efforts to remedy the liminal role of historians in the field of refugee 
studies often seem half-hearted and ineffective, and those appealing for the inclusion 
of more history sometimes are guilty of the same sins of omission that they level at 
others.47 The 2014 Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies includes 
a chapter by a historian who makes a convincing case for ‘meaningful engagement’ 
between historians and the ‘wider refugee and forced migration studies community’ 
– who, he says, need to ‘start taking history seriously’.48 But the fact that it is one of 
only two contributions from historians in a collected work of over fifty scholars goes 
to show how much distance there is still to cover to make this ‘ahistorical field’ less 
‘averse to history’.49
From the other side of the disciplinary divide, the impression given by historians 
is that they have mostly ignored refugee movements and failed to integrate them 
into ‘mainstream history’, in contrast to other previously marginalized groups.50 But 
if you knew where to look, you could always find historians writing about refugees 
in some contexts. More often than not, this work is positioned within and speaks to 
nation-state-bounded historiographies. For example, the work undertaken since the 
1980s by historians of Germany on the impact of migration on German history and the 
integration of successive waves of refugees in the post-war decades is extensive.51 Other 
national historiographies have similarly shed light on the roles played by refugees and 
refugee crises during key chapters of national history.52 In fact, historians of Europe 
have long been writing about refugees, refugees crises and related displacements, even 
before the fractures created by the end of the Cold War reawakened scholarly and 
popular interest in the ‘dark side’ of the nation-state and democracy in Europe. 
Even if this literature undeniably existed before 1989 and 1991, the events of the 
late 1990s and beyond did much to revive historians’ interest in population movements 
more generally and on a broader scale. In the search for continuity and antecedents 
for the violence and displacement following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union and the return of hyper-nationalism and the clamour for statehood, historians 
frequently returned to the years before the Cold War froze borders, ethnicities and 
national identities, and found a (distorted) mirror image in the 1940s. As scholarly 
research on the 1940s blossomed in the last decade of the twentieth century and the 
first of the twenty first, so, too, did research and publications on the vast displacement 
of population that accompanied the end of the Second World War. A particular focus 
of many of these studies was the so-called Displaced Persons (DP) problem in Europe 
and the interaction of national and international initiatives to protect and ‘rehabilitate’ 
these populations, whose numbers ran into several millions. 
Our own interests originally came from a similar source. As historians of mid-
twentieth-century Europe who were both working on projects on the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War in central Europe – the epicentre of mid-century 
displacement and the DP crisis – we were both struck at the time, now almost a 
decade ago, on the one hand, by the growing body of research on displacement, 
particularly on the lives and post-1945 experiences of some groups of DPs, and, on 
the other, by the lack of a common framework for understanding the phenomenon 
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of mass displacement in twentieth-century Europe. Much of this work was original 
and exciting, tapping into new archival material, not only from the former Eastern 
bloc but also from international institutions whose archives had been underutilized 
or had had restricted access. But in spite of growing academic interest in both world 
wars and post-war periods, there was still no consistent historiography that placed 
the many different kinds of refugees, migrants and uprooted people within a common 
framework, or situated the often conflicting national and international priorities in 
the management of the refugee threat within their wider historical context; it was 
mostly episodic or nationally bounded or concerned with a specific group of displaced 
people or sites of displacement. The last attempt at a grand narrative – Michael 
Marrus’s influential The Unwanted – was by this point, in 2009, over two decades 
old. Although it remained (and remains) an important entry point to many themes 
central to the study of refugees in twentieth-century Europe – and perhaps more 
importantly a highly accessible and readable one – its focus rested primarily with 
the experience of Jewish refugees in the 1930s and 1940s.53 The last major academic 
conference of historians on refugees, and the essay collection emerging from one, also 
dated back to the mid-1980s.54 We felt that an international symposium that brought 
together the latest research on attempts to manage the many different refugee groups 
in twentieth-century Europe, with particular reference to the initiatives and work 
conducted by the United Nations, its precursor organizations and other international 
bodies, was long overdue.
The resulting conference in London in September 2010 coincided with the fiftieth 
anniversary of the United Nations’ first-ever ‘World Refugee Year’ (WRY) of 1959–
60, an initiative designed to raise funds for the cash-strapped UNHCR and heighten 
awareness of international efforts in support of refugees.55 We considered WRY to be 
a fitting marker from which to survey the turbulent and crucial middle decades of 
Europe’s twentieth century, which had seen many millions of people on the move. As 
well as having the aim of drawing a line under the post-war European refugee problem 
by resettling the remaining core of the wartime displaced still languishing in refugee 
camps, WRY also signalled that refugees were no longer strictly a European problem, 
nor a temporary one that could be dealt with by various piecemeal, largely technical 
and ad hoc, solutions. In reassessing the development of national, and increasingly 
international, responses to the problem of refugees, and examining the parameters, 
consequences and implications of policies, from the First World War until the late 
1950s, the conference examined the role that European refugee crises played in 
the creation of the new international architecture after 1919 and the following four 
decades. Much of the debate centred on the question of when, why and how focus 
shifted from the identification of an apparently European refugee problem to a global 
one during what we termed the ‘forty years’ crisis’.
Since that conference took place, there has been a steady growth of research and 
publications on the history of refugees from multiple perspectives, a number of which 
were first tested out as works-in-progress at the London conference. Refugee-related 
articles have begun to appear with greater frequency in Anglophone general history 
journals,56 as well as in refugee studies publications.57 Recent interest from publishers 
and journals suggests that the ongoing ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe will act as a spur to 
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further academic inquiry into the origins, course and significance of refugee crises 
past and present, in the same way that the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s revived 
interest in earlier cases.58 But although it is certainly easier today to make the case 
that the history of refugees matters, the fragmentation of the causes, experiences and 
consequences of migration and displacement still limits our understanding of why 
and how it does.59 
This is where we hope this book will make a positive contribution. By presenting 
research on a range of different contexts of refugee policy and groups of refugees 
in one book, we hope to shed light on the common assumptions and frameworks 
that underpinned the history of refugees and refugee policy throughout the period 
under consideration. In commissioning the case studies for this book, we decided 
to retain the idea of a ‘forty years’ crisis’ as a tool for conceptualizing the succession 
of refugee crises of European origin during the tumultuous half century of military 
and diplomatic conflict from the end of the First World War to the late 1950s. Our 
debt here obviously is to E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis, first published in 1939. 
We have borrowed his central conceit as a way of presenting the two post-war eras 
as a single ‘crisis’ of the established order, and through it to explore the continuities 
and disjunctures across the period, and to challenge established historiographical 
certainties and master narratives.60 Although Carr in his writings did not concern 
himself with the ‘refugee problem’, as it was then becoming known, his abiding interest 
in the nation-state and the difficulty of maintaining an international equilibrium in 
a system of proliferating and competing nation-states is a fitting one for the study of 
the international history of refugees.61 As the authors in this book make abundantly 
clear, the rise of the nation-state is central to understanding the creation of refugees 
as an international problem from the early twentieth century onwards. Indeed, Carr 
understood acutely what the Versailles order meant for the nationalities of central and 
eastern Europe, many of whom would become minorities in the new state system, 
and thereby refugees-in-waiting. As a member of the British delegation at what he 
later called the ‘fiasco’ of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he had been partly 
responsible for shaping the legal mechanisms to safeguard threatened populations in 
the new ‘immature’ states of east-central Europe – the so-called ‘Minorities Treaties’, 
which first Poland, and then thirteen other states, were obliged to sign as a condition of 
international acceptance of statehood and/or territorial expansion.62 As we know from 
the discussions at Paris in 1919, it was largely a fear that these new minorities would 
become refugees that led to the massive expansion of international minority rights, 
and the minorities rights regime became one of the principal preventative mechanisms 
for managing the refugee problem internationally for at least the first decade and a half 
afterwards.63 That this innovation failed, as had the other ‘utopian’ innovations of Paris, 
served in the eyes of Carr as proof of the bankruptcy and short-sightedness of the 
liberal order, in this as in so many other areas, and further convinced him of the fallacy 
of the principle of national self-determination in contemporary Europe.64 As he wrote 
in his short 1945 study Nationalism and After, the vast displacement of populations 
accompanying the tracing of European frontiers was ‘the most explicit exaltation of 
the nation over the individual as an end in itself, the mass sacrifice of human beings to 
the idol of nationalism.’65
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We are by no means unique in employing Carr’s device of a single ‘crisis’ in order 
to impose a periodization on a set of related international developments.66 Nor are we 
blind to the limitations of such an approach. We had always considered the idea of a 
‘forty years’ crisis’ as a useful tool for opening up discussion about periodization and 
causation, and it is for this reason that we have asked the contributors to this book to 
reflect on the utility and limitations of this frame for understanding the development 
of national and international responses to refugees in the twentieth century. As Zara 
Steiner, one of the leading practitioners of diplomatic and international history of the 
last fifty years, argues in her chapter, the idea of a ‘forty years’ crisis’ certainly has its 
merits, but it also imposes a somewhat counter-intuitive periodization on the first half 
of the twentieth century. Steiner instead offers an alternative chronology that reaches 
back to the late nineteenth century and the pogroms in Russia, the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and mass immigration to the New World. The ‘refugee problem’ 
formed not so much an overarching crisis as a succession of distinct crises, each 
shaped by their own dynamic. It is, in Steiner’s view, a history that is as cyclical as it is 
linear. ‘There is no Whig history of the refugee problem,’ she argues, as much as current 
writers and consumers of ‘feel good’ refugee history are trying to argue otherwise. 
Other contributors to this book have also tested the temporal and geographical 
parameters we have laid out. Jared Manasek’s chapter looks to the mid-nineteenth-
century displacements in the Ottoman Empire for origins of twentieth-century 
patterns and helpfully cautions that ‘no single line of historical development can be 
drawn between the imperial and post-imperial refugee’. Glen Peterson, meanwhile, 
warns of the limitations of studying the ‘forty years’ crisis’ solely from a European 
perspective and offers instead an ‘alternative history of the international refugee regime’ 
that foregrounds the colonial origins of international law and the global history of 
population displacement. Seen from the perspective of the United States, the very idea 
of a ‘forty years’ crisis,’ Carl Bon Tempo argues persuasively, is a ‘misnomer’, given that 
American isolationism and restrictive immigration policy ‘put … [it] on the side-lines’ 
for the first two decades.
What, then, for the purposes of discussion, was the ‘crisis’? It was above all a crisis 
of a European-dominated international order of nation-states, in the face of successive 
refugee crises, which were both the direct consequence of that system and a challenge 
to it to deal with populations that were ‘forced … into the gaps between nation-states’, 
as one scholar has elsewhere put it.67 The nature of refugee crises, and national and 
international responses to them, changed fundamentally in the period between the 
end of the First World War, which inaugurated a series of new international structures 
and policies, and the late 1950s when Europe’s home-grown refugee problems were 
supposedly ‘solved’. By 1960, focus had shifted from the identification of an apparently 
European refugee problem to a global one. The authors identify a series of key events and 
tipping points in this narrative, such as the appointment of Fridtjof Nansen as head of the 
first international refugee agency in 1921, as well as his death in 1930; the 1933 Refugee 
Convention; James McDonald’s widely publicized resignation as High Commissioner 
for Refugees Coming from Germany in 1935; the Evian conference of 1938; the outbreak 
of the Second World War in 1939; a number of the wartime meetings of the wartime 
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Allies, such as the Bermuda Conference in 1943; the 1951 Refugee Convention; or 
World Refugee Year itself in 1959–60.
The continuities of the parameters of national and international refugee policies, 
and the basic pillars and assumptions upon which they rested, are striking. What Peter 
Gatrell in his chapter calls the ‘threads’ that connect countries, ideas and personnel 
run through the seemingly disparate and ad hoc responses to successive mid-century 
refugee crises. While global in its reach and responsibilities, the institutions and 
practices of the international refugee regime nevertheless remained predominantly 
European in origin. Gatrell and Tony Kushner both identify long-standing assumptions 
that underpinned the period, such as that refugees were invariably a threat and nuisance 
to their hosts and had limited rights that could be dispensed with, if necessary. Or 
as Manasek points out, already in the mid-nineteenth century it was clear to French 
lawmakers that ‘refugees were people whose presence came at a cost to the host’. 
Occasionally, the chapters offer glimpses into another world, for example the Ottoman 
government’s hope that incoming refugees could help to strengthen border security 
and agricultural industry (Manasek), or the realization by a number of governments 
in 1945 that refugees could be of significant economic benefit (Reinisch), as they had 
been in Greece in the 1920s (Frank). However, here, too, not all refugees were equal. 
While governments could see the usefulness of young, healthy and white refugees, few 
of them wanted those of other skin colours, let alone those who were old or sick, who 
soon made up that immovable ‘hard core’ that, eventually, campaigns such as WRY 
attempted to dislodge.
As the chapters in this book show, the story of the ‘forty years’ crisis’ can be 
told in very different ways: as one of upheaval, disintegration and suffering, or 
as one of newly emerging national and international solutions and possibilities; 
as a ‘top-down’ history of nations, institutions and policies (Metzger on interwar 
rights; Frank on group resettlement; Reinisch on UNRRA), or as a ‘bottom-up’ 
history of refugees, relief workers and refugee advocates (Kushner on refugee 
history); as a story of a specific population groups (Levene on Jews) or of states 
and their increasing involvement and entanglement with developments in Europe 
(Bon Tempo on the United States); or of who was not a refugee, as much as who 
was (Eldridge on France and Algeria). This book’s principal aim is to put these 
different perspectives into the same frame and encourage the identification 
of linkages. At its core for the period under study, it remains, however, a story 
centred on and defined by Europe and the experience of European states and 
populations. ‘Quite simply’, as Bon Tempo writes in his chapter, ‘there would not 
have been an American refugee regime without the European refugee problems of 
the mid-twentieth century’. The ‘forty years’ crisis’ provides further evidence, then, 
of how ‘European history was written into the world’ and onto the international 
institutions that helped construct and maintain the idea of an interconnected 
world in a post-European age.68 
21 November 2016 
Jessica Reinisch and Matthew Frank
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Refugees: The Timeless Problem
Zara Steiner
Smash open an ant hill and the ants will scatter irretrievably. Two world wars, systematic 
deportations and the monstrosities of ethnic cleaning have uprooted millions of 
people. Across the planet, men, women and children are in turbulent motion. Call 
them refugees, displaced persons, migrants, stateless, they share a common destiny. 
Classical categories no longer apply. Camps, barbed wire, the bureaucracy of border 
controls, the erection of walls and forced repatriation are almost absurdly ineffective 
in the face of fear, economic need and despair. This is the age of the ‘unhoused’. The 
ancient Greek word was atopos: nowhere at home can signify a curse, or in some cases, 
a blessing.
This book considers refugees in Europe in the four decades following the end of 
the First World War. However, as starting and closing dates for the European refugee 
crisis, 1919 and 1959 are highly problematic. There is nothing new about the condition 
of the refugee, only semantic changes as the causes of displacement alter. The story of 
the exile – the expelled forced to wander, and their reception outside the city gates 
– is one of the basic myths of Western civilization. The Odyssey underlines every 
aspect of the history of the twentieth-century refugee. Even the mass expulsion of 
unwanted groups has a long history – the Jews from Spain in 1492; the Huguenots 
(French Protestants) who fled France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
in 1685. With the development of modern states came an even clearer distinction 
between insider and outsider. The French Revolution established new dividing lines 
between citizens and émigrés/exiles/refugees. Only the citizen could claim natural and 
inalienable rights as defined in 1789. And from the seventeenth century onwards, as 
Paul W. Schroeder has so brilliantly shown, for purposes of convenience and security, 
states began to recognize certain rules and conventions that naturally affected the 
status of the expelled.1 The nineteenth-century conception of nationalism brought 
new distinctions between those groups living together in territorial units with defined 
borders. They might or might not share common histories, languages and ethnic 
origins – real or imaginary.
It was perhaps fortunate that along with the development of the nation-state and the 
strengthening of the concept of nationalism, which often resulted in violent attacks on 
the ‘other,’ the industrialization of western Europe and the United States encouraged 
the flow of immigrants from East to West and from Europe to the United States. Such 
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movements admittedly stimulated and spread the nativist, anti-immigrant and anti-
Semitic sentiments, which, in part, had caused the outflow in the first place. Even using 
the dictionary definition of the term ‘refugee’ before 1951, that is, ‘a person forced to 
leave his country for elsewhere because of religious or political persecution,’ we can move 
the date of the modern European refugee crisis backwards, possibly to the movement of 
Jews from Tsarist Russia to western Europe to escape the pogroms of the late nineteenth 
century, pogroms that were of a different character than those of earlier periods; or to 
the refugees leaving during the Balkan crises at the very start of the twentieth century. 
Or we might begin with the flow of Russian refugees after 1917, a forced emigration that 
played a significant role in the popular imagination and which became so important for 
the young League of Nations. Some choose an alternative date, 1922, which witnessed 
the huge movement of people coming out of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Entire 
populations were menaced or forced to migrate because of political, religious or ethnic 
ties. These migrations, including the forced exchange of populations, were closer to the 
plight and condition of the ‘typical refugee’ of today.
As a closing date, 1959 is even more problematic. It is true that by this time there 
were relatively small numbers of refugees living in collective centres, or, in any case, 
in non-permanent abodes, in western Europe. Most had come from eastern Europe 
but many were ethnic Germans. The number is estimated as less than 10,000 and their 
cases were handled on an individual basis, with local integration offered as the chief 
solution. By 1960, the ‘Year of the Refugee,’ the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) had set the coming year as a target to get rid of all the residual 
refugee accommodation centres, seen by many as the prelude to winding down the 
UNHCR itself. The argument made was that the crisis was over or else had taken on 
another definition, that of non-European refugees trying to get into Europe. We now 
know that this was just the close of one chapter in the European refugee story and, as I 
shall argue, the prelude to another, even within Europe. European countries, however, 
could not escape from the causes and consequences of the waves of refugees coming 
from Africa and Asia however much they would have liked to close their doors.
To speak of a beginning and end of the European refugee crisis would suggest a linear 
development, which neither was nor is the case. Rather, a series of catastrophic events 
(for some), either arising from changes in Europe or in the international environment, 
called for some form of action. Some groups and states worked out new responses 
and initiated experimental techniques in handling these later refugees. Others merely 
adopted old solutions, even when knowing of their limited value, in dealing with 
earlier crises. Worse still, there were times when there was no response at all. Neither 
individuals nor governments necessarily learn from experience. New institutions may 
be created but they do not generally develop greater competencies than the ones they 
replace. Changes in the nature of the refugee crisis have required different definitions 
and pose challenges for which no solutions have been found. The 1951 effort to create 
a general definition of the refugee was built on the experiences of the Second World 
War and the immediate post-war era, but it soon proved inadequate. Different from the 
protective measures included in the minorities treaties after the Great War, the treaty 
makers made the individual the centre of their concern, and not minorities, though 
this was still a state-bounded convention. The adopted definition is as follows: 
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a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his habitual residence as a result of 
such events is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.2
Such a definition allows the state, and not, as in the case of the earlier minorities 
treaties, an international organization (the League of Nations), to retain a high level of 
subjectivity when deciding whether any asylum seeker really has a well-founded fear of 
persecution or not. Perhaps more pertinent to those who suffer forced migration today, 
the definition does not take into account the complex, sometimes complimentary, or 
even contradictory, reasons why a person or family decides to leave his country of 
birth or residence. For some, fear, but also the hope of economic betterment, schooling 
for children, welfare provisions, physical safety, or any combination of these factors 
and others, may contribute to the sense of having been forced to leave. And, of course, 
the definition adopted in 1951 declared refugees only as those coming from Europe, 
and/or those who actually managed to cross a national border in order to escape 
from the ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution. This is part of the reason why there has 
been such a proliferation of descriptions, ‘internally displaced persons’ or ‘climate 
refugees’ of those who leave. Nor does the 1951 Convention, nor indeed any of the 
texts before 1959, refer to the fact that refugee populations, as the 1969 Charter on 
Refugees adopted by the African Union later recognized, can be very destabilizing, 
and threatening both to the countries from which they leave and those they enter. The 
arming of refugee camps, unacceptable competition for resources, religious fanaticism 
among the refugees or their hosts have led to seditious and violent actions.
The limitations of these earlier conventions resulted in the search for new additions 
even before the ink was dry. The above-mentioned Charter of the African Union 
enlarged the definition of ‘refugee’ to include anyone leaving his or her country owing 
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or ‘events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality’.3 In 1984, 
a group of Latin American governments adopted a declaration which tried to give 
greater objectivity to the 1951 definition of refugee.4 The term should include persons 
who flee their countries because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened 
by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of 
human rights or any other circumstances which have disturbed the public order. 
Today, any new definition would have to take in actions which would further erode 
the distinctions made between refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) or 
environmental refugees. Admittedly, the prohibition of ‘forcible return’ found in the 
1951 Convention has become part of international law. This means that even states not 
privy to the 1951 act are obliged under customary law to respect the principle of non-
refoulement. The sanctions which require states to uphold this principle tend to be 
pragmatic. It is assumed that governments exist (not always true) or have a minimum 
level of competence and have an interest in being respected by other states. They have 
to accept the rules and conventions which all the other actors have sanctioned, even if 
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such states are run by a corrupt or incompetent government or one which is incapable 
of helping their own people. This is a contemporary problem, barely glimpsed in the 
post-war world of 1919 and not really understood in 1951.
What the chapters in this book demonstrate is the erratic nature of the refugee 
problem in Europe, its reappearance when reformers thought it would vanish, and the 
various forms this reappearance has taken. It follows from this account that the multiple 
attempts to deal with a question which has both internal and external consequences 
hardly charts a consistent line of development. No Whig history of refugee law is possible. 
The following examples illustrate only some of the chief crises and suggested solutions 
of the past. We know, for instance, when faced with the refugee problems created by the 
Russian Revolution and the Great War, the efforts of a few active individuals, like the 
Norwegian explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, could make all the difference. Operating under 
the League umbrella, and it was a very small umbrella, Nansen not only raised the 
funds but also negotiated the exit and the placing of hundreds of thousands of displaced 
persons during the 1920s. The settlement of the White Russians (though there were 
many reasons why France, in particular, was willing to accept large numbers) proved 
possible, but Nansen was less successful when it came to the Armenians and considered 
his failure to raise the necessary money to rescue them one of the greatest failures of his 
humanitarian crusade. The Nansen protection system, and the Nansen certificates, then 
passports, still in use, provided stateless refugees with a form of identification. In one 
important, but, alas, exceptional case, the coverage of the Nansen system was extended. 
In 1935, about 7,000 refugees were forced to leave the Saar. France, which acted as 
the host country, was able to enlarge the terms of eligibility beyond that of national 
affiliation. Provision was made to extend the Nansen protection system for people who 
potentially found themselves outside their home country, not as a consequence of war, 
but because of a political system that violated human rights. 
Though there is still an intense debate about the minorities treaties and protection 
system adopted in 1919, it is fair to say that this was a step forward in extending 
the responsibilities of the international regime. Much has been written about the 
limitations of the system, its restriction to a special category of states and operating 
within narrowly drawn limits. The appeals process was cumbersome and the whole 
system favoured the state rather than those appealing against the violation of their 
rights. Yet it provided the basis for some form of legal protection for minority rights 
within the nation-state. The peacemakers, in creating states based on the principles of 
self-determination, realized that they had created new national minorities requiring 
protection against forms of discrimination by the ruling majority. The minorities 
treaties, most of which were concluded with the eastern European states or with the 
new Middle Eastern nations, did not apply to any of the victor powers. The treaties 
guaranteed not only the political and judicial rights of minorities but also provided 
legal protection for the free exercise of religious, linguistic, educational and cultural 
practices. The Polish treaty, a response to the recent pogroms in Poland, became the 
model for all the other treaties. David Vital has pointed out that this was the first time 
that the interests of the Jews as Jews were considered, both as individuals and as a 
collective.5 This remarkable recognition of the peculiarities and vulnerabilities of the 
Jews was and remained unique. 
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The system had some successes but also failures. Most of the states in eastern Europe 
abandoned democratic practices and were ruled by authoritarian governments which 
pursued centralizing policies and adopted legislative programmes discriminating 
against their national minorities. Even where democratic practices continued, as in 
Czechoslovakia, the hopes of the peacemakers that assimilation and the growth of 
toleration would ease the problems of the multinational state, proved illusory. The 
dominant nationalities ensured their continued political supremacy and discriminatory 
legislation was the rule rather than the exception. The sovereign state, the cornerstone 
of the League of Nations, proved to be both the begetter and the gravedigger of hopes 
to extend the fabric of internationalism. Paradoxically, during the 1920s, the Germans 
became the main spokesmen for minority rights. A majority of the petitions reaching 
the Minorities Commission came from the German minority living in Poland under 
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.
It should be remembered, that during the 1920s, relatively large numbers of refugees 
were resettled with the help of the League of Nations. Some of the host countries were able 
to deal with the traumas of forced repatriation and managed to rehouse their newcomers. 
The Greeks, with financial help from the League of Nations, were host to almost 1.4 
million refugees including old men, women and children. The chief blow to the permanent 
settlement of the refugee question came from the introduction of the US Immigration 
Act in 1924, which restricted entry to the United States and was aimed at cutting the 
numbers of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe as well as prohibiting the 
immigration of some groups entirely. As the United States was the favoured destination 
for most Europeans needing or wanting to leave their countries of birth, this became a 
major problem as the world depression deepened and spread. By the time of Nansen’s 
death in 1930, nonetheless, it was thought that the Nansen Office, limited in its number of 
employees and always short of funds, could handle the refugees who remained in Europe 
and that the major European refugee problem was coming to its end. 
History is never so simple. The spreading world depression and the arrival of Adolf 
Hitler in 1933 instituted a new chapter in the saga of the European refugee question. The 
former restricted the willingness of states to accept any new refugees; the latter resulted 
in four major waves of Jewish refugees coming out of Germany and the expanded 
Third Reich. After an initial flight following Hitler’s accession to power, mainly to 
neighbouring European countries and with a clear intention to return to Germany 
when conditions improved, some 20,000–25,000 German Jews left the Reich in each 
succeeding year until the late 1930s. By the summer of 1935, two-thirds of those who 
left had been resettled, some 27,000 went to Palestine and 6,000 to the United States. 
While anxious to be rid of their ‘parasites,’ the Nazis not only imposed a heavy ‘flight 
tax’ on those who left but also did not want to release the foreign exchange needed to 
fulfil many foreign visa requirements. Neither the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws 
nor the new Reich Citizenship Law in 1935, both aimed at isolating and impoverishing 
the Jews, led to a massive increase in emigration. On the contrary, many Jews, like 
some Germans, believed that the new laws, by drawing a clear line between Jews and 
Germans, would halt the frequent acts of violence within the Reich. Some Jews who 
had left actually returned. Among those who had fled, many stayed in Europe, still 
hoping that conditions in Germany would improve and that they could go back. It was 
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due to Anschluss and Kristallnacht in 1938 that the relatively ordered expulsion of Jews 
gave way to a flood of refugees searching for places of safety and refuge.
No means were found, as happened with the White Russians and later with 
the Spanish Loyalists, to deal with the Jewish refugee problem. In 1930, a new and 
autonomous Nansen International Office for Refugees was created with a minute 
administrative budget. The Assembly of the League decided at the same time that it 
would be closed down at the end of 1938 on the assumption that that refugee problem 
was a temporary one for which solutions could be found. However, the advent of the 
Nazis raised the possibility that a new stream of refugees could be expected. Before 
Germany left the League in October 1933, an agreement was reached that a separate 
organization, only indirectly connected with the League, would be created for the 
German refugees. To underline its separate existence, it was located in Lausanne 
and an American, James G. McDonald, was made the new High Commissioner for 
Refugees. McDonald proved to be far more active than his appointees had hoped. 
Without League backing, he found himself at a serious disadvantage in finding places 
of refuge; many countries, because of the Depression, were raising new barriers to 
immigration. The High Commissioner’s office did manage to resettle almost two-thirds 
of the refugees leaving Germany between 1933 and 1935, but McDonald knew that 
the problem would become increasingly difficult. His efforts to rouse the international 
community to take action in Berlin proved fruitless. No government would consider 
such collective action. It was not believed that any country should interfere in the 
domestic affairs of another sovereign state, least of all in such a powerful country as 
Germany. McDonald’s plea in his resignation letter that the German refugee office 
should be brought, at least, directly under League control proved more acceptable, 
but the next appointees as High Commissioner were either weak or felt unable to do 
anything concrete for the relief of the Jews. 
This tragic story included many missed opportunities. It is only necessary to look at 
the proceedings of the Evian Conference (6–15 July 1938) called by President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, and attended by representatives from thirty-two governments and thirty-
nine private charitable organizations, to recall the multitude of reasons given, even by 
governments which had previously received refugees, including Jews, for their inability 
to accept the thousands pouring out of the Greater Reich. Traditional and heightened 
anti-Semitism (little surprise that the Nazis hailed the Evian proceedings as absolving 
them from any particular blame for the persecution of the Jews), fear of confronting 
a powerful nation clearly on the rise, the large number of natives unemployed, the 
apprehension that their governments would have to take on the burden of relief and 
sustenance for the penniless Jews determined the outcome. With one or two exceptions, 
no state could find room for the ‘unwanted’ within its own borders. Nor were the efforts 
to raise the funds that might have paid the Nazis for assisting the emigration of their 
unwanted Jews successful. Even Jewish organizations in the United States, the most 
active groups in assisting the refugees, were reluctant to pay the sums demanded by the 
Reich authorities, a blackmail, which continued even after war was declared. In 1941, 
the Romanian government put a price on their 70,000 Jews – $1,300 for each refugee. 
As the Reich Jews became more and more desperate and private organizations, mainly 
but not exclusively Jewish, brought increasing pressure on their governments, some of 
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the latter agreed to take more Jewish refugees, especially children, into their countries. 
The change in British policy was dramatic, partly in compensation for the severe cut in 
Jewish immigration to Palestine as a result of the White Paper of 17 May 1939. At the 
time of the Evian Conference, some 8,000 refugees had been admitted; by the outbreak 
of war, some 40,000 Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria as well as 7,000 from 
former Czechoslovakia had entered the country. Most were expected to move on to the 
United States, but the war intervened and the majority were given residence in the UK. 
The United States became the main place of refuge; the months between March 1938 
and September 1939 marked the high point in US immigration policy with about 20,000 
Germans admitted monthly under the quota system. Most were Jews or Germans of 
Jewish descent. This expanded entry created its own problems; opinion polls recorded 
an increase in anti-Semitic sentiment in both the United States and Britain. In 1933, 
according to German records, there were approximately 525,000 Jews in Germany; by 
the start of the war the number had dropped to well under half. At the start of 1938, 
180,000 Jews lived in Austria; by July 1939, 97,000 had fled. Compared to recent refugee 
flows, the number seems almost small. Western governments did not confront Hitler 
because of the Jews. Apart from Germany, the refugee problem was never given a high 
priority in the capitals of the West. Few statesmen believed that the abuse of human 
rights was the concern of the international community. Hitler had turned back the 
international clock; the League’s refugee regime could not respond to his challenge.
The rest is history. The descent into barbarism and the implosion of European 
civilization has left a permanent scar on Europe’s post-war history, tarnishing prewar 
claims to moral superiority. The old Europe, which as the late Tony Judt, quoting 
Tadeusz Borowski, has reminded us, was ‘an incredible, almost comical, melting pot of 
people and nationalities, sizzling dangerously in the very heart of Europe,’ vanished.6 
This old patchwork quilt, though periodically rent with massacres, pogroms and floods 
of refugees, was torn to shreds. In post-1945 Europe, thanks to the war, boundary 
adjustments, expulsions and genocide, hermetic national enclaves emerged, where 
any surviving minorities were too insignificant to challenge or disturb the prevailing 
political and cultural mainstream. Only a few countries, among them the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, stood aside from this new seemingly collection of uni-national states.
Once again, despite the Shoah – and few had anticipated, even in 1941, the horrors 
that were to come – there were renewed hopes that the latest streams of refugees and 
displaced persons (an important distinction in terms of refugee policy) could be assisted 
and repatriated in the countries from which they had originally come. We are talking 
about thirty million people (the number much disputed): ethnic Germans sent out 
from the Baltic, from Poland and Czechoslovakia; Jews released from the concentration 
camps; people displaced by the bombings and the destruction of war; and those fleeing 
from the triumphant Red Army. During the years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, 
Europe was ‘choked with refugees’. The Allies, led by the Americans, who alone had 
the material means to deal with this avalanche, looked to the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (IGCR), one of the few bodies created at the time of the 
Evian Conference and still functioning when war broke out, the newly formed United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), with Soviet as well as 
other Allied representatives, and finally the International Refugee Organization (IRO), 
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to repatriate the displaced. Some 5.25 million people were resettled or repatriated, but 
one can only despair at the innocence of the organizers who thought their task would 
be a limited one. Many refugees did not want to be repatriated; the forced return of 
Russians to the Soviet Union, admittedly in return for the far fewer number of Western 
prisoners of war, troubled the conscience of many Western statesmen for many years 
to come, as Harold Macmillan’s memoirs clearly show.7 Others could not be repatriated 
because their homelands no longer existed, and some had neither the mental nor 
physical strength to deal with the repatriation process. Until the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, thousands of Jews were kept in detention centres waiting to leave. The 
so-called ‘hard-core refugees’ remained in the camps. Even the establishment of the 
state of Israel did not solve the problem of the Jewish refugees and the ‘right of return’ 
would lead, in time, to the creation of camps for the displaced Arabs, which would last 
not for months or two years as was thought at the time, but to half a century or more.
The next stage of the refugee regime building began with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, the creation of the UNHCR in 1950 and the adoption of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. These positive steps were limited in their coverage, Euro-
centric and still left the state the determining factor in their administration. To be sure, 
references were now to the rights of individuals and the self-determination of people 
and not of national groups. Some rights, above all, the right of non-refoulement, applied 
to every individual, though not the right of asylum. An expansion of the refugee regime 
soon became necessary. In the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of war and the decolonization 
process, refugees were on the move in Africa. In 1964, they numbered about 400,000; 
by 1970, there were several million displaced men, women and children. At first, this 
barely affected the states of Europe. The British took no part in the settlement of Hindus 
and Muslims after the partition of India despite its bloody denouement. It did admit the 
Asians dispatched by Idi Amin from Uganda in 1972 and the emigrant question made 
its appearance on the British political agenda. For the most part, however, the chief 
response of European states, even when the Cold War spread into East Asia, was to keep 
these flows of new refugees away from their national boundaries.
The Cold War itself did not bring massive streams of refugees. The problem of 
displacement changed. The hermetically sealed states of eastern Europe would not let 
their dissidents go. At first, even after the introduction of the Marshall Plan, there was 
some movement, first into Czechoslovakia and then into West Germany, but as the 
divisions hardened, so did the views of Eastern bloc governments. The erection of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 was intended to keep would-be émigrés in. Refugees caused the 
construction of the Wall – in 1989, they would cause its destruction. During the Cold War 
period, another change took place. The refugee, instead of being an unwanted burden 
on the state and a threat to its stability, became an anti-communist hero: a return to the 
status of many of the nineteenth-century exiles. In a sense, the treatment of the 200,000 
displaced Hungarians in 1956 confirmed the new definition of the exiled. Not only 
were they made eligible for United Nations support but almost all were in permanent 
residence within two years. More money, much but not all of it American, was given for 
Hungarian relief than for the United Nations Refugee Fund. The change of emphasis 
in the early Cold War era to the focus on refugees fleeing communism demonstrated 
the politically determined nature of the refugee regime. The normative international 
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environment shaped national conceptions of identity and interest. The shift in the lines 
between West and East caused a repositioning of the state, both in the way refugees were 
regarded and the status they received. Historical experience has shown that refugees 
can help to determine their own fate; many made vital and outstanding contributions to 
their countries of refuge. The condition of being a refugee does not preclude something 
more than survival. Nevertheless, for the most part, refugees have been considered a 
burden and even a threat to the governments and inhabitants of other countries. For a 
brief time, and for very specific political or economic reasons, those escaping or leaving 
countries with communist regimes were given an unusually warm welcome.
The individual has become the bearer of human rights. There could and can be, 
however, no institutional barriers to the creation of new refugees. The ending of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union put into question some of the basic 
assumptions of the 1951 Convention. Large-scale refugee movements within and 
into Europe have become a reality. During the wars of Yugoslav succession of the 
1990s, relatively large numbers of people were uprooted and sought refuge elsewhere. 
Ethnic cleansing in Kosovo led to the largest single refugee movement since the end 
of the Second World War. This time, however, unlike the practices of the 1930s, the 
intervention, albeit reluctantly, of the United States and the European Union (EU), 
the latter partly to avoid an influx of refugees into their own countries, resulted in 
action within the region. Increasingly, the response of the European states, often 
implemented by UNHCR, has been to address the causes of the displacement as well 
as to provide assistance in the countries or regions where they have occurred. This 
was particularly true of the swelling refugee problems in Africa. Here the problems 
were compounded by the absence of effective states, by governments in the hands of 
unscrupulous leaders and elites and/or continuing and bloody civil wars. During the 
1990s the United Nations was repeatedly called on to provide humanitarian relief but 
also to act as mediators or peacekeepers. In Africa, most conflicts were within states 
and not between them. The actual incidence of IDPs soared, but the crossing of an 
international border was no longer a realistic alternative for most of the ‘unhoused’. 
They were more likely to be the objects of the abuse of human rights by their fellow 
countrymen than as ‘refugees’ as defined and covered by the Convention of 1951. 
Refugee flows continue today in large numbers and European states grapple with 
the age-old problems in their new and more complex forms. There are bound to be 
‘others’ and the ‘unwanted’ as long as sovereign states, however defined, exist. Even the 
specifically European origins of these problems may lead to new crises. The linguistic 
differences in Belgium, the ever-explosive tensions between Serbs and Croats, between 
Turks and Greeks, tensions between the national minority groups in Russia and in the 
small countries bordering on its peripheries, each could produce new dispossessions 
and expulsions and even flights. The continued arrival of refugees, internally displaced 
persons, asylum seekers, despite the efforts to maintain these distinctions, has eroded 
such categories. The greatest pressures at the moment come not from within Europe 
but from the Middle East, Africa and East Asia, where colour, cultural differences, 
religious hatreds, human traffickers and terrorists endlessly complicate both the reasons 
for flight and the difficulties of reception. Strangely enough, one of the remaining and 
intractable problems has been the refugee camps established in Haiti as a result of a 
Refugees in Europe, 1919–195930
natural disaster there in 2010. Even as it was adopted, the Convention of 1951 was 
already out of date, and the subsequent protocols have failed to address the changing 
refugee agenda. Problems and solutions combine elements of both old and new, the 
tried and the untried. Efforts to extend protection in the countries or regions of refugee 
origin, however laudable, have the ‘potential to return the refugee to a situation in 
which her basic rights fail to be protected’.8
Has progress been made in the handling of these repeated crises? The answer must 
be ‘yes’ and ‘no’. ‘Final solutions,’ and, alas, the term must be used, still rest with the 
governments of the sovereign states. We have UNHCR, underpinned by a series of 
conventions, all of which were highly contested when passed and resulted from 
hard-won compromises. Its work is backed by relatively large staffs, compared to those 
of the 1920s, of technical experts. Activities are supplemented, complemented and 
contested, by other organizations and individuals also seeking to alleviate the suffering of 
‘refugees’ or ‘internally displaced persons’. As in the interwar period, work is dependent 
on the financial support of governments, activists and private individuals, whose 
contributions may be centred on a particular problem, region, group and for a specific 
period of time. Our screens and papers are filled with pictures and reports of the latest 
refugee crisis, natural and man-made, and of conditions in the camps. The amounts 
of aid and assistance given would have astounded the early pioneers of international 
action. Progress has been made, for humanitarian, political and/or economic reasons. 
The members of the EU have set up mechanisms for dealing with the inflow of refugees. 
Some of these mechanisms are already being abandoned or modified, and there is still 
no single refugee regime. The debates on EU refugee policy have been intense and 
the tensions between national, political and humanitarian impulses that characterized 
the interwar period still exist today. Member states, nonetheless, have accepted some 
limitations on their rights to deal with refugees or IDPs from within the EU. The right of 
movement across boundaries, from member state to member state, is now guaranteed 
as is the principle of non-refoulement. The externalization of the European refugee 
problem, however, has shown the limits of progress beyond the borders of the EU. 
Traditional means, reminiscent of the pre-1939 period, have been resurrected, border 
controls introduced or reintroduced, quota systems adopted and failed asylum seekers 
– whether legal or illegal entrants, displaced persons, political refugees or economic 
migrants – are sent back, wherever this is possible, to their countries of origin. Many 
are held pending deportation in camps of one kind or another. The decisions are 
made by the people employed by the receiving state according to national laws though 
appeals to the court in The Hague may override some of these decisions. Techniques 
used in the 1930s and again in the 1990s are in use as member states assert their rights 
to control the inflow of non-EU refugees on grounds of security, economic necessity 
or the absence of the required qualifications. The new camps, some hardly better than 
the French camps for the Spanish Loyalists in the 1930s and 1940s, are intended not 
only to block entrance but also to facilitate the return of refugees to their homelands. 
Efforts have been made to look at the root causes of forced migration (McDonald 
did not labour in vain) and to provide some forms of protection in the countries or 
regions of origin. Practices vary according to the local situation but also to the political 
agendas of the receiving states. Camps differ from country to country; some asylum 
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seekers are welcomed by their neighbours but others are feared, hated as competitors 
for scarce resources and even attacked by their fellow countrymen. No single solution 
can be applied to the very different conditions of internally displaced persons. The 
creation of ‘safe areas’ in Kosovo in 1999 was a holding operation intended to cover 
the period of turbulence until resettlement within the original home territories could 
take place. Such hopes as they provided have proved illusory as have assumptions of 
the growth of toleration between ethnic groups. Safe havens in northern Iraq in 1991 
and the creation of humanitarian zones elsewhere highlighted the blurring of lines 
between humanitarian and political responses. The UNHCR continues to grapple with 
the problem of who is a refugee and who is a migrant. The reasons for migration might 
be the violation of human rights, lack of economic opportunities or just hopes for a 
better life. Flight, as it has been for many decades, might be a necessity or an exercise of 
free will. The boatloads of migrants turning up on the shores of the southern member 
state in the EU, themselves under severe economic pressure, show only too well that 
there is no end in sight to the refugee problem. 
The refugee crisis has long outlasted the period discussed in this book. Paradoxically, 
on a planet more and more unified by multinational and transnational enterprises 
and increasingly knit by the electronic abolition of frontiers through the internet, 
the refugee status and the problems it generates look set to persist. In the midst of 
economic and mass media globalism, fierce ethnic enmities, religious intolerance and 
ideological nationalism flourish. In consequence, distinctions between the migrant 
and the refugee, and the immigrant and the displaced person have largely lost their 
meaning. Internally generated despotism and racism create shanty towns and ghettoes 
for the unwelcome. Most agree that new psychological understanding, better legal 
safeguards and a more coherent international regime are urgently needed. At present, 
the outlook is bleak. Under Nazism, Jews were compelled to wear a yellow star. Today 
for millions of women and men looking at the night sky, the stars have turned yellow.
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The Forty Years’ Crisis: Making 
the Connections
Peter Gatrell
The relationship between history and refugees is an uncomfortable one. In his 
contribution to this book, Tony Kushner points out that the extensive literature in 
refugee studies lacks a historical perspective; he adds that refugees remain outside of the 
historiographical mainstream. Over two decades ago, Liisa Malkki demonstrated that 
refugees are represented in humanitarian discourse primarily as de-historicized figures 
and ‘speechless emissaries’. In her reading, history is leached out of displacement. Zara 
Steiner argues that it is difficult to establish a linear connection between successive 
refugee crises: there is no easily identifiable beginning or end, and no clear thread 
linking one episode to the next. Each response to a new ‘crisis’ shows little awareness 
of what happened in the past. These authors adopt a different take on the subject, but 
they concur that history and refugees make for uneasy bedfellows.1 
My own work has attempted to make the case for refugee history, but the aim 
of this chapter is more modest.2 I hope to show to what extent and how politicians, 
international civil servants, relief workers and humanitarian campaigners invoked 
history in order to frame their response to refugee crises. The argument is developed 
in relation to a specific case study, namely the United Nations campaign in 1959–60 on 
behalf of the world’s refugees. This campaign, known as World Refugee Year (WRY), 
targeted non-European as well as European sites of displacement. These crises could 
have been presented purely as current trouble spots, but history figured in the campaign 
both as a way of stimulating public interest and support and also as a means whereby 
participating governments could justify the stance they adopted and what they hoped 
to achieve. However, governments and campaign supporters alike appealed to history 
in a selective manner. A closer examination of WRY allows us to trace in what ways the 
past figured in contemporary policy making and in public aspirations for solving the 
‘refugee problem’ towards the end of the ‘forty years’ crisis’.
My case study raises a number of general questions. Does history help to inform 
the issues posed by mass population displacement, or is it more of a smokescreen? The 
past may indeed be used as a call to action, but it can also justify inaction. For example, 
governments are never shy of boasting about their readiness to respond to disasters or 
advertising their ‘traditional’ hospitality towards ‘genuine’ refugees, but this is usually 
a cloak to mask policies designed to deter the mass entry of people seeking asylum 
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and to allay concerns expressed by voters that their country might ‘capsize’ under the 
weight of extra numbers. Here, history serves the purpose of salving the conscience of 
politicians, but politicians are wont to muddy the waters and it requires considerable 
effort to challenge their smug indifference. As will become clear, the campaign for 
a ‘refugee year’ did mount such a challenge, albeit with modest results in terms of 
government policies.3 
Refugee crises involve other actors and interests. Here, too, there is some 
uncertainty as to where history belongs. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
intergovernmental organizations usually display little curiosity in the past, including 
their own history, because attention is consumed on each new emergency. Action here 
and now, rather than historically informed reflection, is the name of the game. NGOs 
advertise their past achievements in order to affirm their credibility when governments go 
looking for operational partners, or to enhance their profile vis-à-vis rival organizations 
that compete for donations from the public. How are supporters to be galvanized and 
how might their commitment be sustained? History has a part to play in pointing to a 
legacy of humanitarian ‘action’ in meeting the needs of displaced persons.4
The narrative of action requires a visual accompaniment. Much has been written 
about the dissemination of powerful images of mass suffering as a means of generating 
and reinforcing a compassionate sensibility. Deeply embedded allusions to the past are 
built in to these images, ensuring that culturally recognizable references are familiar to 
the viewer from whom a sympathetic response is awaited. For the most part, as Malkki 
recognized, these images of suffering are devoid of political background and historical 
explanation. The world of suffering humanity is one in which history is absent, save for 
a superficial implication that these are recurrent disasters, connecting past and present 
in a cycle of distress. As we shall see, WRY did not avoid that pitfall, because the UN 
repeated the mantra that the campaign was ‘non-political’, but a close reading of the 
iconography of displacement reveals a determination on the part of some campaigners 
to bring history and also politics to the fore.5
World Refugee Year
These reflections are developed in relation to an episode that is now largely forgotten 
– another amnesia to which I return at the end of this chapter – but which at the time 
sparked considerable public debate about the plight of refugees. In 1959–60, the United 
Nations launched WRY. This campaign originated in the UK with an appeal ‘to save 
the world’s refugees’, drafted by a group of socially conscious young Conservatives, 
including future government ministers Timothy Raison and Christopher Chataway. 
They bemoaned the failure of governments to find a permanent solution to the 
prolonged suffering of refugees in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. With 
official backing from the British government, the initiative was formally adopted by 
the United Nations, albeit in the face of objections from the Soviet bloc, on the grounds 
that the root cause of most of the world’s refugee problems was located in the actions of 
Western powers (see below). The United Nations hoped with the assistance of NGOs 
to assist these refugees either to resettle or to ‘integrate’ locally. Nothing on this scale 
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had been undertaken hitherto. The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), operating on a shoestring budget since its formation in 1951, also saw an 
opportunity to boost its profile on the international stage and to secure additional 
funds from governments and the general public to support its mandate. By the time 
WRY came to an end in June 1960, it had raised a total of $92 million (approximately 
$600 million in today’s prices) from governments and public donations, including 
$57 million from individual contributions. Close to one hundred countries took part, 
each with a national committee, and so too did around eighty NGOs whose work was 
coordinated by a small office in Geneva.6 
Coming at the end of the ‘forty years’ crisis’, WRY invites us to think about forms 
of domestic and international action in which history was never far from the surface. 
As Zara Steiner argues, there was no straightforward connection between successive 
refugee crises but instead a series of ad hoc responses by governments. Nevertheless, 
there are threads connecting successive refugee crises before, during and after the 
two world wars: the insistence on the part of states that immigration policy was a 
fundamental aspect of state sovereignty; the widespread view that refugees had only 
limited rights that could easily be overridden; and a widespread contempt for refugees, 
many of whom were deemed ‘bogus’ or a threat of some kind. Steiner is correct that 
refugees from the Soviet bloc were generally portrayed as heroic ‘escapees’ (as in the 
US Escapee Program, launched in 1952), but by the later 1950s refugees from Hungary 
and Yugoslavia were being described as ‘economic migrants’ with a dubious claim to 
refugee status.7 Western governments coupled this stance with pronouncements that 
refugees from communism included fifth-columnists, echoing remarks made about 
Russian refugees in the 1920s. So there are connections and continuities even as 
governments and NGOs lurched from one crisis to the next. 
To be sure, significant changes took place in international refugee law after 
1945, particularly when the 1951 UN Refugee Convention enshrined the concept of 
protection for individuals who suffered persecution. The post-war refugee regime 
imposed a strict chronological and geographical demarcation, because signatory states 
feared that an open-ended definition of the refugee would write a blank cheque that 
their successors would be obliged to honour. States retained control over immigration 
policy, including control over claims to asylum, and this underscored the fact that 
the post-war system provided for a selective rather than systematic approach to the 
‘refugee problem’. It also kept the UNHCR at arm’s length. To all intents and purposes, 
Convention refugees were supplicants with only a thin veneer of rights.8 Other 
displaced populations came under the aegis of regional or local refugee regimes in 
which the writ of UNHCR did not run. In these instances, improvised responses were 
fashioned by the governments most directly affected, often drawing upon the resources 
of national and international NGOs.9
This mixed regime provided part of the context for WRY, which directed public 
attention to enduring situations of population displacement and canvassed the means 
to improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Its initial proponents, Raison 
and Chataway, did not hesitate to connect different refugee crises. They identified four 
groups of refugees where international action was urgently needed: first, the so-called 
‘hard core’ of refugees and Displaced Persons (DPs) who had been forcibly conscripted 
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by the Nazi war machine and who remained in Germany and Austria, fifteen years 
after the end of the Second World War, having refused to repatriate and having been 
refused permission to resettle, usually because of a question mark over their health 
or ‘character’. In 1959 around 32,000 registered DPs were still housed in camps and a 
further 100,000 lived outside camps as ‘unsettled’ refugees. The wretched condition of 
this so-called ‘hard core’ was largely hidden from public gaze, but they remained the 
responsibility of UNHCR under its mandate.10 The second group comprised Palestinian 
refugees who fled to the West Bank (under Jordanian administration), the Gaza strip, 
Lebanon and Syria after the 1948 war that culminated in the creation of the state of 
Israel. Their numbers had climbed to around 915,000 in the late 1950s. The United 
Nations had accepted responsibility for them by creating the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA), but ten years after their exodus no long-term solution 
seemed likely. The third group was made up of around 700,000 Chinese refugees who 
fled to the British colony of Hong Kong following the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949. Here, too, a decade had passed with little sign of progress, 
and their numbers continued to grow. UNHCR had no mandate to intervene here. 
World Refugee Year derived its inspiration from a general sense that history 
had been unkind to these refugees. Cold War politics constituted a key element, 
particularly in the United States where some journalists and State Department officials 
were keen to hammer the point harder than their British counterparts.11 Of course, 
antagonism between Western governments and the Soviet Union stretched back to 
1917–21, when revolution in Russia, civil war and Allied intervention culminated in a 
mass exodus of Russian opponents of the Bolsheviks. Those who made their way to the 
Far East subsequently became trapped by revolution in China in 1949.12 They too were 
earmarked for support during WRY. The United Nations hoped to assist these elderly 
survivors to emigrate, with the help of the Intergovernmental Committee for European 
Migration (ICEM) and the fresh funds made available by WRY. 
At the same time, the campaign’s supporters acknowledged that responsibility for 
this state of affairs could not be laid entirely at the Soviet bloc’s door. Public opinion 
in the West included a strong sense of the need to atone for its past action, or rather 
inaction. Here the issue was not about the forcible repatriation of DPs to the Soviet 
Union – this only became a cause celèbre later on – but about the fact that those who 
refused to return to their homes had in effect been abandoned by governments in 
the First World. Granted, many of them had been resettled in the West, although the 
recruitment of able-bodied workers was widely criticized, not just in the Soviet bloc, 
as a kind of slave market or an attempt to ‘skim the cream’. In any case, the selective 
admission of former DPs left sick and handicapped relatives to an abject fate in squalid 
camps in Germany and Austria. Thus to alleviate their situation was simultaneously to 
draw attention to the fact that the ‘free world’ had treated them callously. It was widely 
believed by advocates of WRY that surviving DPs had become apathetic and alienated 
human beings whose psychological condition was a function of the injury inflicted on 
them, not by Hitler, but by the free world after 1945.13
Something similar emerged in the case of the Russian refugees in China. Here, too, 
Soviet repatriation officers had been hard at work at the end of the Second World War, 
appealing to their ‘patriotism and nostalgia’, and indeed several thousand refugees had 
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taken up the offer of Soviet passports. The determined anti-communist, Pastor Karl 
Stumpf, who worked with refugees in Hong Kong, ascribed this to ‘confusion’ brought 
about by the wartime alliance with the USSR and by cynical Soviet propaganda 
designed to reassure them of a warm welcome.14 He lobbied hard on behalf of those 
who remained in China. By the late 1950s there was little enthusiasm on the part of the 
British government to admitting any of these ‘hopeless White Russian cases’, the more 
so as any publicity would likely draw unwelcome attention to the plight of Chinese 
refugees in Hong Kong. Yet, as Stumpf recognized, their very age and their adherence 
to Russian Orthodox Christianity turned them into a ‘deserving’ case that should prick 
the West’s conscience. Pictures of elderly and dignified men and women making their 
way down the steps of aeroplanes were calculated to reassure WRY’s supporters that 
past neglect could now be translated into current rescue.15
Relief workers in Hong Kong portrayed Chinese refugees as victims of communism 
and official abandonment alike. Having entered the colony to escape the People’s 
Republic of China, they became the direct responsibility of the British authorities, who 
regarded them as immigrants looking to improve their economic prospects and in so 
doing added to an already overcrowded population. This mealy-mouthed stance did 
not go down well with local relief agencies, which counted on the UNHCR to use its 
‘good offices’ to support them, but to little avail.16
It was not so easy to locate Palestinian refugees in the framework of the Cold War, 
but this did not stop some vocal advocates from advertising the historic and current 
challenge from communist ‘subversion’. Edgar Chandler, a senior official in the World 
Council of Churches (WCC) wrote ‘the fact is surely obvious that the communist 
penetration of the Near East is serious, and Moscow has never in history had the 
indirect influence it now enjoys there.’ In his view, Palestinian refugee camps served 
‘as hotbeds of Communism’ and it behoved Western governments to address the needs 
of Palestinian youth through education and vocational training. Henry Labouisse, 
outgoing director of UNRWA, likewise argued that ‘in many cases the attitude of the 
refugees is influenced by the work of unscrupulous agitators and troublemakers.’17 In this 
interpretation, what mattered was the ongoing challenge from communist subversion 
whose antecedents could ultimately be traced back to 1917. It is revealing that at this 
stage very little attention was devoted to the history of 1948 – the Nakba was not yet the 
defining moment that it would later become in Palestinian politics and historiography.18
There were, of course, other histories to take into account. Non-mandate refugees 
included ethnic Germans who had been expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland 
under the terms of the agreement that the Allied powers reached at Potsdam; and 
Germans who crossed from East Germany to the West. Elfan Rees, the outspoken 
authority on refugee affairs in the World Council of Churches and chairman of the 
executive group of the international committee for WRY, called the decision by 
the Allies to expel the Volksdeutsche a ‘massive crime against humanity’, and urged 
that something now be done to provide for their needs.19 Others excluded from the 
provisions of the Refugee Convention included 420,000 Karelian refugees who fled to 
Finland from the Soviet Union in 1940 and in 1944 and some 175,000 members of the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria who found asylum in Turkey after having been expelled 
from Bulgaria. Hungarian refugees crept in to the orbit of UNHCR thanks to some 
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clever footwork on the part of the high commissioner. Much greater in number were 
refugees in India and Pakistan, as well as others in Korea, Vietnam and Tibet. The 
WRY team in Geneva issued short publicity newsletters that supplied a brief historical 
background to these sites of displacement.20
WRY coincided with a particularly troubled time in the history of Algeria, where 
the refugee crisis resulting from the war between the French state and the FLN freedom 
fighters was difficult to ignore, although the French government did its best to limit 
what they saw as damaging publicity. France issued a ‘solemn’ declaration in June 1959 
announcing that it ‘assumed entire responsibility for its citizens amongst whom there 
is a large number of women, children and old people whom the rebellion had forced 
across the border’. This was a pre-emptive strike against any attempt to link WRY to 
a crisis that France regarded as its internal business. However, the small publicity 
machine in Geneva drew attention to the magnitude of Algerian suffering, as did several 
international NGOs, and the UNHCR high commissioner offered his ‘good offices’ to 
assist displaced Algerians who had sought sanctuary in Morocco and Tunisia.21
Other histories found little or no resonance during WRY. No one mentioned the 
fate of refugees from the civil war in Spain (1936–9), doubtless because the exiles were 
assumed to be making the best they could of life in France or Mexico, and maybe 
because no one in the First World wanted to ruffle France’s feathers. France, in 
particular, had no wish to draw attention to the harsh conditions that Spanish refugees 
endured in French concentration camps in the late 1930s that were subsequently 
used by the Vichy regime to incarcerate French Jews.22 The mass displacement that 
accompanied the civil war in Greece (1944–9) warranted barely a mention, and the 
same is true of the consequences of the population exchange between Greece and 
Turkey in 1923, although both governments hoped that some residual funds might be 
found to improve the conditions of these ‘national’ refugees as well as newcomers who 
arrived from Bulgaria.23 WRY ignored the Holocaust, save for occasional references 
to the ‘rescue’ efforts of Western powers.24 Armenian refugees, so much the focus of 
international attention during the 1920s, were virtually absent from WRY, presumably 
because they were assumed to have successfully resettled in the West – and it would 
have been inopportune to mention the fact that some had resettled in Soviet Armenia.25 
In these instances, amnesia was the order of the day.
The ‘plan to save the world’s refugees’ did not extend to supporting the ongoing 
relief efforts on behalf of displaced persons in the Indian subcontinent. This omission 
was consistent with the response of most countries to the events of Partition. More 
than ten years on, and having invested heavily in relief and rehabilitation measures for 
at least fifteen million refugees, the governments of India and Pakistan bemoaned the 
fact that they had largely been left to address the consequences of mass displacement on 
their own. Other countries deemed the refugee crisis to be fundamentally a domestic 
issue of helping ‘national refugees’ to resettle. Bar the involvement of several foreign 
NGOs, this was a history of international neglect, as India did not fail to point out. As 
WRY began, the government announced that India would not take an active part in 
the campaign, because it had ‘a staggering refugee problem of her own’. Indian officials 
wished it to be known that India nevertheless contributed to UNRWA, because ‘the 
Palestinian refugees form an integral part of the Arab community with which India 
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and her people have had close relations for many centuries,’ and that India and the 
Arab peoples ‘are both engaged in the great task of building their countries in peace 
and in freedom’. Acknowledging these historic connections served to make a political 
point about India’s place in the post-war world.26
Different countries, therefore, had their own rationale for taking part in the 
campaign (or not) and for marking the limits of their commitment. Western European 
governments subscribed to the British view that there should be a division of labour, 
whereby ‘countries who could be most encouraged to increase their visas would be 
those who could not give substantial financial help.’ This was clearly aimed at Latin 
American countries that had contributed to the resettlement agenda since the days 
of the International Refugee Organization. The leading American Catholic layperson 
James Norris summed it up when he described South America as a highly suitable 
destination for Europe’s overcrowded population, allowing ‘people without land’ to 
move to ‘lands without people’ – a neat if simplistic way of connecting the past histories 
of refugees and countries of potential settlement.27
The selective focus on the ‘hard core’ in Europe (and to some extent newly arrived 
refugees from Yugoslavia), in the Middle East, in Hong Kong and China did not 
prevent the United Nations and member states from recognizing the extent of suffering 
brought about by fresh crises, in Tibet, Rwanda and Congo, as well as the ongoing 
conflict in Algeria. But these crises raised difficult diplomatic issues since in most 
instances they involved European imperial powers whether, like Belgium, they sought 
to abandon its possessions in Africa or, like France and Portugal, they attempted to 
retain such control. WRY also implicitly asked questions of the Netherlands, which 
embraced WRY as enthusiastically as anyone, without addressing the consequences 
of its retreat from empire in Indonesia.28 In the case of Tibet, the imagination of First 
World countries was seized by the drama of the Dalai Lama’s flight from Chinese 
occupation in March 1959, accompanied by 100,000 refugees. Tibetan exiles in India 
and Nepal were portrayed as ‘deserving’ refugees who suffered for their faith and 
whose civilization needed to be secured.29
History also intruded into the campaign through the recurrent emphasis by 
national governments of a ‘tradition’ of hospitality towards refugees. This rhetoric 
served different purposes. It might explain why a country was willing to support WRY, 
but it also served as justification for doing only so much and no more. According to 
British prime minister Harold Macmillan: 
Some people may think that the best contribution that we can make in the WRY 
is to take in a large number of the refugees ourselves. They may say that the life of 
our country has been enriched because 80,000 refugees the majority of whom were 
Jewish came here before the war, and because we have taken in about a quarter of 
a million other refugees since then. But precisely because in our small country 
we have welcomed so many, we cannot raise further hopes in this direction. 
Essentially our contribution must be in money.30
Activists expressed disappointment at the cautious stance adopted by the British 
government, and used the familiar trope of generosity to take the government to 
task for not doing more. One local newspaper remarked that ‘English history is full 
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of examples of this country providing a refuge. We think of the Belgian families of 
World War 1 in Guildford, Jews who escaped from Nazi tyranny before 1939, and the 
many after World War 2, like the Poles who have been absorbed into our community’, 
adding that ‘yes, this country can act again and do something better than 200 families.’ 
A constituent used a different historical tack to ask his MP what William Wilberforce 
would have made of the government’s offer to give no more than £100,000 to WRY.31
Other governments joined the chorus of countries advertising their humanitarian 
past, usually as a preface to avoiding an extensive commitment to resettle refugees. King 
Olav of Norway told his subjects that ‘we are a small nation. We can undoubtedly by the 
power of example make it quite clear where we stand. I think it is in the humanitarian 
field where Norway has so many fine traditions that we may do something that counts.’32 
Mexico announced its willingness to admit up to twenty-five ‘specially selected refugee 
families,’ having assisted many more refugees from Spain and Poland in the 1930s 
and 1940s.33 The shah of Iran boasted that ‘my country has a long historical record of 
affording shelter to refugees and homeless persons’, and in the Dominican Republic 
the appalling president Rafael Trujillo did not hesitate to publicize his ‘rescue’ (much 
overblown, as it eventually turned out) of Jews from Nazi Germany in 1940.34
The rhetoric of humanitarianism came in different guises. Israel’s national committee 
for WRY pledged to help ‘in the resettlement of the Arabs who left this country at the 
time of the Arab war against Israel,’ adding that ‘the solution of that problem depends 
essentially on the readiness of the Arab states to facilitate such resettlement.’ The 
pledge to provide technical assistance neatly deflected politically sensitive questions 
about Israel’s share of responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. Picking on a 
different strand of history, the country’s president announced that ‘it is no exaggeration 
to say that a very substantial sector of its population has a refugee past,’ including half a 
million Jews from Middle East and North Africa.35
History could thus be troubling for governments as they contemplated the extent 
and shape of their participation in the campaign. Germany hoped to earmark for 
expellee families up to half the funds donated by the public during WRY. The past 
intruded in other uncomfortable ways as well. The German national committee 
expressed misgivings about anything that smacked of a ‘massive propaganda’ effort, 
explaining that ‘since 1933 the public is extremely suspicious of large-scale propaganda. 
The committee therefore do not wish to be associated with the unhappy recent past 
experience in this respect’. It did not help that the Federal Minister for Refugees Dr 
Theodore Oberländer had come ‘under severe attack in Germany and abroad. It is 
undisputed that in 1941 he was a major in the SA. He arrived in the Polish city of Lwów 
[Lviv] at a period when 31,000 people were massacred. What is in dispute is whether he 
took part in the massacre or arrived afterwards.’36 Like Germany, Japan had unfinished 
business of its own. The government wanted to use WRY to get the United Nations to 
acknowledge the burden it had shouldered following the repatriation of 6.3 million 
citizens from Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin since the end of the Second World War. The 
repatriants included soldiers who had survived incarceration in Soviet prison camps. 
Japan hoped to find out what happened to those others who were unaccounted for.37
Other countries too went out of their way to explain what they could and could 
not do as a result of previous episodes of displacement. The government in Rome 
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responded that ‘Italy had many refugees within her own borders and these imposed a 
considerable financial burden’. Finland wanted it known that it supported the proposal 
in principle but excused itself by referring to the influx of refugees from Karelia who 
imposed an ‘indirect cost to the economy [thanks to] high agricultural subsidies, 
which have to be paid to enable them to make a living on their small uneconomic 
agricultural holdings.’ For this reason it would be unable to match the commitment 
shown by its Scandinavian neighbours.38 
Something of the difficulties in signing up to WRY emerged in discussions about 
suitable iconography, particularly in relation to the issue of stamps to commemorate 
the campaign. Here, too, history became a means of framing the issues around 
displacement. The most interesting example is France, which made a point of revisiting 
the Second World War, with an image on its postage stamp of a distraught young girl 
standing amid a ruined urban landscape, as if to reinforce the fact that the main point of 
reference for its citizens should be the consequences of Nazism in continental Europe 
rather than its own actions in Algeria. France thus portrayed itself as a historic victim, 
not the perpetrator of displacement. Austria, unsurprisingly, chose to commemorate 
the arrival of refugees from Hungary in 1956, with a stamp that depicted a refugee 
family escaping through the snow, the mother clutching her child, and the father 
holding on to the family’s suitcases. Austria portrayed itself as a place of recent refuge, 
a country that now belonged to the democratic European mainstream.39 
Of course, there was another kind of history that hardly dared speak its name. 
Seeking grounds on which to limit the admission of refugees to the UK during WRY, 
officials appealed to the history of the British Empire, which obliged the government to 
accept ‘British subjects from overseas [who] have a prior claim upon our hospitality.’40 
Nor was this the only intrusion of Britain’s imperial legacy. Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd explained privately that the UK government declined to support a UN resolution 
on Tibetan refugees, because it would have led to accusations about its human rights 
record in Kenya and Nyasaland.41
The rhetoric of historic humanitarianism was not confined to governments. NGOs 
also appealed to the past in seeking to persuade potential donors that their money 
would be well spent. The Canadian Jewish Congress advertised its ‘considerable 
experience in the settlement of refugees following the First World War and in large 
numbers in assisting in the rescue, relief and rehabilitation of victims of concentration 
camps after the liberation of Europe’ (as well as from Shanghai). It was happy to 
associate itself with ‘the world wide plans to bring succour and relief to those who 
deserve and will appreciate it’.42
A more personal history emerged in the accounts of individual refugees who 
periodically intruded into the campaign. One particularly vivid example emerged 
during a radio broadcast prepared by the UN information office. It is worth quoting 
at length, because it illustrates the way in which the UN information office sought to 
dramatize displacement and connect it to Cold War politics:
My name is Mitetich, Nicholas Mitetich. It is written on the cover of many files, on 
the papers inside these files; name, age, profession, health, personal history. And 
these files rest in consulates, in immigration offices, and with people who have 
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been trying to help me – in many filing cabinets marked under the letter M. But 
in the country where I come from, the name Mitetich stood for something. … For 
centuries there had always been a Mitetich to attach his name to some work for 
our people. … I was a man with solid career who could one day hope to hold high 
positions. I married, bought a house, and had servants. The world in which I lived, 
which had grown on traditions hundreds of years old, which from my boyhood I 
saw as an order of society so natural as leaves on a tree, exists no more, except in 
the memories of those who remember. Now it is a name written in indelible ink on 
a grey piece of cardboard which I have nailed on the door of my room. There it has 
been for the best part of the last 15 years.
The narrator of the broadcast continued that ‘stripped of everything [Mitetich] grew 
sick and finally died a prisoner in a cage, swept into a refugee camp by the currents of 
history’.43 Here, WRY publicity made Mitetich the tragic symbol of the outcome of war 
and the political division of Europe. But he also embodied a failure of will on the part 
of the ‘free world’.
A different kind of biography framed the history of humanitarian relief work 
during WRY.44 Prominent examples included figures in Christian Aid (Janet Lacey), 
Aid to European Refugees (Richard Russell) and the Ockenden Venture (Françoise 
Rigby) whose involvement stretched back to the Second World War. The executive 
director of the newly constituted US Committee for Refugees, Edward B. Marks, had 
worked with Displaced Persons in post-war Europe on behalf of the International 
Refugee Organization and the International Office for Migration, including being sent 
to Yugoslavia in 1957 to deal with the Hungarian refugee crisis. Others too gained 
extensive experience in humanitarian relief work on behalf of refugees. Kathleen Regan, 
a native of San Francisco, studied social work at Columbia University before working 
for the UN on behalf of DP children and refugees from Czechoslovakia. Afterwards she 
was posted to Korea. At the time of WRY she was working for the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC) in Yugoslavia.45 According to a newspaper profile, WCC’s 
resettlement officer Mollie Rule ‘has dealt with more refugees than any other woman, 
anywhere’. She worked in Greece during World Refugee Year, but her career took in 
stints in Rhodesia, Tanganyika and the Philippines, where she dealt with victims of 
disasters; and in 1956 the WCC sent her to Yugoslavia to support Hungarian refugees. 
Interviewed in 1960, she lamented the recurrent flow of refugees (‘I see no end to it’) 
but affirmed the benefit of long years of experience in resettling refugees: ‘You can’t 
learn it all from books.’46 In this way the life story of relief workers who contributed to 
WRY’s programmes was connected to the ‘forty years’ crisis’.
As WRY came to an end, UNHCR was confronted with fresh manifestations of 
mass population displacement. Supporters of the campaign were anxious about what 
the 1960s had in store. Would the Soviet bloc extend its influence across the globe, 
filling the gap left by retreating colonial regimes and helping to inspire revolution 
among the peasantry and emerging working class in the Third World? Democratic 
societies faced a potential crisis of citizenship. UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
Auguste Lindt spoke apocalyptically of the potential dangers of creating a ‘race of 
camp dwellers’, should Western countries fail to address the needs of refugees. The 
US Committee for Refugees, mindful in part of the consequences of revolution 
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in Cuba, pointed to millions of people ‘trapped’ as stateless persons, half of them 
‘escapees from communist-controlled countries … a needless waste of humanity 
[that] may have a powerful and dangerous impact on the society which has failed to 
assimilate them.’47
By the early 1960s, the ‘refugee world’ was already being re-conceptualized. 
In the course of that decade the emphasis shifted to local integration rather than 
mass resettlement, and to ‘development’ rather than ‘relief ’.48 Ageing European DPs 
and Russian refugees dwindled in number as death took its toll. Small contingents 
were allowed to resettle in a third country. German expellees benefited from the 
prolonged Wirtschaftswunder in the Federal Republic, and expellee organizations 
found themselves marginalized politically. Similarly, Chinese refugees in Hong 
Kong capitalized on the rapid economic growth of the colony. Palestinian refugees 
disappeared from the humanitarian radar, at least until the Six-Day War in 1967 and 
the rise to international prominence of the Palestine Liberation Organization, inspired 
by the victory of the FLN in Algeria. Algerian refugees made their way home from 
Morocco and Tunisia after France granted independence. The focus shifted to sub-
Saharan Africa where refugees were often regarded as a product of ‘tribal’ conflicts; 
their displacement could not be fitted into the rhetorical framework created by WRY. 
Even so, it was clear that the root cause of conflict was located in the struggle to shake 
off the shackles of colonialism in Algeria, Angola, Rwanda and elsewhere.49
NGOs found it relatively easy to adjust to the new era. They were not constrained by 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, whose mandate imposed a time limit on those deemed 
to be recognized refugees: 
When governments set out to relieve the distress of refugees by officially supported 
programmes they can and must define both the refugee and the problem in such 
a way as to limit their commitments. The voluntary agencies do not and cannot 
draw such lines. Their mission is to help even those refugees who are left when the 
governmental or international programmes cannot do so.50
WRY advanced the claims of numerous NGOs, secular and faith-based alike. The UN 
continued to rely heavily on organizations such as the WCC, Catholic Relief Services, 
the AFSC, CARE and the National Catholic Welfare Conference. Something of their 
historical consciousness emerged in a call made by the Standing Conference of Voluntary 
Agencies Working for Refugees, which advocated an international conference to ‘take 
place twenty years after the Evian Conference of 1938 [that] would usefully illustrate the 
permanency of the world refugee problem.’ Yet this was a muted appeal, and it failed to 
drive home the point about the limitations of Evian.51 
UNHCR made a bit more of an effort, acknowledging its own prehistory when 
it instituted a medal to be awarded to people or organizations in recognition of 
outstanding service to the cause of refugees. Known as the Nansen Refugee Award, 
UNHCR awarded it in 1960 to the British quartet who devised WRY. But Nansen 
belonged to a rather remote past, and the poster boys for WRY were deliberately 
cultivated because of their youthful and dynamic personalities. The extensive UN 
paperwork left behind when WRY came to an end in 1960 makes no mention of 
predecessor organizations such as the League of Nations’ work on behalf of refugees, 
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as if to say that the clock of humanitarianism was reset after 1945. Whatever Nansen’s 
achievements in the 1920s, its well-documented failures in the era of Nazism seemed 
to make it embarrassing to mention the League.52
All the same, WRY itself belongs to a history that stretches back to nineteenth-
century humanitarian efforts and forward to Band Aid and Comic Relief. Selwyn 
Lloyd, the British foreign secretary, described it as ‘the most universal short-term 
humanitarian enterprise the world has yet seen.’53 Yet the campaign all but disappeared 
from view in the years that followed. Why? The United Nations as well as participating 
countries hid the history of WRY from view, as if to stifle any demand for the initiative 
to be repeated as refugee crises multiplied. But that does not tell the whole story. Many 
campaigners believed that WRY’s achievements should not be exaggerated. As Elfan 
Rees put it, ‘The United Nations has been singularly obtuse in thinking that the refugee 
problem could be solved by “crash programmes” and time-limited agencies. Even 
now there are too many governments and too many people who imagine that WRY 
is the panacea to all these ills.’54 It was imperative, he added, that local and national 
committees continue, ‘not necessarily as fund-raising bodies but as watchdogs’ that 
can bark and bite. They should ‘bark at “we the people” and bite governments, in case 
they should lapse back into the disquieting indifference they have shown towards 
refugees for so many years.’55 In fact the national committees soon vanished from the 
scene, but most of the NGOs that helped maintain the campaign’s momentum lived to 
fight another day, even if they found little or no space for WRY in their documentation. 
The caravan of humanitarian concern had moved on.56
Conclusion
This chapter has shown how history intruded in the UN campaign for World Refugee 
Year in 1959–60 and helped justify the stance taken by governments and relief agencies, 
and how supporters were partly galvanized by a sense that past failures could be turned 
into success stories. But the appeal to history also entailed obfuscation and amnesia. 
As a humanitarian initiative, WRY invoked history in ways that were recognizable 
and comforting, but also less familiar and disquieting. In the UK, for example, the 
government argued that Britain’s participation fell squarely within a tradition of 
humanitarian concern, but that previous commitments to refugees meant that it had 
no obligation to accept fresh numbers, including among the ‘hard core’ admission of 
DPs. On the other hand, public support for the campaign rested on the argument that 
the ‘free world’ had a historic obligation to those who remained in the DP camps.
However, the campaign reached beyond ideas of atonement for past errors towards 
DPs in Europe. It encompassed Russian refugees in China whom the world had more 
or less forgotten; their elderly status and Christian faith struck a chord in the West 
at a time of growing Cold War antagonism. More controversially, WRY turned the 
spotlight on the unresolved ‘problem’ of Palestinians and on Chinese refugees in Hong 
Kong, and in so doing implicitly directed attention to the colonial past and present. In 
Hong Kong, campaigners helped cajole the colonial authorities to acknowledge a duty 
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of care for refugees who arrived from the mainland. Having renounced its mandate 
in Palestine in 1948, Britain bore some responsibility for leaving Palestinian refugees 
high and dry, and although campaigners did not press the point very firmly WRY 
broached uncomfortable questions about colonial rule as well as how to manage the 
process of decolonization. This emerged most clearly in respect of the French Empire, 
which had shed its possessions in East Asia but regarded Algeria as an integral part 
of the metropole. By confronting the issue of mass displacement in Algeria and in 
Morocco and Tunisia, the United Nations placed French policy in an embarrassing 
position. This was the nearest it got to acknowledging the politics of displacement.
Participating countries could not amend the original agreed targets for WRY, 
but they could and did publicize the extent of the ‘refugee problem’ on their own 
doorstep and its historical antecedents. The situation of expellees in Germany is a 
case in point, and activists such as Elfan Rees urged the need to put right a historic 
injustice. Likewise, India and Pakistan drew attention to their ongoing commitment 
to millions of Partition-era refugees whose history matched in duration the plight of 
Europe’s DPs. The United Nations refused to get involved, and the refugee crisis in 
the subcontinent – which was current as well as historic – failed to generate much 
heat beyond the countries directly affected. But to list the groups of refugees who 
were excluded from WRY rather misses the point. As a British official rightly pointed 
out, the campaign ‘meant different things to different people’.57 History mattered. The 
campaign drew attention to the career trajectories of leading humanitarians whose 
claims to intervene rested on their past engagement with refugees and the experience 
they acquired. Citizens in the First World came to ‘know’ refugees as a condition of 
helping them – not all refugees admittedly, but at least some. To be sure, the history 
did not run very deep, and in truth relatively little attention was devoted to the root 
causes of displacement. But no thoughtful supporter could conclude that the past did 
not weigh heavily on the present. 
Governments invoked history as humanitarian tradition, but this too could not 
be pursued very far, lest it direct attention to some uncomfortable truths about the 
limitations of action at the time and in years gone by, and about the history and the 
current repercussions of colonial rule. For governments seeking to limit damage to 
their reputation, it was important to recognize that WRY offered what amounted to 
recompensing for wrongs done to displaced people in the past. Yet there were limits 
to this kind of self-flagellation. In general, governments pointed to history as evidence 
of the ‘burden’ that they had shouldered previously, and therefore why they imposed 
conditions on their participation.
Governments tended to keep refugees at arm’s length – that is to say they were 
seen but not heard. This did not stop NGOs and the United Nations from including 
personal histories in the campaign. These biographies had a formulaic nature, but this 
too shows how the past was called upon to sustain public interest. The irony is that 
the history of WRY itself disappeared from view. Only a cynic would regard this as 
an appropriate outcome for a bold if inherently short-lived campaign that made the 
connections, keeping the world’s refugees firmly in the public eye. Inflected though it 
was with a patronizing tone, the World Refugee Year offered them at least a glimmer of 
hope. This is more than what can be said for most political leaders today.
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Writing Refugee History – Or Not
Tony Kushner
In summer 2000, a retired newspaper executive provided his response to a directive 
from the social anthropological organization, Mass-Observation. The topic was 
‘Coming to Britain’ and the volunteer writers were encouraged to reflect on a heated 
contemporary issue through their own life stories, enabling a consideration and 
juxtaposition of ‘then’ and ‘now’: ‘Back in 1905, a young Jewish man left his village 
in Poland, tired of pogroms and persecution, and set sail for America. I don’t know 
much of the details, but his ship was wrecked in the English Channel and he was able 
to swim ashore.’
And this remarkable narrative of survival and personal endurance did not stop 
there: ‘He landed in Plymouth and, after a few days for recuperation, started the long 
walk to London. He had lost all his possessions, was virtually penniless and spoke very 
little English.’
Settling and prospering in the East End of London, he married a young Jewish woman 
also from Poland and they had four children, the oldest of whom was the mother of the 
Mass-Observer. He notes that, while he never met them, ‘I don’t remember hearing of 
any special difficulties that my grandparents had in being accepted into this country, 
although today they would have been undoubtedly described as asylum seekers.’1 
At the turn of the twenty-first century when this family vignette was scripted, a 
moral panic was in place in Britain concerning asylum seekers with large sections of 
the media and politicians of different hue attacking those coming into the country as 
‘bogus’.2 Yet rather than his background providing a bond with those attempting to 
find refuge, the Mass-Observer desired to create a distance between those entering 
Britain at the start of the new millennium compared to his ancestors a hundred years 
earlier: ‘Unfortunately, these two words [asylum seeker] have taken on an unwelcome 
significance in recent years, largely because of the comparative few who have taken 
advantage of the system to such an extent that they seem to be raising two fingers to 
the nation that has taken them in.’3
But typifying many of Mass-Observation’s directive respondents, having put 
forward a more reasoned argument – criticizing only ‘the comparative few’ – as 
the response developed, restraint and nuance faded. Indeed, his antagonism gained 
momentum: ‘The trouble is that Britain seems to have become a “honeypot” for asylum 
seekers from all over the world. ... In the politically-correct times in which we live, 
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the government seems determined to be lenient with potential immigrants, no matter 
how weak their case for “asylum” or whatever devious and often clearly illegal means 
of entry they use.’
It was thus not surprising that the ‘indigenous population’ was upset when these 
newcomers went to the top of the housing list and received ‘massive benefits’. He 
concluded in a flourish that ‘the only way to stop asylum seekers flooding in is for the 
government to take an extraordinarily strong hand and allow in only a few “genuine” 
people.’4 
A close reading of this directive has been necessary in order to reveal the importance 
and instrumentalization of ‘history’ in understanding the experiences of and responses 
to refugees in the modern era. It is easy to dismiss the Mass-Observer’s account of his 
family origins in Britain as sheer invention. No such ship carrying immigrants sank 
in the English Channel in the early 1900s – although others did elsewhere, including 
the Norge in 1904 off Rockall. Of its 635 largely immigrant victims, 200 were Russian 
Jews.5 The Norge has been seen as the maritime disaster predecessor of the Titanic, a 
ship that was also carrying many hundreds of immigrants and refugees who made up, 
along with the Southampton-based crew, the vast majority of those who drowned.6
But the heroic journey of the Mass-Observer’s grandfather swimming to safety 
and walking to London as an ‘alien Dick Whittington,’7 while blatantly fictitious on 
one level, is permeated with meaning on another, exposing the importance of myth 
in the construction of individual life story. As Paul Thompson and Raphael Samuel 
noted, myths ‘have an extraordinary power to rally, whether at the ballot box or on the 
battlefield.’ At a national level, therefore, myths ‘raise fundamental questions of just 
who belongs and who does not ... in rallying solidarity they also exclude, and persecute 
the excluded’. Thompson and Samuel suggest that it is for this reason ‘for minorities, 
for the less powerful, and most of all for the excluded, collective memory and myth are 
often still more salient: constantly resorted to both in reinforcing a sense of self and 
also as a source of strategies for survival’.8
Returning to our Mass-Observer and his juxtaposition of ‘then’ and ‘now’: if 
contemporary and undeserving ‘asylum seekers’ conspire and cheat their way to Britain 
in order to partake of its benefits (and thereby defraud the innocent and too trusting 
local population), it is necessary to create a myth of origins that distances his forebears 
from these ‘bogus’ and therefore ‘undeserving’ immigrants. He thus embellishes his 
family story to emphasize danger (persecution in the place of origin in the form of 
pogrom) but also in flight (the emigrant ship that sinks en route to America). But 
rather than reach the ‘Promised Land’ of the Goldene Medina, his grandfather arrives 
purely by accident – he is literally washed up on England’s shores. Even so, this refugee 
possesses great strength – mental and physical – and the desire to succeed by honest 
means in his adopted home. He thus contrasts to the ‘undesirable alien’, frail, diseased 
and dishonest, whose entry leads to the physical deterioration of the British race, as 
depicted by late Victorian and Edwardian popular press and literature.9 
As a deserving and undeniably genuine refugee, he and his new family are 
welcomed in England and by hard work they establish themselves as an integral 
part of the nation. A classic refugee journey is thereby completed – flight from 
genuine persecution, a perilous journey, innocence in arrival and, to provide closure, 
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settlement in and contribution to the country of chance arrival. There is gratitude 
for the asylum afforded matched by welcome and acceptance by the host nation. The 
wider political significance of this recurring narrative will be teased out later. At this 
stage it is simply necessary to note, in the words of Peter Gatrell, how refugees (and, I 
would add, perhaps equally the descendants of refugees) ‘have called upon history to 
explain their displacement and to help negotiate a way out of their predicament’. He 
adds: ‘Refugees were created by violence and governed by regimes of intervention, 
but they gave meaning to their experiences through engaging with the past. History is 
a refugee resource.’10 And the trauma of ‘placelessness’ and of being a refugee has, as 
with the Mass-Observer, led to a desire among later generations to prove their right to 
belong – even if at the cost of denigrating today’s asylum seeker: ‘The recently arrived 
immigrant, the last through the door, and now settling down in the new country, can 
himself be disgusted by the idea of this newer arrival or interloper, the one who could 
take his place, because this threatening Other does not resemble him in any way.’11
Revisionist scholarship in relationship to the two of the most numerically significant 
and mythologized mass movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
– east European Jews and the Irish – downplays the role of persecution. Instead it 
emphasizes economic factors and the greater ease and affordability of transportation in 
the millions of decisions that were made to leave and the seeking of better opportunities 
in the ‘west’, especially in North America.12 Here, current historiography is at odds 
with popular memory from within and outside these migrant groups. For example, 
almost every memoir of those of second-, third- or fourth-generation east European 
Jewish origin will highlight pogroms as a cause of flight from the Tsarist empire, even 
when ancestors left areas without persecution such as pre-1914 Lithuania. Moreover, 
places as varied (and as unlikely) as Grimsby, Hull, Liverpool, Glasgow and Swansea 
where these immigrants arrived in Britain were allegedly mistaken for New York by 
parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, having supposedly been hoodwinked 
into being sold false tickets by unscrupulous agents. The list of unlikely ports includes 
some such as Swansea where no ships carrying east Europeans ever arrived.13 Likewise, 
collective memory of those of Irish migrant background privileges the famine as the 
primary cause of movement, in spite of the larger numbers that left before and after 
this catastrophe.14
The point to be emphasized here is not that professional, university-based historians 
as voices of authority are needed simply to separate out myth from reality in refugee 
narratives and thereby pronounce the ‘truth’. Whatever be the ethics of such elitist 
interventions, their status in wider society is not so respected that they will directly 
influence popular discourse. Indeed, being told what really happened can often be 
resented and rejected at a grass-roots level. Yet critical historical interventions are 
necessary in the wider context of the increasingly negative debates about migration, 
especially when sensitive questions of identity and belonging are at stake and are 
being manipulated by politicians and the media. ‘Governments,’ it has been noted, 
‘appeal to a history of “generosity” towards refugees ..., but this frequently serves as 
a justification for maintaining tough controls on admission.’15 History, or rather the 
instrumentalization of a form of myth-history, matters. Ironically, however, ‘history’ 
remains the poor relation of refugee studies and historians as a whole, beyond a few 
Refugees in Europe, 1919–195954
important but isolated specialists, have yet to confront the presence of the ‘refugee’ in 
both the distant and recent past.
Katharine Knox and myself started our overview, Refugees in an Age of Genocide – a 
pioneer historical study of twentieth-century movements to Britain through global, 
national and local perspectives – by quoting the last speech of Holocaust survivor, 
Hugo Gryn, which he gave to the Refugee Council and was devoted to the importance 
of granting asylum: 
Future historians will call the twentieth century not only the century of great wars, 
but also the century of the refugee. Almost nobody at the end of the century is 
where they were at the beginning of it. It has been an extraordinary period of 
movement and upheavals.16
Our book was published in 1999, as Europe witnessed its last internal refugee disaster 
of the century (though not, as the current crisis in the Ukraine graphically illustrates, 
its last ever) in the final stages of former Yugoslavia’s disintegration with the Kosovan 
crisis. But Hugo Gryn was not the first in this era of genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ to 
suggest that there was something unique about the twentieth century. Writing in 1944, 
when the gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau were working at their full capacity, 
Arieh Tartakower and Kurt Grossman believed that earlier movements of refugees – 
such as the Huguenots – had been localized, whereas ‘in our generation the refugee 
movement has spread like wildfire through the continents of the Old World. Refugees 
from Soviet Russia, from Greece, from Turkey, from Bulgaria, from Armenia, from 
Iraq, from Italy, from Germany, from Spain, from China – all these before the present 
war, – such is the long procession of uprooted humanity.’ Acting as contemporary 
historians (and with their status as recently uprooted themselves, they were close to 
the events), Tartakower and Grossman added that the Second World War had ‘seen 
the rise of a fresh crop of refugee problems in nearly all European countries.’ They 
concluded: ‘Indeed, no other period has had so many refugees as the last three decades, 
so that ours may truly be called the era of refugees.’17 
Since 1945, of course, rather than slowly dissipating, the refugee crisis has both 
grown and become truly global. It has shifted the focus of international political debate 
from a Eurocentric Cold War perspective to one involving a ‘North-South’ paradigm.18 
But as B. S. Chimni has noted, there has been a ‘myth of difference’ in both Western 
state responses and in refugee studies when comparing ‘[past] refugee flows in Europe 
and [more recently] in the Third World,’ which are deemed to be separated by ‘volume, 
nature and causes.’ His argument is not to suggest homogeneity in background and 
experience. ‘Of course there are differences. Indeed, every refugee differs from another 
in the circumstances which force her to flee.’ He suggests, however, that ‘the differences 
which have been propagated are self-serving and refugee studies has done little to 
combat this’.19 
One lacuna that Chimni emphasizes is the lack of detailed historical work on earlier 
movements, including Cold War refugees and the complex reasons and varied reasons 
why they left. ‘There has been ... no serious exercise to determine whether those fleeing 
the former Socialist bloc countries were not leaving for mixed motives or simply for 
a better life in the West.’ He thus quotes with approval the work of Claudena Skran as 
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one of ‘the rare refugee studies scholars who has challenged the myth of difference.’20 
Skran, in her 1995 overview of refugees in interwar Europe, insists that ‘the notion that 
the contemporary refugee crisis is unique lacks a historical perspective and neglects 
this important fact: mass refugee movements are neither new nor exclusive to specific 
regions. They have been an enduring and global issue throughout the twentieth 
century.’21
In a work written in the early 2000s and published as Remembering Refugees: Then 
and Now, I returned to Hugo Gryn’s speech and particularly raised the question of 
why historians, rather than acknowledging the essence of his intervention, seemed 
to be even more reluctant to recognize the presence of, and responses to, refugees in 
the modern era – the challenge that had been made by Chimni appears to have been 
ignored.22 
In the years since Remembering Refugees, there has been both continuity and change, 
most significantly with regard to the latter in the form of Peter Gatrell’s remarkable The 
Making of the Modern Refugee (2013).23 Covering the twentieth century as a whole, 
Gatrell’s study has a global focus and includes not only Europe but also the Middle 
East, South and South East Asia and Africa. Its chronological and geographical range 
is thus far more inclusive than that of its predecessor, Michael Marrus’s The Unwanted 
(1985).24 Addressing the current state of historiography in a foreword to the 2002 
edition of Marrus’s classic work, Aristide Zolberg referred to a handful of monographs 
and edited collections which had been published since the mid-1980s, most of which 
were specific case studies. It had taken the return of a European refugee crisis, he added, 
to foster ‘a revival of historical interest in the subject more generally.’25 And what is 
now a generation on from the original publication of The Unwanted, Gatrell could still 
highlight in the conclusion to The Making of the Modern Refugee that ‘refugees have 
been allowed only a walk-on part in most histories of the twentieth century, and even 
then as subjects of external intervention rather than as actors in their own right.’26 
Elsewhere he has lamented that there are still ‘yawning gaps in our knowledge and 
understanding of the history of refugees.’27 It is necessary now to explore at a deeper 
level the reasons why this is the case and why historians are still hesitant, even resistant 
to studying refugees. My focus, largely, will be on British historiography and/or British 
examples, but I believe that while each nation-state has its peculiarities, the comments 
have a wider resonance.
Perhaps inevitably given the increasingly crowded market, but also reflecting the 
broadening out of the subject matter and approaches to it, historians have a natural 
tendency to claim that their area of interest has been previously neglected and is in 
need of greater attention. And in the case of the study of the marginalized, rather than 
special pleading, the desire to correct imbalance is often a desire to challenge the bias 
and exclusions of the past. Path-breaking books including Sheila Rowbotham’s Hidden 
from History: 300 Years of Women’s Oppression and the Fight Against It (1973) and Peter 
Fryer’s Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (1984) are examples of 
interventions that are as much about contemporary issues as they are about the past. 
Rowbotham’s aim was to turn ‘up the top soil in the hope that others will dig deeper. 
I know already the women’s movement has made many of us ask different questions 
of the past’.28 Similarly, Fryer made clear that ‘traces of black life have been removed 
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from the British past to ensure that blacks are not part of the British future’ and that 
his pioneer study was ‘offered as a modest contribution to setting the record straight’.29 
Both books notably were published by the radical Pluto Press, founded in the 1970s 
and which has been at the forefront of socialist, feminist and anti-racist scholarship. 
Earlier than Rowbotham and Fryer, E. P. Thompson famously justified his The Making 
of the English Working Class (1963) as an attempt to rescue his subject matter from ‘the 
enormous condescension of posterity’.30
Subsequently, labour history, women’s history, black history and immigration history 
more generally – all with their roots in earlier work before these landmark studies – 
have become further established, if still not fully part of the historical mainstream, in 
Britain and beyond. The same has not happened to refugee history, in spite of the equally 
landmark publication of Michael Marrus’s The Unwanted. Building on the groundwork 
provided by contemporary scholar-activists such as John Hope Simpson,31 this superb 
synthesis left many areas still to be covered. The approach was very much from the top 
down providing a much needed history of the international refugee institutional regime. 
Its focus was Europe and the chronology from after the First World War to the early 
years of the Cold War. These were, of course, key decades, especially in constructing 
international responses to refugees as reflected in the chapters in this book. But if we 
need to know more about the Nazi era and its aftermath, this is even more so of the 
prehistory of globalized refugee issues. Peter Gatrell has opened up the crucial study of 
the First World War and especially the refugee crisis of eastern Europe.32 But we need to 
go further back, beyond even the Protestant refugees of the early modern era,33 and to 
make connections to the ancient and medieval worlds and concepts such as sanctuary 
and asylum in different religious traditions, as well as legal and cultural constructions 
of the ‘alien’ and the outsider in society.34 Likewise, the historical study of refugee 
movements and responses to refugees post-1950s is still in its infancy.35
Yet rather than simply being a new historical subject requiring, Whiggish style, only 
a new generation of scholars to fill in the gaps and to engage with existing scholarship, 
there are – as was and continues to be the case with other marginalized groups such as 
women, ethnic minorities and GLBTs – reasons behind the absence of refugee history 
or, more accurately, refugee histories. I want to go through various forms of study – 
both academic and popular – to explain this lacuna, and how in certain areas there is 
greater potential for change.
First, refugee studies itself: this is a relatively new discipline, or matrix of disciplines, 
and one itself that is undergoing a critical internal debate. Should it be subsumed under 
forced migration studies, broadening its subject matter and approach, or should it 
remain as a distinct, but related, field of endeavour? For legal scholar James Hathaway, 
a proponent of the latter school, the methodologies are fundamentally different. 
Refugee studies is ‘centred on studying particular persons (“refugees”)’. In contrast, 
‘Forced migration studies scholarship focuses on analysis of a phenomenon (“forced 
migration” – notably, not “forced migrants”)’.36 Given their numerical marginality 
within the much larger category of forced migrants in the contemporary world, there 
are clearly dangers for those concerned with the specific dynamics affecting refugees 
if academic absorption takes place. This runs alongside the dilemma of losing the 
individuality of refugee stories and contexts as feared by Hathaway. 
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Yet even within the narrower field of refugee studies, the discipline of history 
remains marginal. I have highlighted how the Journal of Refugee Studies, formed 
in 1988, and linked to the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford, first did not include 
history in its areas of potential interest, describing its remit to be in the fields only of 
‘anthropology, economics, health and education, international relations, law, politics, 
psychology and sociology.’37 Subsequently, history has been at the bottom of its list of 
submitted (and published) articles at just 4 per cent of the total.38 Law, anthropology 
and sociology continue to dominate the journal and research as a whole. If refugee 
studies is still relatively marginal within academia, then the historical study of refugees 
continues to suffer a double liminality.
So, why is history so peripheral to the major journal and institute of refugee studies 
in the UK and beyond? The most blatant answer is that it is seen as at worst irrelevant, 
and at best, of minor interest in explaining and dealing with current refugee crises, 
which are at the forefront of academic research. ‘History’ is even possibly an irritant for 
those who want the focus to be on the developing world and not on Western refugees 
who are seen to be relegated to the past. Furthermore, as Peter Gatrell has suggested, 
for humanitarian activists, there is a focus purely on the present and a reluctance ‘to 
thinking about the root causes of displacement’. It leads to a temptation to treat refugees 
‘with no history, past experience [and] culture’. From such a perspective, ‘This is a field 
where history dare not speak its name.’39 More theoretically, the anthropologist Liisa 
Malkki argues that ‘in universalizing particular displaced people into “refugees” – in 
abstracting their predicaments from specific political, historical, cultural contexts – 
humanitarian practices tend to silence refugees.’40 
For those more sympathetic to considering history within refugee studies, it might 
fall into the ‘nice to know’ category, but not essential as those constructing census 
questions would put it.41 Apart from the academic shortcomings of this ahistorical 
position, there are also political implications. This is neatly illustrated by former 
British prime minister Tony Blair in his autobiography, A Journey. There are numerous 
negative references to asylum seekers in the index to this book, but none to refugees. 
In fact, there is one explicit reference to refugees in the text, and it is revealing of both 
Conservative and Labour handling of asylum issues since the early 1990s and the new 
wave of legislation on the subject: ‘Essentially, Britain, like all European countries, had 
inherited the post-war, post-Holocaust system and sentiment on asylum. The painful 
story of refugees fleeing from Hitler and the Nazis and being turned away produced a 
right and proper repulsion. The presumption was that someone who claimed asylum 
was persecuted and should be taken in, not cast out.’
Blair adds, however, that while it was ‘an entirely understandable emotion in the 
aftermath of such horror’ that ‘unfortunately, it was completely unrealistic in the late 
twentieth century.’ He adds – his conviction politics obviating the need for any evidence 
to support his statement – that ‘the presumption was plainly false; most asylum claims 
were not genuine.’42 
As Louise London and Peter Gatrell have illustrated, the past has been 
instrumentalized in current campaigns, largely for and only occasionally against 
restrictive policies against those seeking asylum.43 Rather than promote empathy, 
reference to past refugees, as with Blair’s comments (which could be replicated through 
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the words of so many politicians), is instrumentalized to denigrate contemporary 
asylum seekers. As London concludes, awareness of historical responses to refugees 
‘can help us be more generous’. But knowledge, she adds, is ‘double edged’:
What we know about the past will be an obstacle to present and future asylum-
seekers if we let it deceive us into assuming that the persecution that this year’s 
applicants face will correspond exactly to what earlier refugees were fleeing, or 
if we are slow to respond to this year’s refugees because they aren’t sufficiently 
similar to those who were helped in previous years.44
Gatrell notes how Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the time of World Refugee 
Year used the example of past generosity to justify contemporary exclusion: ‘Precisely 
because in our small country we have welcomed so many, we cannot raise further hopes 
in this direction.’45 There is a wider significance and practical relevance to London’s and 
Gatrell’s observations. Those supporting refugees, especially in the public sphere and 
including within academia, simply cannot afford to avoid the past. It is not a luxury or 
self-indulgent pursuit.
But in explaining the absence of the past in refugee studies, we also need to turn 
to the history profession itself. One reason for the low publication rates in the Journal 
of Refugee Studies inevitably relates to the paucity of historical submissions: thus 
there has been a mutual and mutually reinforcing disinterest from both sides. I have 
attempted, following Liisa Malkki, an explanation of why historians have been slow to 
grasp questions relating to refugees by reference to the approach that has dominated 
the field – that of the study of the nation-state.46 A case study from the world of British 
television heritage-history illustrates the wider point. 
David Baddiel is a prominent comedian and writer of Jewish origin. His mother was 
born in Nazi Germany, a family background he has used in his fictional work.47 In 2004, 
Baddiel took part in the extremely successful BBC genealogical television series, Who 
Do You Think You Are?.48 He perceptively noted that ‘one of the things I felt very acutely 
during the film [and researching for it] was how ephemeral, how rootless, refugee 
history is: how quickly it moves’.49 Here Baddiel differentiated himself from television 
journalist, Moira Stuart, and actress and writer, Meera Syal – of Afro-Caribbean and 
Indian backgrounds, respectively, – who had appeared in the same series: ‘[They] 
are the immigrants, but my family, to my knowledge, are the only ones who arrived 
here as refugees.’50 Baddiel personalizes a theme opened up in Remembering Refugees. 
In Britain – and elsewhere – there is a growing move in both history and heritage 
to incorporate immigrant and minority history. In the process, refugee history has 
yet again been marginalized. I have argued that it is the impermanence and fluidity 
of refugees that make them hard to incorporate in historical narratives, popular or 
academic, which rely on the fixity and security of the nation-state’s borders to give 
themselves a sense of coherence, of a place called ‘home.’ 
On one level, the lacuna in history writing and representation reflects an everyday 
reality – those permanently on the move and who are marginal in society leave less 
evidential trace. I will close with a brief case study of one such example of this problem, 
which reveals not only the truly global nature of refugee journeys but also how they 
can be so easily forgotten because they require extra detective work on behalf of the 
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researcher. On another, more fundamental, level, studying refugees can be unnerving. 
First, refugee experiences can be and often are traumatic. As Bosnian refugee, Vesna 
Maric, in her powerful memoir Bluebird starkly comments with ironic understatement: 
‘It’s not easy suddenly becoming a refugee.’51 Second, unlike immigrants as a whole, 
refugees are, as Baddiel notes, especially ephemeral and rootless, and hard to define. 
They are, as Liisa Malkki so astutely reminds us, ‘liminal in the categorical order 
of nation-states’ and, as people who do not ‘fit,’ treated, in Mary Douglas’s timeless 
phrase, as ‘matter out of place.’52
It is significant, therefore, that those refugees whose stories have been incorporated 
have had their experiences and responses to them shaped, or reshaped, to fit certain 
narrative conventions and expectations. As Peter Gatrell notes, during World Refugee 
Year governments ‘tended to keep refugees at arm’s length – that is to say they were 
seen (and very frequently too), but not heard’. He adds that this did not stop NGOs 
from ‘including personal histories in the campaign [but] these biographies had a 
formulaic nature’.53 
More generally, some refugee stories have been easier to exploit than others. Chief 
among the groups chosen for special, positive consideration are the Huguenots in the 
late seventeenth century and Jews in the first half of the twentieth century, especially 
those from Nazism, and, emerging as a third possibility, Ugandan Asians from the 
1970s. The narrative has to be constructed on the following lines: persecution from 
an obviously evil regime with an obviously evil leader (preferably one whose religion 
and/or politics are fundamentally opposed to the country of refuge); a life or death 
flight from oppression that should be dangerous and uncertain; arrival in the country 
of freedom greeted with sympathy and understanding; and permanent settlement 
and later economic or cultural contribution and everlasting gratitude to the nation 
of refuge. It is one, as noted, that has been made to fit the family origins of the Mass-
Observer whose story was analysed at the start of this chapter.
In all three historical cases of Huguenots, Jews and Ugandan Asians, the reality 
was more complex, especially the initial welcome, but anything that does not fit the 
comforting and redemptive story line has to be air brushed out of the picture. A neat 
version is provided by Robert Winder in his beautifully narrated Bloody Foreigners: The 
Story of Immigration to Britain, written in 2004 and partly as an answer to the extremely 
negative rhetoric in the British media to asylum seekers. It was, as he noted, ‘a torrent 
of abuse, often based on absurd figures’.54 Here Winder is describing the arrival of the 
Minet family who escape terror after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, 
fleeing to Dover having been captured and tortured a year earlier when their boat was 
intercepted:
Isaac Minet immediately set up shop in ... London. In 1690 he returned to Dover, 
where he helped establish the family insurance firm (and a line that led unbroken 
to John Minet, a leading light at Lloyd’s in the twentieth century). He also, in a 
poignant tribute to the sea-crossing that had saved his life, set up a packet-boat 
service between Dover and Calais. For the rest of his life, 1 August – the date of 
his arrival – was a sacred festival in the Minet family, observed with fasts and 
prayers.55
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In spite of the thousands of individuals, and scores of groups who have been excluded, 
deported and returned, historians have been hesitant to acknowledge and recognize 
their stories. Their experiences fail to confirm – in fact, negate – the goodness of the 
nation-state, especially important as the concept of offering asylum is often central, as 
Liza Schuster highlights, to the self-mythology of many countries, even if in reality it 
often means in practice ‘admitting a [small] number of (carefully selected) refugees’.56 
Unsurprisingly, those working on behalf of the displaced and the groups themselves 
want to present refugees in a positive light, countering negative sentiments that pervade 
society and culture, whether in the past or in the present. This process has a long 
history. The Huguenot Society of London and the Jewish Historical Society of England 
and their transatlantic equivalents were formed in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, coinciding (though not accidentally), with the rise of anti-alien sentiment in 
Britain that was to result in the 1905 Aliens Act and the opening in 1892 of the Ellis 
Island immigration processing and detention centre in New York.57 Moreover, through 
historicization, group worth can be strengthened for both an external and an internal 
audience. It can also be therapeutic for the individuals concerned, both the refugees 
and their supporters. In the words of Peter Gatrell: ‘History directs our attention to the 
way in which refugees have been valorized by non-refugees and how they valorized 
themselves in order to negotiate a way out of their predicament.’58 
One historiographical change that has occurred lately is that more recent groups, 
including those from the developing world, have been covered in the heritage 
industry, most notably in the British context in a landmark exhibition at the Museum 
of London, ‘Belonging’ (2006). Based partly on the testimonies collected through the 
Refugee Community History Project, ‘Belonging,’ as its title suggested, documented 
the experiences and contributions of refugees to London. Somewhat weak on deeper 
history, it focused on recent arrivals and what they had added to the capital’s economy 
and cultural life. It would be wrong to simply label such history/heritage as celebratory, 
but it is a self-conscious effort to emulate the prestige associated with the earlier, 
idealized refugees whom I have highlighted. If nothing else, raw material is being 
produced for future historians, but with the danger perhaps, as was the case with the 
early historical societies of Jews and Huguenots, that anything regarded as unsavoury, 
threatening or non-conforming is in danger of being swept under the carpet.59 
Responding to the wave of xenophobia in the twenty-first-century Europe, the writer 
Hanif Kureishi despairs that ‘it is impossible to speak up for the immigrant or, more 
importantly, hear him speak for himself, since everyone, including the most reasonable 
and sensitive, has made up their mind that the immigrant is everywhere now, and he 
is too much of a problem’.60 Refugees and asylum seekers, being harder to place in 
terms of ‘home’, are especially prone to ‘speechlessness’ and great effort is needed to 
hear their multifarious voices. It remains true that ‘such first-hand testimony as is 
available from refugees must be interpreted carefully’.61 To quote again Peter Gatrell: 
‘Whose experience counts, and why? ... For every voice that speaks loudly there are 
dozens that are suppressed.’62 His comments are salient in relation to ‘Belonging’ and 
its strengths and limitations as a path-breaking exhibition. Nevertheless, as at the 
Museum of London and at new museums on immigration in Paris, Bremerhaven, 
Hamburg, Melbourne, Adelaide and elsewhere, recent refugee movements are being 
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represented and their testimony incorporated (if somewhat uncritically). It is to be 
hoped, at least, that this grass-roots approach to everyday experiences might inspire 
critical historical studies to follow suit.63
Lastly, with regard to the attempt to write a history of refugees, the question of 
periodization is clearly crucial. This book explores and critiques the concept of a 
forty-year refugee crisis in Europe from 1919 to 1959. Earlier in this contribution, 
I have suggested that the prehistory of modern refugee movements requires more 
attention both in carrying out the detailed research and in making comparisons with 
later movements. Yet even for the latter, there are still huge gaps in our knowledge. In 
moving towards a conclusion and further reflecting on chronology, I will refer to a 
group of refugees who have so far escaped any scholarly attention. Their story, from 
the late 1870s, is one of tragicomedy – they were, even in their own estimation, one of 
the most inept group of refugees in the modern era – but it is also one that predicted 
the world of anti-refugee restrictionism to come. 
It is a story that has been recoverable through archival accident – a file has been 
somewhat misleadingly but tantalizing catalogued in the local records office as 
‘Brazilian Refugees in Southampton, 1878’.64 The group were in fact Volga Germans 
who left Russia for a mixture of economic reasons and also to avoid military 
conscription as the Tsarist regime attempted to impose Russification on its nationally, 
ethnically and religiously diverse subjects. These particular Volga Germans were 
enticed to Brazil as agricultural colonists. Used only to wheat cultivation they managed 
to destroy what fruit crops they had by harvesting them by cutting the trees off at their 
base. Impoverished, they returned to Europe, but rejected at Antwerp as unwanted 
immigrants, they were dumped at Southampton. In the course of a few weeks, they 
were transformed from refugees, to immigrants and then to unwanted foreigners in 
local, national and international discourse. Unwilling to set a precedent of looking 
after them, the English south coast port town sent the Volga Germans back to Russia 
where they underwent harrowing treatment in Hamburg in a forerunner of what 
would be the most clinical transmigrant processing centre in Europe before 1914.65 
Eventually, through the goodwill of the Tsar and pressure from the British Foreign 
Office, they were returned to the Volga region. En route, they were the subject of 
intense international negotiation and diplomacy, in spite of numbering just ninety-
one individuals.66 Subsequently their story, as well as that of the thousands of other 
Volga Germans who tried their luck in Brazil, has been forgotten in various different 
national and local historiographies and heritage work, and it does not feature in any 
history of refugee movements more generally. Here is a small example showing the 
need to examine the local, the national and global and their interrelations. It is why 
refugee history is not only fascinating and important but also complex and difficult. It 
is a challenge that few historians have been willing to take on board. 
Reviewing my Remembering Refugees, Philip Marfleet has commented that the 
exclusion of refugees from national narratives has a wider currency than just Britain, 
pointing to South Asia and the Partition of India in 1947 as particularly acute examples 
of the process of forgetting.67 Likewise, in elections held in 2010, Klaus Neumann 
applied its findings to Australia and suggests this tendency is even more acute: in spite 
of ‘all the talk about the need for transnational histories ..., most Australian historians are 
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still wedded to the national framework, which is unsuited to analysing most refugee 
issues.’68 
The comments of Marfleet and Neumann could be applied to official and popular 
memory work in many other national contexts. Peter Gatrell has illustrated the 
tendency towards ‘silence’ of many different nation-states in World Refugee Year when 
confronting (or failing to confront) their past role in either failing to help refugees or 
in generating refugee movements themselves. They still managed to provide a ‘rhetoric 
of historic humanitarianism’ as did many non-governmental organizations.69 Such 
collective myth-making and amnesia have hindered the writing of critical studies of 
refugees over the longue durée, especially as the historical profession has too rarely 
challenged the assumptions on which they rest. In this respect, Zara Steiner rightly 
points out in her challenging overview that ‘to speak of a beginning and end of the 
European refugee crisis suggests a linear development which neither was nor is the 
case’. She adds that the book as a whole reveals ‘the erratic nature of the refugee 
problem in Europe, its reappearance when reformers thought it would vanish, and the 
various forms this re-appearance has taken’.70
There is, of course, a danger in rejecting all periodization. More detailed and sensitive 
research could lead to history becoming ‘one damned refugee crisis after another,’ to rewrite 
Toynbee. The nature of refugee movements and responses to them (local and global as 
well as from state, NGOs and public) have undoubtedly changed. Each one has its unique 
dynamics. Even so, there is, I would argue, more continuity than change, especially with 
regard to the refugee experience, regardless of place of origin, the oppression leading to 
flight and treatment in places of transit and asylum. But we are still hindered in making 
nuanced and authoritative comparisons because of the marginalization and abuse of 
the past when confronting the refugee. For this to change and for history of refugees to 
become mainstream, the historical profession at a global level requires transformation. 
So far, historians have been part of wider tendencies towards refugees (including within 
refugee studies itself) in which, some notable exceptions apart, the dominant mode has 
been one of ‘remembering to forget’. The refugee, as Liisa Malkki noted in 1996, ‘remains 
curiously, indecently, outside of history’.71
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The Imperial Refugee: Refugees and Refugee-
Creation in the Ottoman Empire and Europe
Jared Manasek
On 2 July 1875, the district commissioner of Metković, a border-town in Habsburg 
Dalmatia, sent an urgent cable to Gabriel Rodich, the province’s governor general, 
regarding disturbances across the border in Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
what to do should Ottoman Christians ‘flee to our territory’.1 The night before, two 
Muslims reportedly attacked the Herzegovinian town of Dracevo. After the attack, two 
townsmen fled to join a new and loosely organized uprising against allegedly abusive 
Muslim landowners.2 Along the way, the young men escorted Dracevo’s women and 
children across the Habsburg border to safety. Given the circumstances, the Metković 
district commissioner thought more villagers might soon come.
In his report to Habsburg foreign minister Gyula Andrássy, Rodich interpreted the 
event primarily as a security matter: Ottoman Christians crossing into Austria-Hungary 
were to be disarmed, ‘in order to maintain [Habsburg] neutrality.’3 Neither the crossing 
nor the Habsburg response was particularly out of the ordinary: Ottoman subjects fled 
across the border most recently in 1873, but also in 1862, 1858, 1842 and earlier, while 
the principle that neutral receiving states maintain their status by disarming refugees 
and removing them from the border had long since been enshrined in international 
law.4 The news from Metković brought no indication that within a matter of months 
the commander of the Habsburg’s military border with northern Bosnia would have 
cause to describe the worst aspect of the rapidly spreading uprising as ‘the massive 
entry of Bosnian refugees onto Austrian-Hungarian soil’, without precedent in the 
past century. 5 By late September, 23,000 Ottoman Christians had fled across Bosnia’s 
northern border; by the time the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, a quarter 
of the population had left and over a third of its Christian population had crossed into 
Austria-Hungary.6
The refugees at Metković internationalized the small peasant uprising that triggered 
the Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 – three years of violence and war across the Balkans and 
beyond. The crisis became one of nineteenth-century Europe’s most serious, with 
the Russian Army reaching the outskirts of Istanbul and Europe on the brink of a 
general war. It ended with the 1878 Treaty of Berlin – the big bang of nation-state 
creation that yielded an independent Montenegro, Romania and Serbia as well as a 
nearly independent Bulgaria, while placing Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina under 
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Habsburg occupation.7  The crisis was also a watershed moment in the history of 
European population politics, and in particular the history of the modern refugee. 
Flight and forced removal became a central feature of the violence across the region, 
leading to demographic shifts that were ‘an ominous portent of what was to come with 
subsequent imperial collapses’,8 In the eastern Balkans, well over a 100,000 Christians 
were displaced, although the violence disproportionately affected Balkan Muslims, of 
whom 250,000–300,000 were killed and another 1.5 million were displaced.9
The violent displacement of 1875–8 typically lacked a consistent and overarching 
intentionality of nation-state creation. In carving new nation-states out of the Ottoman 
Empire’s European provinces, however, the Treaty of Berlin explicitly tied these new 
states’ sovereignty to dominant nations. At the same time, the great powers inserted 
language to protect the civil, religious and property rights of minorities. Romania’s 
treatment of its Jewish minority was a particular concern at Berlin, and while the treaty 
language was intended to protect Balkan Muslims and Christians as well, it was in 
a great part thanks to pressure from Jewish organizations that minority protection 
became a central obligation for all of the newly created Balkan states.10 Romania’s 
subsequent disregard for its minority protection obligations became a prime example 
of the toothless gears of international protection. Nevertheless, with its focus on 
dominant nationalities and minority protection, the Treaty of Berlin concretely made 
‘populations, not just territory, the central object of the international system’.11
In her contribution to this book, Zara Steiner cautions against reading a linear 
development into the successive refugee crises of twentieth-century Europe. The 
warning stands for the nineteenth century, too, when the links between imperial 
collapse and refugees or between nation-state formation and ethnic cleansing were 
hardly straightforward. To be sure, forced migration was endemic to the unwinding 
of European empire, but neither the nation-state nor the ethno-national refugee 
burst into European modernity with a clear, fully formed place in the international 
system. Instead, in the second half of the nineteenth century the relationship between 
displacement and state was dynamic, with nation-state formation neither the exclusive 
driver of displacement nor the necessary outcome. 
By the late nineteenth century European empires were quite familiar with refugees, 
and at least in some respects had become good at both creating and managing displaced 
populations in ways that did not destabilize the international order, even in the face 
of human tragedy. As Nora Lafi has observed of Ottoman attempts to bolster the 
empire’s economy and security through refugee settlement, the treatment of refugees 
by authorities offers ‘many indications of the very conception of imperial governance’.12 
Refugees, and in particular refugee management, could in fact be constitutive of 
empire. 
This chapter begins at the European centre with the creation of an international 
regime for political asylum, before turning to the periphery – to the area of imperial 
contact Mark Levene has dubbed the ‘rimlands’ – where in a wide arc stretching from 
the Russian to the Ottoman Empires, unprecedented mass forced removal challenged 
the emergent refugee regime.13 Europe’s western core was not wholly unfamiliar with 
sudden and large-scale refugee movements triggered by wartime violence. But the 
principles of neutrality and protection that came to define a ‘refugee status’ emerged 
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during Europe’s revolutionary years from the late eighteenth to mid-nineteenth 
centuries in response to individuals fleeing prosecution for ‘political crimes’ – a 
category largely understood to mean revolutionary activity.14 Political asylum came 
to provide a framework for states to protect those fleeing persecution for their politics 
while preserving comity and international stability by preventing asylum questions 
from inciting acrimonious international disputes.15
Criminality and state obligations to combat political crime were a central element 
of nineteenth-century international relations, and the interstate regulation of refugees 
fleeing political persecution lent itself well to management by treaty law. This was 
particularly the case after the revolutions and uprisings of the 1830s, when countries 
of the European core consolidated an extensive body of treaty law and international 
norms that described and governed state responses to political refugees.16 In the 
Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman periphery, several centuries of war and peacemaking 
regulated various forms of population movement – in particular prisoners of war and 
deserters. 17 Viewed from the rimlands, the international refugee and asylum regime 
was particularly relevant, not least because many of the political refugees in the 
European core – such as the 29,000-strong Polish army that fled through Prussia after 
Russia crushed the 1831 insurrection – were, in fact, from the periphery.18 
As a standard of international relations that helped maintain the European order, 
asylum policy could create new diplomatic possibilities: the Ottoman Empire based 
its refusal to surrender Hungarian and Polish refugees from the revolutions of 1848–9 
on the expectations of political asylum as an international institution, thereby using 
European norms to assert its sovereign rights and international legitimacy.19 And 
yet, in the following decades, forced displacement in the rimlands became more 
common, more complicated and larger than before. The 1850s and 1860s saw the 
migration of over one million Russian Muslims to the Ottoman Empire, followed by 
the demographically disastrous Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. The size and rapidity of the 
flights as well as the ethno-national homogeneity of the Black Sea and Balkan refugees 
laid bare the inadequacies of the existing asylum system and anticipated the challenges 
posed by mass movements and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century.
The internationalist institutions that came to embody twentieth-century refugee 
policy supplanted the normative and national refugee regime of the nineteenth 
century, and many of the values and principles were carried over. Yet as this chapter 
shows, no single straight line of historical development can be drawn between the 
imperial and post-imperial refugee. The radicalized politics of the twentieth century 
helped ensure that political asylum endured as an international institution even as 
the context changed. Large-scale refugee movements tagged to ethno-national identity 
occupied different international and domestic political space in the nineteenth 
century than they would occupy in the twentieth century, thanks in part to the flexible 
linkages between demography and the imperial state. Governments still drew on much 
older utilitarian views of refugee immigration as potentially providing populations 
for colonization and economic growth without viewing such immigration as an 
existential threat to the integrity of the empire; at the same time, the forced removal of 
populations could also serve the interests of a modernizing imperial state. Even in the 
face of growing territorial nationalism in the late nineteenth century, refugees could 
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still fit into the imperial world order, while their management, aid and repatriation not 
only legitimized imperial rule but also offered, if only temporarily, alternative models 
for nation-state construction.
From criminal to victim
The refugee regime that emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century was, in the 
first instance, an international criminal law regime.20 Europe’s liberal revolutions had 
forced a reassessment of the nature of criminality – particularly illegal activities against 
the state carried out in the name of a political ideology. Liberal reformers, many of whom 
had themselves been persecuted for political activity, created a new category of ‘political 
crime’ in which the perpetrator did not completely lose his honour through his actions: 
buried in the ‘right of revolution’ was the possibility that one could have honourable 
motives but misguided goals.21 The new category had a profound impact on extradition, 
once a rare practice that became more frequent in the eighteenth century thanks to 
growing cross-border mobility and resultant international crime. New treaties covering 
the ‘surrender of deserters, robbers, murderers, arsonists and vagrants’ proliferated after 
the French Revolution and in the decades following the Congress of Vienna (1814–15), 
making extradition a central component of international criminal law.22 And while 
extradition for general criminality became the norm, by the 1830s, states had begun to 
recognize a ‘political offence exception’ to protect individuals accused of committing 
political crime by granting them something new: political asylum.
The refugee question of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had little 
to do with the earlier linkage between refugees and political crime; Herbert Reiter has 
argued the fundamental change in forced migration in Europe’s nineteenth century 
was in fact a transition from ideology to identity as the driving force behind flight.23 
Nevertheless, political asylum and the political offence exception served as a model, and 
delineated much of the state responses to later refugee movements. Asylum created an 
architecture of refugee protection that was a core component of the European system 
of states and strengthened basic and enduring protocols for states responding to the 
arrival of refugees. In short, political asylum normalized refugees and ‘refugeedom’ as 
a phenomenon to be managed internationally. 
The Congress of Vienna undermined French revolutionary ideas of political 
criminality as Austria, Russia and Prussia pressured European countries to surrender 
revolutionaries and rebels seeking asylum. It was public opinion and the July 
Revolution of 1830 that revived the question of a political offence exception and 
changed the direction of French, and ultimately European, asylum policy. 24 In 1829, 
France extradited Antonio Galotti, a Neapolitan officer and revolutionary, after Naples 
promised to try him only for common crimes and not for political criminality. When 
Naples promptly sentenced the man to death, public outrage was such that the French 
government requested the officer’s return and, after failing to obtain it, threatened war.25
In the wake of the July Revolution, liberal lawmakers refined and institutionalized the 
concept of political crime, and in April 1831, a circular declared the French government 
would no longer request or grant extradition for political crimes.26 The following year 
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French law moved beyond criminality and extradition to focus on refugees themselves. 
In debate, lawmakers defined the term ‘refugee’ as someone residing in France without 
the ‘protection of their government’ or ‘without a passport or contact with any kind of 
ambassador’. Statelessness became the defining characteristic of the refugee.27 The law also 
articulated a sense of individual dependence and state responsibility by narrowly focusing 
on managing refugee populations. It empowered the government to compel refugees 
to assemble in designated towns as well as to expel refugees should they disturb public 
order.28 Moreover, as one lawmaker opined, refugees were people whose presence came at 
a cost to the host.29 In the case of Polish refugees from the November Uprising (1830–1), 
that amounted to two million francs in 1832; for the first quarter of 1833, the interior 
ministry budgeted 375,000 francs – over one-third of the ministry’s entire budget.30
On 1 October 1833, Belgian lawmakers passed an extradition law that for the 
first time codified political asylum – or rather, the political offence exception to 
extradition. The law viewed extradition as an exception to the rule, permitted it only 
in specific circumstances and subjected all extradition claims to judicial control. It 
also governed the contents of any extradition treaties Belgium might sign, requiring 
for example that a foreigner ‘shall not be prosecuted nor punished for any political 
offence [committed] before extradition, nor for any fact connected to such a crime ....’31 
The Belgian principles spread quickly through European treaty law, and the process 
seemed to depoliticize extradition. Even though host countries continued to restrict 
movements, intern refugees or even transport them to penal colonies, the institution 
of political asylum acquired an idealized veneer as an expression of universal human 
values.32 It was this characteristic, with its civilizational undertones, that helped to 
make extradition a powerful tool of Great Power diplomacy during one of the most 
dramatic episodes of nineteenth-century political emigration – the flight of Polish and 
Hungarian revolutionaries to the Ottoman Empire in 1848–9. 
The exact number of individuals who fled to Ottoman territory is unclear. Ottoman 
and European sources broadly agree on around 5,000 Hungarian soldiers although 
when dependents and civilians are included the number might have been as large as 
16,000. There were as many as 6,000 Poles.33 While refugees were already the subject 
of Austro-Ottoman negotiations in late 1848, the majority of them did not arrive on 
Ottoman territory until the final defeat of the Hungarian army on 13 August 1849 
at Világos. By the end of August both Russia and Austria had submitted extradition 
requests to an unreceptive Ottoman government. Russia requested the return of ten 
individuals who had fled after the collapse of the Hungarian revolt; Austria issued a 
blanket demand for the return of all who had fled to the Ottoman Empire.34 
Russia and Austria based their demands on existing treaties forbidding the 
contracting powers from sheltering fugitives.35 The Ottoman government viewed the 
claims as unfounded; in the case of Russia, the Ottomans argued that according to the 
Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) they needed only to expel, not extradite, fugitives in 
order to meet obligations.36 For its part, Austria quickly realized its treaties left it with 
little hope for anything more than the fugitives being removed from the border zone.37
The Ottoman’s rejection of the Austrian and Russian extradition requests 
precipitated an international crisis. Both Russia and Austria broke off diplomatic 
relations on 17 September, with the former threatening that the escape of even one 
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refugee from Ottoman custody would be a casus belli.38 Fearing any concessions 
would further undermine Ottoman sovereignty, France and Britain pledged to support 
the sultan. Russia and Austria backed down after Britain and France clarified their 
position by sending their Mediterranean fleets into the Dardanelles.39 Austria, for its 
part, finally agreed to allow the Ottomans to send some refugees into inner Anatolia, 
and allow some 3,000 more to go home.40
Extradition and asylum were embedded in balance-of-power politics and 
the emerging ‘Eastern Question,’ but they were also more than the kernel of an 
international crisis: they formed a language for diplomatic pressure. The Ottoman’s 
success in repulsing Russian and Austrian extradition demands underlined the 
strength of political asylum as an institution, while enabling the Ottoman Empire to 
assert international legitimacy and membership in the European family of nations. 
Beyond the political offence exception as a new international legal trump, asylum was 
discussed in reference to the standards of ‘humanity’. Humanitarian language had long 
appeared in relation to political asylum, but in 1848–9 it became central. The sultan 
defined his motives not as political, but as an ‘effect of the sentiments of humanity 
and compassion’, while the foreign diplomatic corps invoked humanity to articulate 
concerns over likely punishments should the revolutionaries be extradited.41 
For the Ottomans and their supporters, the concept of humanity informed and 
buttressed the idea of an ‘honourable’ policy that would elevate European sympathies 
for the Ottoman Empire while reifying and universalizing an emerging European 
standard.42 For legal scholars, the Ottoman resistance was a key moment in the history 
of political asylum: the involvement of all Europe’s great powers, the threat of war and 
the display of force clearly demonstrated the centrality of asylum to the functioning of 
the international system. The German jurist Franz von Holtzendorff saw the willingness 
of the ‘Islamic government’ to protect Christians against despotic Christian states as a 
source of European sympathy during the Crimean War.43 Hyperbolic, but the point drew 
a broader lesson about civilization: not only were there ‘civilized despots’ in Europe, but 
countries that ‘typically count as uncivilized’ could nevertheless display ‘political honor’.44
Removal and resettlement
Less than a decade later, the Ottoman Empire faced a refugee crisis of a different nature 
and on a different scale: from 1855 to 1866, somewhere between 500,000 and nearly 
1 million Muslims left Russia for the Ottoman Empire.45 The emigration of Crimean 
Tatars and Circassians from the Caucasus was one of the largest and most concentrated 
mass migrations in European history up to that point, and while these populations 
were frequently described as ‘emigrants’, the violence of their expulsion and the misery 
of their flight has helped to insert the population movements into a ‘death and exile’ 
narrative that feeds into the twentieth-century history of forced migration and ethnic 
cleansing.46 Yet displacement was not based simply on identity, and particularly in 
Crimea, Russia lacked a clear policy on expulsion and emigration.47 
Russia’s relationship to its Muslim population was determined as much by location 
and imperial planning as by religion, and removal was not an empire-wide project: 
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elsewhere, the Russian government and Muslims cooperated.48 In the Caucasus, for 
example, the ‘cleansing’ was part of a modernization project that foresaw resettlement 
of the region by Orthodox Russian colonists, but was also intended to civilize Muslims 
after their relocation elsewhere in the Empire.49 Similarly, the Ottoman Empire viewed 
the migrants as both a burden and a resource for its own modernization projects.50 
More than just prefiguring nation-state demographic politics, the expulsion and 
slaughter of Russian Muslims was also deeply, inherently, constitutive of empire – 
informing and expanding on seemingly viable imperial models of rule in the Russian 
and the Ottoman empires. 
The emigration of Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire began in the eighteenth 
century, but grew rapidly during the Crimean War.51 Conflict among Russian and 
Tatar peasants, confusion during military operations and suspicion that Tatars were 
cooperating with the enemy led some Russian officials to propose mass deportation 
of Tatars from the conflict zone. These plans were never put in effect, even though 
removals did take place in an ad hoc manner at the local level.52 Land speculators 
spread many of the stories of collusion in the hope of ousting Tatar landholders, while 
wartime flight of Tatars – possibly at Ottoman invitation – reinforced the rumours of 
collaboration.53 
It was, instead, government reaction and local circumstances that prompted Tatar 
flight. Alexander II’s response to the emigration convinced many Tatars they were no 
longer welcome in Russia; in June 1856 an order came down that Crimean officials were 
not to block any emigration, which should instead be viewed as beneficial because it 
would free the land of a ‘harmful element’.54 The Tatars, reported one Russian general, 
‘accepted this as a forced measure of eviction, concluding that they had forever lost the 
favor of the tsar.’55 The emigration took on new proportions in 1860 with the arrival 
in Crimea of Nogai Tatars from the Caucasus. The Nogais’s stories of Russian military 
victories and forced displacement spurred the Crimean Tatar ‘great migration’ of 1860, 
when the majority of the 200,000 post-war emigrants actually left.56 
In the Caucasus, ongoing Russian military operations against indigenous mountain 
tribes complicated Muslim emigration. Russian claims to the territory went back to 
the late nineteenth century, but it was only at the end of the Crimean War that the 
Russian Army began its final push into the restive Caucasian highlands. Circassians 
and members of other tribes had started to leave in noticeable numbers not long after 
the end of the Crimean War, but Russian Army tactics and an imperial decree from 
September 1861 giving the Caucasian mountaineers one month either to emigrate or 
resettle accelerated the process: between 1856 and 1862 fewer than 100,000 Circassians 
left for the Ottoman Empire; in the following three years, 300,000–400,000 fled, and 
possibly many more.57 The Caucasian highlands were virtually depopulated.58
As with the Crimean Tatars, Russian policy seemed muddled. Officials initially 
sought to restrict emigration of some groups from the Caucasus while allowing those 
seen as less compliant to depart; in both cases, among the first to leave were the elite.59 
Even though the Russian government tried to prevent return migration from the 
Ottoman Empire, it also took measures – such as more closely regulating individuals 
who claimed they were performing Hajj to Mecca – to prevent the Muslim population 
from leaving.60 Starting in 1862, this approach gradually changed and the state took 
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on an increasing role in organizing departures, including by 1863, opening bidding to 
shipping companies for the transportation of 200,000 Circassians from various ports 
to the Ottoman Empire.61 For their part, the Ottomans had little choice in the matter. 
They helped Tatar populations leave after the Crimean War, and throughout the 
period there were constant rumours of secret Russian–Ottoman population transfer 
agreements. In the Circassian case, there was less active support for emigration. The 
Ottomans were surprised by the bidding for shipping companies in 1863, but they took 
their role in protecting Muslim populations seriously and were ultimately unable to 
say no to new immigrants – the best they could hope for was some control over how 
many refugees would arrive where and when. Partly for this reason, the Ottomans and 
Russians concluded a set of agreements for using both civilian and military ships to 
transfer people.62
Russia’s policies of removal in the Caucasus were central to a colonial civilizing 
mission that was part of a broader project of imperial modernization. Once cleared of 
the mountaineers, land would be put to better use by Orthodox Russian settlers, while 
the highlanders would be resettled in areas where they could farm and be culturally 
elevated. The fact that so many Circassians died in the process was, Irma Kreiten 
argues, beside the point: forced removal would eliminate the radicals while helping the 
state to ‘mould’ those who remained.63 
The Black Sea migrations in the decade after the Crimean War put extraordinary 
pressure on the Ottoman Empire, its institutions and its infrastructure. And while the 
sheer number of refugees arriving in the empire – particularly during the peak years 
of 1864–5 – resulted in overwhelming loss of life, the Ottoman government began a 
massive aid project designed to receive incoming refugees and then resettle them in 
strategically important locations across the empire. The refugees, it was hoped, would 
help strengthen border security and contribute to the Ottoman agricultural industry. 
In this way, just as the Circassians’ removal served Russia’s modernizers, their arrival 
in the Ottoman Empire might well help to strengthen the Ottoman state and increase 
agricultural output.64 
An early manifestation of this combined refugee and modernization programme 
came in 1856 with a large-scale Ottoman effort to settle Tatars in the eastern Balkans. 
Among the most dramatic undertaking was the creation of a new town, Mecidiye, in 
Dobruja.65 Lying at the intersection of major trade routes, the town was intended to offer 
housing to refugees as well as become a commercial and administrative hub. Engineers 
and builders were brought in from across the empire to build a modern planned 
community, laid out on a grid, with housing and commercial areas. Construction went 
quickly and by November, some 1,000 houses had been built.66 Refugees were offered 
land for free, agricultural tax holidays, exemption from military service and money 
to pay for construction and agricultural tools.67 While profiteering marred the pilot 
project, Mecidiye quickly became a successful community – by 1864 the population 
was 15,000–20,000.68
The Ottoman refugee aid project was predicated on permanently settling refugees in 
strategically important locations and providing the settlers with similar terms as those 
offered to the people of Mecidiye. Though clever on paper, the system bred discontent 
on the ground: migrants were expected to start farming in unfamiliar climates and 
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with inadequate supplies, while in Bulgaria, for example, the land they were offered 
had often been seized from Christian peasants expressly for the purpose of aid.69 As the 
scale of migration grew, settlement projects such as Mecidiye became an impossible 
luxury. The lack of preparation and the limits of Ottoman resources and weaknesses of 
the project appeared early: unpaid bills meant shipping companies stopped providing 
transportation for refugees to their settlement locations and provisions did not arrive.70
Up through 1860, the Ottomans had been processing refugees at the regional 
level. But with the rate of arrival increasing as Russia pressed into the Caucasus, the 
government established an empire-wide Emigrant Commission in January, 1860 to 
centralize responsibility for all aspects of refugee management.71 The Commission was 
strained severely. By February 1864 in the port city of Trabzon, 2,500 refugees had 
been arriving each week with another 40,000–50,000 expected not long thereafter.72 
The refugees had in many cases been camped out in the open for months while waiting 
for transport on rickety ships to the Ottoman Empire and on arrival were again forced 
to camp. Contagious disease, starvation and exposure killed hundreds of refugees per 
day, while Anatolian towns started reporting destitute, starving and naked refugees 
wandering aimlessly.73
The summer of 1864 brought with it better weather and more experience on the 
side of the Emigrant Commission. More provisions were reaching the port cities, and 
refugees were transported in a more orderly fashion to inland metropolitan centres, 
and were then settled in outlying areas. In the early years of the migration, refugees 
had largely been settled on the border regions with the intent to shore up Ottoman 
defensive lines. By 1863–4, the Emigrant Commission was settling refugees, especially 
in Anatolia, with an eye towards agricultural production – a tactic that was repeated 
with Balkan refugees during the Eastern Crisis. While innovative for managing large 
numbers of refugees, settlement programmes of this sort were hardly new, and the 
Emigrant Commission’s programme placed the refugees very clearly in the long-term 
project of Ottoman economic modernization through the sedentarization of nomadic 
tribes.74 In the Ottoman case, refugee settlement and nomadic sedentarization were 
intimately entwined at a functional level, and the growing competition over land 
resources encouraged nomads to settle and turn to farming.75 By 1914, the Ottoman 
government had formally recognized the similarities when it merged refugee 
settlement with its nomadic civilizing mission in the new General Directorate for 
Tribes and Refugees.76
Nations, states and refugees
The Ottoman Empire continued strategic settlement as a means of relieving the pressure 
of refugee populations well into the twentieth century. Yet despite the continuity in some 
patterns of refugee management, by the late nineteenth century refugee movement 
was becoming an unfamiliar and new challenge to the international system. With the 
Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 came an unprecedented intertwining of territorial nationalism 
and forced removal. The minority rights clauses inserted into the 1878 Treaty of Berlin 
were an early international attempt to minimize the impact of demands for popular 
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sovereignty in emergent nation-states; by the end of the Great War, what Eric Weitz calls 
the ‘Paris System’ of international guarantees for minorities and restricted sovereignties 
for the post-imperial rimland nation-states had – at least conceptually – fulfilled the 
promise of Berlin. Moreover, the Berlin Treaty’s concern with not only protecting the 
minority populations at hand but also extending rights and protections to those who 
were displaced helped to create a new framework that explicitly tied international 
refugee politics with the development of minority rights regimes. 
Read backwards, the displacements of the Eastern Crisis and the international 
response to them appear to mark a turning point at which forced removal and 
territorial nationalism intersect, and map out the path towards the forty years’ crisis 
of the twentieth century and the failure of the international minority rights regime. 
Read forwards, a different picture emerges. The violence of the Eastern Crisis revived 
the great powers’ long-standing concerns over how to maintain a European balance of 
power in the face of Ottoman military defeats and territorial fragmentation. Nationalist 
aspirations were certainly important in 1875–8, but they are easy to overemphasize. 
77 Moreover, the home-grown and nationalizing nature of the violence as well as the 
ensuing mass displacement were new, and at the time they were not obviously the first 
step towards a new normal. The sheer size and intensity of the displacement opened 
new political possibilities as populations – and by extension the ability to manage 
population movement – became increasingly tied to state sovereignty. 
The emerging link between population, displacement and sovereignty cut in two 
directions. Increasingly, expulsion and disenfranchisement of some accompanied by 
the inclusion of others might secure domestic legitimacy. Yet the terms of the Berlin 
Treaty were intended to discourage a ‘great unweaving’ of populations, and that meant 
international legitimacy might be claimed through incorporation – including through 
refugee management, repatriation and settlement.78 While the outcome of Berlin does 
suggest an important turn towards the link between displacement and territorial 
sovereignty, the essential characteristic of exclusion that took hold in the twentieth 
century had not yet been fully formed.
The examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eastern Rumelia demonstrate 
alternatives to the homogenizing model of territorial nationalism.79 In the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the number of Orthodox Christian refugees increased 
on the Habsburg side of the border, both the Habsburgs and the Ottomans at first 
saw common purpose in repatriation, which would have relieved Habsburg border 
populations while demonstrating internationally an Ottoman ability to meet the 
needs of its Christian population.80 Early joint attempts to repatriate the refugees seem 
to have been in earnest, but as the violence continued, Austria-Hungary saw in the 
uprising an opportunity to realize long-standing designs on the provinces. The failure 
to return refugees became a key bargaining chip at Berlin, where Austria-Hungary 
used the Ottoman inability to repatriate refugees to win support for an expansionist 
plan to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Ottomans.81 
Austria-Hungary gained control over Bosnia and Herzegovina through what 
amounted to a legal trick, in which the Ottoman Empire maintained nominal 
sovereignty even as the provinces came under a Habsburg administrative occupation. 
But Habsburg designs extended beyond acquisition to an imperial civilizing mission 
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that included the restoration of the earlier demographics through repatriation of 
Christian refugees, and support for the existing Bosnian Muslim community.82 Austria-
Hungary’s premise that Ottoman ‘misrule’ had inhibited the cultural development not 
only of Christians but also the Muslim community put the new administration in a 
situation analogous to the one faced by the Ottomans: failure to ensure Muslim well-
being would directly challenge claims to administrative legitimacy. Although Abdul 
Hamid II, the Ottoman sultan, had reluctantly consented to the occupation, he had 
little influence over the local population, which resisted. What officials in Vienna had 
assumed would be a peaceful transfer of power instead turned into a bloody fight to 
take the capital.83 The violence perpetrated by both sides caused many Muslims to 
leave, and the rate of emigration increased with the establishment of the Habsburg 
martial government, which swiftly and often indiscriminately executed members of 
the resistance and others suspected of having opposed the occupation. Even after the 
violence subsided, Muslim emigration continued for a variety of reasons, ranging from 
family affairs to concerns over Muslims’ status under Christian rule.84 
The question of Muslim migration mattered not only to the Habsburg government 
and its civilizing mission, but also to the Ottomans, who justifiably worried about the 
total loss of Ottoman influence in the provinces. In fact, Ottoman policy underwent 
a reversal: after first encouraging Muslim emigration as a form of protest against 
the occupation and to undermine Habsburg claims to effective administration and 
legitimate rule, the Ottoman council of ministers realized preserving a Bosnian 
Muslim population was essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the 
provinces.85 Both of the Ottoman approaches as well as Habsburg policy goals point 
not just to the increasingly important link between population and sovereignty, but 
to population politics that, in the face of growing territorial nationalism, stood as a 
bulwark of the imperial system itself. 
The circumstances in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia offer a counterpoint to 
those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and complicate traditional narratives of how non-
national populations figure into the emergent nation-state. The Treaty of Berlin was a 
multilateral revision to the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano that had actually ended 
the war. The other great powers particularly disliked San Stefano’s creation of a so-called 
‘Greater Bulgaria’: a large, autonomous principality that would owe its very existence 
to Russia. San Stefano included guarantees for Muslim landowners and non-Bulgarian 
populations in the new territory, but even though Russian negotiators pointed out 
that large swaths of territory had been depopulated of Muslims through mass flight, 
they also flatly rejected Ottoman requests for refugee return and settlement.86 In the 
face of Russian efforts to reduce the Muslim population of a new Bulgaria, Ottoman 
negotiators offered a population and territorial exchange: The Ottomans would 
maintain control over the southern section of San Stefano Bulgaria, and would then 
facilitate a trade, in which the Muslims in the north would move south, and the non-
Muslims in the south would move north. 
Russia rejected the Ottoman proposal and the Great Powers overturned San 
Stefano months later at Berlin, which created a Bulgarian principality under Ottoman 
suzerainty in the north and returned Eastern Rumelia to Ottoman control as a province 
with a Christian governor and a liberal autonomy. San Stefano had given the Orthodox 
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Southern Slavs a taste of what could have been, but the Berlin solution to Eastern 
Rumelia changed the calculations of how to achieve it. Even more so than in the case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the well-being of minority populations – and Muslims 
in particular – was linked explicitly to international legitimacy. For Bulgaria, that 
meant putting in place the mechanisms for repatriation while actively discouraging 
emigration.87 A similar phenomenon played out in Eastern Rumelia, where the 
Ottoman government, trying to maintain suzerainty, and the provincial government, 
aspiring to full independence, both saw refugee return and long-term settlement as 
primary tools for staking claims of sovereignty over the territory.88 
At least in principle, the Eastern Rumelian model of territorial national sovereignty 
was to be characterized by a level of inclusivity not apparent among other emergent 
Balkan nation-states, in particular Romania. To be sure, Eastern Rumelia was marked 
by anti-Muslim violence at the local level and a pervasive structural exclusion of 
Muslims – for example, in the use of Bulgarian in the government. But the leadership 
was invested in demonstrating its ability to govern both Christians and Muslims in the 
hopes of securing eventual independence while couching their policies in the language 
of civilization.89 For their part, the Ottomans tried to demonstrate the provincial 
government’s inability to rule effectively over Muslims. The Ottomans pointed to 
bureaucratic obstacles to refugee return, the settlement of Christians on Muslims’ land 
and to petitions from Muslims seeking protection.90 Eastern Rumelia did provide some 
aid for Muslim refugees to return, but could not stem the steady departure of Muslims 
for the Ottoman Empire, a fact that led to mutual recriminations from the imperial 
and provincial governments.91 Nevertheless, the back-and-forth over the treatment 
of Muslims and the return of refugees – regardless of the veracity of claims – was 
indicative of the terms set up by the Treaty of Berlin: emerging nation-states could try 
to curry international favour through refugee return. 
Conclusion
If the major transformation in the cause of refugee flight over the course of the nineteenth 
century was a shift from people fleeing and seeking protection based on ideology to 
flight based on identity, the corollary was this: the language of national homogeneity 
as an ‘ideal of state sovereignty’ forged new connections between forced migration, 
sovereignty and legitimacy.92 This chapter has examined Habsburg, Russian and 
Ottoman imperial experiences with forced migration to argue that throughout much of 
the nineteenth century, flight and asylum were central to the international system, and 
that refugees and their management could be instrumentalized to serve domestic and 
foreign policy goals. As national identity and the demands of homogeneity took hold, 
however, the nature of the relationship between refugees and the state changed. With 
the fracturing of empire into nation-states, forced migration and control over refugees 
could be used to stake claims to contested territory. The Habsburg and Ottoman 
empires both argued the imperial case by trying to maintain ‘multi-ethnic’ populations, 
while emergent and presumptive nation-states saw in international agreements means 
of using refugee return and protection in their claims to sovereignty.
The Imperial Refugee 79
There is no mention of refugees in the Treaty of Berlin, yet in discussions of land 
ownership claims and civic protections their departure is acknowledged and potential 
return anticipated. The Berlin Treaty is also less than explicit when it comes specifically 
to nationality. For all the talk of Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Turks and others, the 
actual protections Berlin put in place were exclusively religious and did not therefore 
define protected groups in the light of an official ‘state people’. And yet, while the 
nomenclature of Versailles had yet to be fixed, it is clear that as nationalization in 
the Balkans fell along religious lines, the arbitrary creation of European minorities in 
the wake of the Great War that Hannah Arendt described was already under way in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century.93 Even in the language, the continuities are hard 
to overlook: the text from Article 7 of the ‘Little Versailles’ minorities treaty with Poland 
guaranteeing ‘the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance the admission 
to public employments, functions, and honors, or the exercise of professions and 
industries’ is almost verbatim lifted from the guarantees imposed on Bulgaria in 1878.94 
The Berlin Treaty has been described as a ‘paper threat’ the great powers failed 
to stand behind: a harbinger of the failures of the interwar minorities treaties yet to 
come. Indeed, in the treaties ending the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, many of Berlin’s 
principles were walked back; the bilateral treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey proposed 
population transfer.95 Yet, after the signing of the Berlin Treaty, the persistence of 
refugee return and management policies among some emerging Balkan states and the 
Habsburg and Ottoman empires points to a precarious viability of minority protection, 
despite the lack of the transnational structures created in 1919. From this perspective 
at least, the Berlin Treaty was more than just paper. It was a tenuous framework that 
emerging states did, in fact, try to use.
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The Forty Years’ Crisis: The Jewish Dimension
Mark Levene
In a three-day period at the end of August 1941, near an obscure western Ukrainian 
town close to the intersection of the pre-war Polish, Soviet, Hungarian and Rumanian 
borders, some 23,600 Jews were murdered by the Nazis. Noteworthy for this being 
the first occasion in which the tally reached and vastly surpassed a five figure number 
as well as one of the first in which men, women and children were systematically 
exterminated, the massacres at Kamenets-Podolsk have been treated by historians 
as a major staging post in the shift from an initial ‘experimental’ phase in the Nazi 
destruction of European Jewry to a programme of concerted annihilation, which we 
have come to recognize as the Holocaust.1 
Yet this is only half the story. Though some of the murdered Jews were Soviet citizens 
local to the town, some 16,000 were either Jews who had recently been made stateless 
by the Hungarians in the nearby Carpatho-Rus region, were refugees from across 
Europe evicted by Budapest – as the US ambassador there noted in ‘distinct violation 
of the right of asylum’ – or were Rumanian Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina 
forcibly deported by the Bucharest authorities.2 In other words, the majority of those 
killed at Kamenets-Podolsk, alongside many more who died in nearby massacres at 
this time, were either Jews who had been denied their citizenship or their recognition 
as legitimate asylum seekers by states other than Germany but who then used the 
opportunity of Operation Barbarossa to illegally eruct them across international 
borders into a Nazi-occupied war zone. 
From this perspective Kamenets-Podolsk becomes less a significant moment in the 
unfolding of a specifically Hitlerian drive against the Jews and more a climactic one 
in a much wider and deeper European, not to say global, crisis of Jewish displacement 
and unwantedness. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to propose that the 
attempted destruction of European Jewry, while clearly the direct outcome of a self-
inflicted Nazi cul-de-sac in their own efforts to be rid of them, was also a consequence 
of this much more embedded and universal malaise. One might go further and suggest 
that the international community, through its individual and collective ambiguity, if 
not downright refusal, to accept the notion of displaced and dispossessed Jews from 
the Reich, and beyond, as refugees – either in principle or practice – paved the way for 
and, inadvertently or otherwise, became complicit in the radicalized Nazi solution to 
the problem. 
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Yet a difficult question is posed by the implications of this assertion. The forty-year 
refugee crisis, as this book makes abundantly clear, was hardly a Jewish one alone. 
Indeed, one could argue that in terms of a truly searing moment, when the liberal 
West was faced with having to do something immediate and consequential to relieve 
a truly gargantuan emergency prior to the Second World War, it was not Jews who 
were the community at issue, but rather the Greeks of Asia Minor. Compared with this 
1922 catastrophe, the British refugee expert, Sir John Hope Simpson, considered the 
much smaller number of central European Jews at the centre of the 1938 emergency 
an entirely more manageable prospect. Yet Hope Simpson also recognized that the 
immediate pre-war Nazi effort at Jewish expulsion had the capacity to trigger a much 
wider and entirely more demographically serious displacement of the much larger 
Ashkenazi communities further to the east.3 Even then, this might simply remind us 
that these Jews were among many peoples who were exposed to the winds of radical 
change as the imperial empires of the historically multi-ethnic rimlands of eastern 
Europe and western Eurasia were replaced by successor polities implicitly or explicitly 
committed to nation-state-building master narratives. Indeed, this intense epoch of 
‘minority group’ vulnerability coincided with the exact post-Great War moment when 
what Alfred Crosby has dubbed the neo-Europes, most especially North America, 
blocked off the migratory safety valve, which had provided refuge for any number of 
diverse peoples prior to 1914.4 After all, the estimated 2.4–2.7 million Jews who exited 
Europe for these new worlds between 1881 and 1914, at a rate of 65,000 per annum to 
the United States alone in the key 1899–1910 phase, were only a fraction of the total 
European or near-European migrant exodus from this period.5 But if this process was 
both momentous and traumatic, it only provided the antechamber to the post-1918 
crisis because the relatively minimally regulated and largely unstanched prior flow 
was superseded by an entirely more mobilized, bureaucratic regime of immigration 
controls and quotas. 
From this perspective the specifically Jewish refugee crisis might be seen as yet 
another symptom of the post-Great War mismatch between the urgent needs of 
minority group exit from the imperial shatter-zones, as set against the barriers 
to Western state ingress heralded by the onset of a contemporary era of close state 
supervision and surveillance of cross-border people movements. This, in the starkest 
terms, would reduce the Jewish crisis to an entirely functional question, a position 
sometimes adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and most 
certainly in some of the ‘blue-skies’ thinking of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s top-secret 
1940s M-Project (M for Migration) to shift Europe’s surplus peoples, Jews included, 
to often far-flung and obscure colonial vistas.6 Yet we have already proposed that the 
actual Nazi denouement cannot be viewed as some entirely aberrant or peculiarly 
contingent twist in an otherwise fraught yet ongoing process, leading towards some 
ultimately benign resolution of the refugee crisis, Jewish or Gentile. This is why it has to 
be contextualized within its wider parameters. What nevertheless stands out about the 
Jewish aspect is not just the extreme cultural hostility evinced towards Jews at national 
and international levels, but the way this translated into an almost standard political 
pretext to deny or refute the existence of a specific Jewish refugee issue at all. As the 
Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann acidly summarized at the time of the infamous Evian 
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Conference, the world had become divided ‘into two camps, one of countries expelling 
Jews, and the other of countries which did not admit them’.7
To be sure, the reification of all state actions on the one hand, and a more general 
societal animus on the other into a single indictment of anti-Semitism, fails to grasp 
the spectrum of tendencies at work, some of which were empathetically, even defiantly, 
humanitarian. By the same token, any assumption that there was or could only be one 
single Jewish response, encapsulated in the Zionist insistence that the only answer to 
the crisis was the creation of a sovereign state of their own in Palestine, wilfully ignores 
Jewish narratives which sought other routes to communal rescue and survival. It also 
avoids the impact that the creation of Israel had in terms of its knock-on displacements 
– both Jewish and non-Jewish – on the manner in which the forty-year crisis had a 
pronounced if convoluted afterlife.
That said, the fundamental historical challenge is to understand the causative factors 
which lead to primary, dominant trends with significant or lasting outcomes, as opposed 
to those which become recessive, submerged or completely obliterated by the course 
of events. And one cannot but note that what stands out as dominant in Gentile terms, 
namely a desire to be shot of Jewish ‘refugees’ through some far away, extra-European 
territorialized ‘solution,’ had its corollary in mainstream Zionism’s absolute rejection of 
humanitarian asylum notions in favour of a politically led, if firmly Palestine-centric, 
‘emergence from powerlessness’.8 The searing tragedy of the actual Jewish crisis is that set 
against these grand political agendas, vast swathes of human beings caught in the middle 
were denied their most urgent need: a place of genuine refuge. Or put another way, the road 
from Kamenets-Podolsk towards Auschwitz may have been in some very definite sense 
unilaterally taken, yet it is very difficult to conceive of it in isolation from the broadening 
gulf between the asylum imperative and the absence of effective international response. 
The onset of mass Ashkenazi migration from eastern Europe is usually dated to 1881 
as galvanized by the wave of pogroms across the Russian Pale of Settlement, following 
the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. For our purposes, however, a stronger clue 
to the crisis as it would begin to crystallize forty years later is offered by the great 
power deliberations on the ‘Jewish question’ three years earlier at the Congress of 
Berlin. The point at issue was the sovereignty of recently self-appointed post-Ottoman 
Balkan polities, and more exactly, whether the persistent refusal by Rumania to grant 
citizenship to the majority of its Jews would debar Bucharest from international 
recognition. The issue of political and civil rights aside, what Rumanian stonewalling 
at the Congress posited was the possibility that a modern nation-state might determine 
that a portion of its population were on ethnic or religious grounds apatrides, yet in 
spite of that could still be accepted as a fully recognized member of the community of 
nations. But then, from a Rumanian perspective, most of the Jews in question were not 
‘native’ but in the words of one notable supporter at Berlin, the Russian foreign minister 
Alexander Gorchakov, ‘a veritable scourge to the indigenous population’. Gorchakov 
drew out his point to his fellow plenipotentiaries by making a distinction between 
‘the israe﻿́lites of Berlin, Paris, London or Vienna, to whom one would assuredly not 
withhold these rights, with the juifs of Serbia, Rumania and several Russian provinces’ 
who were inferred to be alien invaders disruptive of any ‘natural’ societal evolution.9 
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A few years later the influential Polish journal Glos would reinforce the insinuation 
thus: ‘Every society, in relation to the Jews, must work to destroy them – whether we 
will call this extermination, expulsion, or assimilation, does not change the essence of 
things. Both judeophiles and anti-Semites want to destroy the Jews as Jews, that is, as 
representatives of a separate society.’10 
Through to the outset of the Great War, such a gloomy forecast appeared to be only 
partially proven. In 1878 the immediate diplomatic scandale of Rumanian intransigence 
on Jewish rights had been averted, while the deteriorating condition for Jews in the east 
did not lead to the raising of the emigration drawbridge. However, what is interesting 
about this immediate pre-crisis period is the degree to which elite Jewish opinion was 
so thoroughly exercised by the scale of the migration flow. Largely plutocratic Western 
Jewish leaderships, operating on the assumption that large numbers of incoming 
Ostjuden spelt the rise of domestic anti-Semitism, strove to develop strategies aimed 
at moving them on, dispersing them away from major metropoles, or even, as in the 
case of Anglo-Jewish Board of Guardians, paying for their repatriation.11 Yet Theodor 
Herzl, the fin de sie﻿̀cle arch-prophet of Zionism, sought to mobilize the international 
community behind his notion of a Jewish sovereign state on the not dissimilar premise 
that as a matter of self-interest the great powers would want to help found such a 
‘colonial’ entity – even in Africa – in order to siphon off a mass Ashkenazi influx to 
their own shores.12 Other non-Zionist schemes such as that of the Jewish Colonization 
Association to settle Jews on the Argentine Pampas, or that of the Jewish Territorial 
Organization – which was less particular about the exact geographical locale – seem 
to have been motivated by similar imperatives.13 If some of the thinking behind such 
projects was certainly utopian as opposed to the more precisely dystopian Gentile 
fantasies from the late 1930s and early 1940s for removing European Jews en bloc to 
some faraway hell, not only do these tendencies suggest an elite Jewish perception of 
migrant co-religionists as a problem to be resolved en masse but they also indicate 
an underlying cultural sensitivity on the matter, reflecting an almost Gorchakov-like 
duality. 
The pre-1914 Jewish world thus provides a rather fractured insight into the early 
intimations of how Jews would respond, in the event of the real crisis later on. There 
were Zionists longing for an imagined Jewish national community in Palestine, very 
often impelled by a horror of the shmutzige shtetl (filthy village) of east European life. 
There were acculturated western Jews supposedly at daggers drawn with Zionism, who 
often wanted to be kind and generous to needy immigrants but in their heart of hearts 
also wanted them to go anywhere but where they lived. And then there was the vast 
majority of the immigrants themselves whose ideological moorings may have been 
flaky, shifting or non-existent but who responded to their increasingly dire situation 
at home with a firm determination that however they were going to get there and 
whatever bureaucratic obstacles were thrown in their path it was not towards Palestine, 
or some other distant agricultural colony, but the true goldene medina (promised land): 
New York. 
This presents a certain paradox about the pre-1914 migration sequence. Should 
we call this in itself a refugee crisis? With various caveats the answer is not quite. So 
long as they could, even when as a consequence of direct flight-specific pogrom events 
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perhaps excluded, most departing Jews were able to do so in relatively good order. And 
working through their own increasingly transnational family networks for subsistence 
and support, they did not generally need interfering communal organizations to 
show them how to do it, however grateful the migrants may have been for temporary 
Jewish charity-supported shelter and succour in transit or on destination arrival. To 
be sure, there is another darker side to this pre-1914 assessment. Set against Western 
liberal expressions of sympathy for their persecution, there was a growing, insistent 
and most often media-led, demotic trend within receiving countries, which mimicked 
not so much the Gorchakov as the Glos line. The very term ‘alien’ as given concrete 
political expression in the British statute of 1905 gives the lie to the notion that this 
virulently anti-Semitic trend was a purely ‘continental’ phenomenon. It is true that the 
Aliens Act proved to be much worse in its threatened bark than its actual bite. Nor in 
itself did it radically stem the Jewish immigrant flow to London’s East End and other 
major cities. Yet the very fact that this was the first time that Britain had introduced 
immigration controls and registration paved the way for an entirely new regime. The 
British Aliens Restriction Act rushed through Parliament within twenty-four hours of 
Britain declaring war on Germany on 5 August 1914, marks a precise cut-off date.14 
The era of open, laissez-faire migration from East to West was over. 
The point at which one might thus set the emergence of a genuine Jewish refugee crisis 
narrative would appear to be the moment when wartime legislation was reaffirmed for 
the peace, in the British case with the 1919 Aliens Restriction Act extending the terms 
of its 1914 predecessor but now also consciously omitting any reference to refugees 
or asylum.15 With the US quota system coming into force two years later, the safety 
valve enabling east European Jewish exit to the west was almost completely shut off. 
Yet this needs to be set against why it was exactly this moment when the potentiality of 
mass Jewish flight from Russia and eastern Europe became so acute. The Great War’s 
most long-term and searing consequence was the destruction of the old, multi-ethnic 
European empires and their replacement by post-imperial regimes which, whether 
national or Soviet, had little or no wish to accommodate the ongoing existence of Jews 
as Jews in their midst. In fact, the possibility of some huge, even total, Jewish evacuation 
from the empire had already passed a threshold during the war when the Tsarist military 
had of their own initiative sought to eruct some three quarters of a million Russian Jews 
in the line of their 1915 ‘Great Retreat’. The event has largely gone down a memory 
hole, utterly eclipsed as it was by the Hitlerian exterminations in this same rimlands’ 
arena a world war later. The closest synchronous Great War parallel is with the Ottoman 
Armenian deportations. To be sure, whereas the latter were either cover for or prelude 
to mass extermination, total Jewish disaster at the hands of the Russian Stavka was 
averted in critical part because political pressures from the Western Allies – rehearsing 
the stock-in-trade line that a total assault on Russian Jewry would undermine Wall 
Street credit, not to say the sympathies of a still neutral America – prevailed.16
The Great War emergence of an international Jewish power motif cannot but be 
factored into our overall crisis narrative here. Later on, Hitler, the motif ’s most fervent 
believer, ultimately believing himself stymied by Jewry’s supposed manipulation 
of Washington and London, accelerated the crisis towards a point of no return. By 
Refugees in Europe, 1919–195990
contrast, the 1915 emergency was diffused through Russia’s temporary lifting of the 
Pale: the rimland provinces beyond which to the east Jews were historically disallowed 
from inhabiting. Nevertheless, what was latent in 1915 became manifest in 1919 
when in the post-tsarist civil war struggles for control of the region, most particularly 
this time in the Ukraine, Petliurist troops, quasi-independent warlords and finally 
Denikin’s White Army revenged themselves on Jews for their military defeats at the 
hands of the Bolsheviks in a manner and on a scale entirely dwarfing the grass-roots 
pogroms of pre-war years.17 If eastern Jewish exodus to the West had been possible, 
this is the most likely moment, pre-1939 when it might have occurred. Instead, those 
who attempted to make the journey were more than likely to end up for months if 
not years in the shipping-line-run, Jewish charity-supported transmigrant camps such 
as that at Atlantic Park, near Southampton, stranded between a United States which 
refused them entry and a Soviet Russia to which they dared not return.18
To be sure, there was meant to be an international post-war system aimed at 
preventing this sort of staatenlos (statelessness) void, though it was hardly applicable 
to Soviet territories where Western Allied diktat – despite want of trying – had failed 
to penetrate. The Minorities Treaties – an adjunct to the Western-imposed Versailles 
and related peace settlements – were at face value an attempt to secure not only the 
political but also cultural rights of ethno-religious communities within the now post-
imperial, purportedly nationally self-determined states of the ‘New Europe’. Indeed, 
as Zara Steiner also notes in her chapter, the treaties were very specifically formulated 
with Jews in mind as an atypical ubiquitous ‘minority’ grouping who did not obviously 
fit within or were deemed absorbable into this national societal reordering.19 However, 
we might equally view the treaties as a weak Western Allied attempt to shore up their 
own domestic frontiers from a wave of Jewish migrants by anchoring them instead in 
the ‘New Europe’ countries where they resided. The fact that the elites of these states 
themselves looked upon the treaties as an unwarranted interference in their sovereign 
rights, rather like Rumania had done in 1878, and that many of their Jewish inhabitants 
themselves had no obvious loyalty to the national ethos to which they were now 
supposedly wedded rather underscores the provisionality of the arrangement. 
One might argue that there was an important new safety valve: Palestine. But we 
need to approach this idea with caution. At the end of the Great War there was no 
Western master plan, which conceived of the Minorities Treaties on the one hand, a 
League of Nations-authorized British Mandate to create a Jewish National Home in 
post-Ottoman Palestine on the other, as two synergistic sides of a liberal commitment 
to Jewish refuge from anti-Semitism. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 
had been a wartime contingency founded on Whitehall’s own vastly confabulated 
assumptions about the role – and behaviour – of Russian Jewry in the Bolshevik 
equation.20 And while reaffirming the post-war commitment to the Zionist endeavour, 
successive British administrations had no intention of allowing a Jewish migration 
into an already populated Arab region to destabilize the UK’s own best interests. 
Necessarily these seemed to be served by maintaining some modicum of demographic 
balance. That said, the irreconcilable aspects of the undertaking ensured a convoluted 
trajectory leading in 1937 to the Peel plan to partition Palestine into separate Jewish 
and Arab states, only for Whitehall to then execute a rapid about-turn – the May 
The Forty Years’ Crisis: The Jewish Dimension 91
1939 MacDonald White Paper – in which it came as close as it conceivably could to 
relinquishing the entire Zionist commitment and with it almost all further Jewish 
immigration into the Mandate.21
Peel thus represents a high watermark in what might have been, had Britain grasped 
the nettle. The other side of the coin is that the Jewish Agency, the Zionist body 
constituted to facilitate development in Mandate Palestine, was itself hardly geared up 
for either rapid, let alone massive, immigration or settlement. Some extravagant early 
forecasts aside on the number of Jews Palestine could absorb, the Agency’s main aim was 
to foster a slow but steady year-on-year Jewish ingress until such time as having not only 
created a ‘majority’ but demonstrated to the British that the experiment was sound, the 
latter would have no choice but to relinquish the country to Zionist control. To be sure, 
a decade into the experiment, unintended contingencies started shifting this long-term 
game plan in entirely unforeseen directions. One of these was the Ha’avara Agreement 
(August 1933). An ingenuous Zionist scheme to link Jewish migration with a Depression-
hit German economic recovery, a Nazi renegotiation of the package secured the flight of 
mostly but not exclusively wealthier German Jews in such a way that they were able to 
recover a modicum of their assets in Palestine. The controversy about dealing with the 
Nazis aside, the Ha’avara Agreement helped enable a mid-1930s migration spurt, which 
brought the Jewish element to some 400,000 or one-third of the population total.22 This 
proved a precipitating factor in the 1936 Arab revolt and so paved the way for Peel and 
his radical solution. However, the Jewish Agency was not yet ready for statehood, or at 
least not for the much smaller territory the British were now offering.23
The partition proposal highlighted the nub of the Jewish nationalist dilemma. 
Political Zionism was nothing if not about sovereign self-possession. Back in 1903 the 
movement reluctantly conceded to the ephemeral British offer of a colony in Uganda 
as a nacht-asyl – in other words, a temporary way station en route to Palestine. The 
Yishuv, the pre-state entity, by contrast was never conceived of as an emergency refuge, 
the Nazi threat notwithstanding. To be sure, by the early 1930s a more urgent mood 
prevailed. The assault on another minority community – the so-called Assyrian affair 
– in nearby newly independent Iraq had galvanized some Zionist thinking towards 
the need for a general European Jewish evacuation plan. Initially, it was so-called 
Revisionists, acolytes of Vladimir Jabotinsky such as Abba Achimeir, who were its 
open, sometimes shrill, proponents.24 But leading Yishuv figures such as David Ben-
Gurion were by 1937 also weighing up the options not least through setting up a secret 
committee, which was to consider how a mass transfer of Palestinians to surrounding 
Arab states might facilitate the object. Ironically, the then plight of German Jewry 
remained essentially marginal to either explicit or implicit Jewish Agency agendas 
except insofar as it helped put greater pressure on the British to accelerate a pro-
Zionist solution. German Jews were generally not considered ideal immigrants to 
Palestine because very few of them were committed Zionists. But then the Yishuv 
leadership repeatedly evinced a notable lack of enthusiasm for its main east European 
constituency, most of whom were deemed to lack the sort of pioneering ethos or 
credentials considered essential for Jewish nation-state building.25
Zionist ambivalence on its supposed mass following aside, Palestine could only 
have assisted the actual refugee crisis as it came to a head in 1938–9 if the British had 
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been prepared to follow through on the Peel recommendations, indigenous population 
‘transfer’ from the Jewish to neighbouring Arab states included, or there again offered 
a ‘territorial’ solution to European Jewish unwantedness, somewhere else in its far-
flung empire. In fact, as the crisis intensified, all manner of settlement projects were, 
to varying degrees, explored by the British Colonial Office. The roster included British 
Guiana, Borneo, Nyasaland and northern Rhodesia. And where the British were not 
involved directly, they were party to a range of other schemes and enquiries, which 
included Portuguese Angola, French Guiana, New Caledonia and above all Madagascar, 
a three-man Polish-sponsored commission to which in the summer of 1939 reported 
entirely negatively on its settlement prospects.26 What we remember today is the Nazi 
scheme, one year later, to turn the island into a tropical death camp. Yet how big was 
the gulf between Nazi thinking and that of Poles, Rumanians, French, British or even 
Americans when it came to ‘spiriting away’ the Jews to some distant vista?27
What many European leaders in truth would have liked for the Ostjuden was that 
they were eructed en masse to somewhere closer to the moon. As late as 1946, the 
British Foreign Office were in all seriousness inquiring of Moscow as to whether the 
far-eastern Soviet territory of Birobidzhan might be available for Jewish post-war 
‘displaced persons’.28 Yet what is extraordinary about this fairyland ‘territorial’ motif is 
the way it kept on being regurgitated even during and after the Holocaust: all the more 
so when set against its essential unreality. At the very time, for instance, in late 1942 
when news of the ‘Final Solution’ was being widely reported in the Western media, 
the British home secretary, Herbert Morrison, was seeking to veto schemes which 
would allow refugees into Britain in favour of ‘a biggish territory where large numbers 
can go e.g. Madagascar’. Morrison was not some notably hard line or obviously anti-
Semitic minister. And his views were reflected a few months later in an April 1943 
cabinet committee minute ‘to investigate the possibility of allocating some suitable 
area of large size as a place of settlement for Jewish refugees after the war’.29 Yet it 
was at this very juncture that the British and Americans convened a conference in 
Bermuda ostensibly to demonstrate their public commitment to Jewish rescue from 
Nazi Europe but actually with entirely the opposite aim of reaffirming to themselves 
that they would not be entering into any wartime arrangements involving admittance 
of Jewish refugees into Palestine or any other Allied colonial or occupied territory.30
If this exemplified the searing contradiction between public spin and official practice, 
the specifically British blockade on flight from Nazi Europe into Palestine necessarily 
in itself began to unravel the Mandate’s fragile relationship with Zionism. The wartime 
loss or internment of refugee boats bound legally or illegally for Palestine waters would 
ultimately present Ben-Gurion post-war with a propaganda gift with which to shift 
international and more specifically American opinion firmly against the British and in 
favour of the Zionist cause. Cynically put, all he needed was enough Zionist-organized, 
Palestine-directed refugee ships crammed full of Holocaust survivors to be interdicted 
by the British, preferably using brute force and in the full glare of the world’s media.
The fact that the summer 1947 Exodus affair achieved this symbolic object to a T at a 
time when the UN Special Committee on Palestine was trying to assess the Mandate’s 
post-British future proved almost the final nail in the Mandatory coffin, paving the way 
in turn for the US-led UN vote in favour of a two-state solution.31
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Yet looked at through the prism of the refugee crisis tout ensemble a celebratory 
Zionist version of these events is in key respects wanting. Ben-Gurion may have both 
succeeded in using the boat-refugees as a stick with which to beat the British, and 
hence, as a purposeful tool towards the creation of Israel. However, the fact is that the 
Yishuv leadership paid scant attention to the issue of humanitarian wartime rescue, 
nor was it probably in a position to do so. In this sense Zionism failed to provide the 
answer for Europe’s most vulnerable Jewish masses, the majority of whom were now 
dead. By the same token, Zionism’s later political success proved a convenient alibi for 
those countries who had been trying to get rid of Jews in the first place or, alternatively, 
did not want to receive them in significant numbers. The latter group included the 
United States. This may be to do the United States – and Britain – a certain injustice. 
Humanitarian impulses did play a role in the political trajectory of these and other 
Western liberal societies. Yet this does not change the fundamentals of the case, 
namely that there was no concerted unilateral or international action either before or 
after 1939 to offer refuge to Europe’s most threatened Jews. 
The paradox is that some of the evidence would seem to suggest otherwise. At critical 
moments, official immigration policies could be relaxed, most particularly when elements 
of Western public opinion were mobilized towards practical action. In Britain, the 166 
local committees who formed the Refugee Children’s Movement provided the often 
Quaker-led grass-roots framework through which some 10,000 Central European Jewish 
children were brought to homes in Britain in the wake of Kristallnacht.32 Yet the whole 
process whereby refugees were able to get temporary visas to stay in Britain or elsewhere 
was highly dependent on independent rather than state financial guarantees – the unsung 
heroes of the whole interwar saga, the mostly Jewish-aid committees and umbrella 
organizations who stumped up the necessary cash to both meet state visa requirements 
and succour the asylum seekers. If governments themselves were usually obdurate and 
bureaucratic on such matters, there were, however, many cases of individuals within 
administrative departments, consular officials included, who were prepared to bend the 
rules or to even quite consciously and proactively create their own in order to save lives.
Pressure too from hastily organized national campaigns could produce significant 
results. Largely thanks to such grass-roots activists, there were in September 1939 an 
estimated 70,000 refugees in Britain.33 Similar easing of visa requirements in France, 
and Belgium in particular, especially in the months immediately prior to war enabled 
last minute if albeit provisional escape for many German, Austrian and Czech Jews 
– the provisionality (and hence difference from Britain) clearly being that once these 
states were overrun by the Nazis, Jewish refugees were as vulnerable as they would 
have been had they stayed at home. Wartime efforts from within governments also 
made some difference. For instance, the creation of the US War Refugee Board (WRB) 
in January 1944 represented what amounted to an internal coup by elements within 
the Treasury Department against those in the State Department who had remained 
– like their British counterparts at Bermuda – resolutely opposed to any action which 
might lead to any domestic Jewish influx.34 Yet in a sense the very belated and quite 
limited nature of WRB success simply underscores the dominance and persistence of 
the opposing tendency. Certainly, the sensitivity of liberal states about being seen to 
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be less than principled on questions of asylum was reflected in the early Nazi years 
in the manner in which immigration restrictions, specifically from Germany, could 
be temporarily eased, usually nearly always under demotic pressure. But equally they 
could be entirely closed down with the sophistry – as offered in a Dutch ministerial 
statement in April 1934 – that the Jews were not ‘in any mortal danger’ – or, as one 
British Foreign Office official iterated at the time of the Czech crisis, they were not 
refugees ‘in the proper sense of the word’.35 Jews then were different from other 
‘genuine’ asylum seekers, a special category to be to held at arm’s length and even when 
they were offered assistance at all, it was on the strict understanding that their transit 
could be expedited elsewhere. This almost universal state view was pithily summarized 
by Henry Berenger, the French delegate to the League High Commission on Refugees: 
‘La France, c’est un passage, pas un garage.’36
What that meant in practice was that Jews who thought they had found a safe haven 
instead could be rounded up, criminalized as clandestines, incarcerated in camps and 
expelled or deported across borders, even back into Nazi clutches. We remember the 
vicious Vichy Vél. d’Hiv rafles of July 1942, we forget the pre-war French round-ups; 
we remember Westerbork and Mechelen as Dutch and Belgian preludes to the ‘Final 
Solution’, we forget the pre-war creation of the Westerbork and Merksplas internment 
camps by a sovereign Hague and Brussels.37 To be sure, further east it was entirely 
worse, though again we tend to recall Zbaszyn where the Nazis dumped potentially 
stateless Jews in October 1938 on the Polish border, not the thousands more now 
equally stateless Jews from Slovakia and the Sudetenland who post-Munich were 
marooned in a no man’s land at Michsdorf or on a Danube riverboat unwanted by 
either Czechs or Hungarians.38 By this juncture it was not just the Jews of an expanding 
Nazi Reich who were at risk of ejection into ‘nowhere’: whole swathes of Hungarian 
and Rumanian Jews were being earmarked for denationalization, the Hungarian 
authorities in Carpatho-Rus particularly energetic protagonists of cross-border 
expulsion.39 But it was at this very point as mass Jewish displacement began to present 
overtly transnational characteristics that liberal Western states responded with not just 
ever-tighter border controls but a way of denying entry, which the Swiss authorities 
had effectively gifted to them through their own bit of Nazi collusion. Indeed, the ‘J’ 
stamp on German passports introduced by Berlin at Swiss request in late September 
1938 to differentiate Jews from other travellers proved as powerful a way as any of 
turning the very essence of refugee status on its head.40 
At the international level the same basic contours of avoidance, deflection and 
buck-passing are well known. Having failed to create a mechanism for stateless Jews 
as Nansen had been able to initiate for comparable Armenians and Russians after the 
Great War, and with no safeguards for such contingencies written into the Minorities 
Treaties, the eventual League agreement in late 1933 to the creation of a quasi-official 
High Commission to deal with the German refugee situation – providing it had 
no official League standing for fear of upsetting the Nazis (not to say with almost 
complete dependency on Jewish funding) – demonstrated to the world just how 
little leverage it had. True, some accolades have been offered for its first head, the 
American, James G. McDonald, though mostly for his resignation letter two years 
later in which he castigated League states for their failure to create a strong, collective 
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approach to Nazi Jewish persecution.41 But if this was an indictment of the obvious, 
McDonald’s own avoidance of the key issue of how to create an international rescue 
plan which would distribute refugees equitably among potentially receiving states 
is surely telling not so much for what it says about him but an international climate 
in which the very premise was a taboo. Presented three years later with the entirely 
more glaring emergency arising from the Nazi campaign to eject Austrian Jewry 
in the wake of the Anschluss, President Roosevelt’s initiative to bypass the League 
altogether and set up the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) seems 
in retrospect the nearest pre-war thing on offer to a radically new international 
approach under a once again proactive American leadership. In fact, the occasion of 
the IGCR’s formation, the July 1938 Evian Conference, proved nothing of the sort, 
demonstrating instead how international solidarity – the United States included – 
existed only in the degree to which each state confirmed the others’ aim of not to be 
a refugee recipient. Worse, Evian is particularly remembered for some of the more 
overtly racist comments enunciated there by the Australian and Canadian delegates, 
though in truth what they said was simply a more blunt version of what more or less 
everybody else was thinking.42 The Swiss had their own powerfully toxic word for 
it: Überfremdung, the notion that to let the Jews in was not just a matter of physical 
inundation but also of alien takeover.43 It speaks volumes about the underlying 
prewar paranoia, fear and loathing of Jews in states and societies whether supposedly 
liberal or illiberal. 
But is stating this to deflect from the real villains of piece? The Nazis, after all, had set 
the specific emergency in motion. Presented with an effectively Roosevelt-proffered 
subterfuge to secretly facilitate a deal for an orderly removal of Reich Jews, the Nazi 
riposte was to continue illegally shifting Jews across frontiers completely removed 
of any assets which might have given them the wherewithal with which to relocate 
elsewhere. As for the Nazi negotiating position itself in these so-called Rublee-Schacht 
talks, it boiled down to the major US Jewish relief organizations being asked to pick 
up an astronomical 1.5 billion Reichsmarks financial tag for a recalibrated Ha’avara-
type trust fund, the immediate and arguably sole Nazi aim of which was to save them 
from their immediate post-Kristallnacht foreign currency crisis. With war looming, 
the Jewish groups unsurprisingly interpreted the Nazi stance as blackmail, not least 
because acceptance of the package would have reinforced the canard that they put 
their international Jewish (hence allegedly conspiratorial) loyalties before those to 
home country.44 It was Nazi perversity, not Jewish obduracy, which ploughed the talks 
into oblivion, though one might add that the Nazi notion that they could render their 
Jews homeless, penniless and stateless and then ransom them to the Western Allies 
for the latter’s acquiescence to the regime’s wider goals was no more or less than what 
Bulgarians, Rumanians and Hungarians each in variously convoluted ways attempted to 
do towards the end of the war.45 British and American refusal to contemplate such ‘sales’ 
however was not just about refusing to break their own wartime economic blockade of 
the Axis. Fundamental to their unwillingness to contemplate such negotiations was the 
old yet persistent fear, true in 1944 as it had been in 1939, of opening up the floodgates 
to mass Jewish flight: even though the majority of European Jews by then were dead. 
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But could the floodgates somehow have been prised open by force? It was not the 
Nazis but the colonels in the twilight Poland of 1939 who came nearest to trying to 
realize that goal when they dreamt up a truly hare-brained scheme to secretly arm and 
train Revisionist Zionist activists to invade British Palestine.46 While the project was 
killed stone dead by Hitler’s invasion of Poland, it left him with the exquisite dilemma 
of what to do with an added nearly two and half million more Jews, over and above the 
ones his minions had already been trying to eject from their expanding pre-September 
1939 Reich. Is it at this point that we arrive at the limits of the possible and the onset of 
the genocidal? The Nazi plan the following year to ship the entirety of European Jewry 
to Madagascar fell down on the inability to defeat the British in the early autumn of 
1940, thereby denying the Germans the secure seaways for their ‘phantom’ project.47 
A further example of Axis states being blocked off from their ‘Jewish’ exit strategies is 
offered by way of the squalid Rumanian holding camps set up on Soviet-relinquished 
territory across the Dniester (Transnistria) from late 1941. Here many tens of thousands 
of Jews cleansed from Rumania’s Soviet-liberated western provinces perished through 
to 1944.48 But they did so here because they could not be pushed or deported further 
to the east; something which would have happened had Bucharest’s big German ally 
roundly defeated the Red Army in the summer or autumn of 1941.
If this Soviet blockage to Nazi fortunes returns us to the blood-soaked terrain where 
we began, we still need to rewind a couple of years for one final speculative look at 
those elusive eastern vistas before we can reach the end of our journey’s crisis sequence. 
Implicit in our discussion so far has been a questionable assumption that faced with 
an explosion of European anti-Semitism the only countries which could offer succour 
to large masses of displaced Jews, whether territorially by way of colonies – Palestine 
included – or through a more standard process of domestic immigrant absorption, 
were those of the progressive West. Yet there was another possibility: the USSR, 
however dystopian the implications. After the Hitler-Stalin carve-up of Poland – the 
major consequence of their August 1939 Non-Aggression Pact – this was, after all, 
the country with the largest Jewish population bar the United States. True, the Soviet 
Union’s own project to create an autonomous Jewish ‘homeland’ in the far Siberian 
wastes of Birobidzhan had been abysmally unsuccessful. Yet the very fact that Russia 
had a vast geographical arena into which people might move, aligned to a major new 
spurt of urbanization, offered a route for a more traditional immigrant absorption 
already well testified in the 1920s and 1930s in the steady flow of Jews from the former 
Pale into the major, especially metropolitan, centres of Russia proper.49
There is no direct documentary evidence to suggest Hitler at the time of the Non-
Aggression Pact was seeking to resolve his Jewish ‘crisis’ by way of a mass removal 
into the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it is curious that the rapid population 
transfer of some million or more ethnic Germans from the newly acquired Soviet 
rimland territories back in the direction the Reich, which was fundamental to Stalin’s 
negotiating position, did not involve a major exchange of population involving the 
ethnic element the Nazis most desperately wanted rid of. Circumstantial evidence 
that the Nazis understood the arrangement to include the Jews includes Heydrich’s 
infamous September 1939 Schnellbrief in which Polish Jewry was to be concentrated 
around major railheads, pending their deportation eastwards. His Sicherheitsdienst 
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(SD) subordinate Adolf Eichmann’s shifting of Jews from central Europe around this 
time towards the far reaches of Nazi control in Eastern Poland suggests a similar intent. 
The only problem with this proposed trajectory is that when the Nazis began to push 
Jews literally across the rivers San and Bug dividing line, the Soviets responded by 
shooting them, while the some 20,000 Jews who attempted to flee across the new 
international frontier as ‘refugees’ ended up on the cattle trains heading for Soviet 
Central Asia alongside all the Poles, Balts and others the Soviets perceived as ‘security 
risks’.50 The Nazi intention at this point was certainly no more benign than what 
might have been the case two years later had they achieved military success in Russia. 
Heydrich’s Wannsee Conference articulation of the ‘Final Solution’ in which Jews 
were to be worked to death in the ‘east’ simply underscores that reality.51 However, 
had European Jewry been eructed into the USSR in 1939, or even 1940, the possibility 
that some of them – removed from Nazi clutches – might have survived the almost 
inevitable Soviet mass deportation to the east remains a grotesque yet at the same time 
tantalizing case of the counterfactual. 
In retrospect, we can see that any idea of Soviet salvation was a dead end. There was 
a tentative early 1944 plan to regroup Holocaust survivors in the Crimea as the kernel 
of a Jewish Soviet Socialist Republic – the idea apparently emanating from within the 
Soviet secret police (the NKVD) but fed back to the Politburo as if it were the request 
of the then quasi-independent Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Yet not only was this 
initiative toxically linked to the NKVD-organized mass Tatar deportation from the 
Crimea three months later but was also central to the fabricated charge sheet against 
the committee four years on, when they were accused of seeking to ‘invade’ the Crimea 
in a US-cum-Zionist plot. The growing storm clouds over Russian Jewry thereafter 
culminated in Stalin’s pet project to deport them in entirety east to Birobidzhan, a fate 
only forestalled by the dictator’s timely death in February 1953.52
The Jews of Russia were never to recover their poise. The remnants of self-
identifying eastern Jewry who had survived the Holocaust equally found it impossible 
to survive the chill winds of Soviet anti-Semitism, new peaks of which around the 
Eastern bloc crisis years of 1956 and 1968 ensured their near-complete departure. Post-
glasnost and the collapse of the USSR, the majority of Soviet Jewry were also rapidly 
migrating elsewhere.53 Most were absorbed – as were the earlier but smaller waves of 
post-Holocaust survivors – into Israel under the ‘Law of Return’. This seminal piece of 
1948 legislation takes us back to the Zionist riposte to the crisis even before it became 
fully manifest. The notion of a sovereign Jewish state was intended to put an end to 
Jewish refugee status once and for all, and with it the ignominy and humiliation of 
border controls and refused visas: in short, a pillar to post-immiseration. Jewry under 
the threat of extermination. The paradox is that the very assimilated and un-Jewish 
Russian Jews who made aliyah in the 1990s were a far cry from their eastern European 
ancestors which Zionism had in its mind’s eye to save and succour several generations 
earlier. Yet Zionism’s lack of actual muscle on the world stage in the interwar years 
and its own primary emphasis on gradual state-building proved it unequal to the role 
of refugee sanctuary. By the 1990s, that was no longer true. Israel was able to absorb 
vast numbers of immigrants albeit in its increasingly limited urban space, bursting 
at the seams and over onto the contested West Bank, though as a further paradox 
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with considerable US aid to enable the absorption of those who might otherwise have 
preferred to have relocated to none other than the United States. The added poignancy 
is that the majority of historic east European Jewry would equally have preferred to 
have gone there too, but in the crucial years of the 1920s and 1930s they were denied 
that possibility.
To be sure, by the end of the Second World War, any issue of preference had become 
entirely academic. The Minorities Treaties were dead, Europe was a Jewish graveyard, 
and the continued tardiness of countries, including Britain and the United States, to 
offer an open welcome to survivors seemingly made the national option their only 
viable one. Yet there was a huge price to pay for it. Israel gained its sovereignty in 1948 
but at the expense of two groups of people. The first were the Arabs of Palestine, vast 
numbers of whom now became perpetual refugees in their own backyard or beyond. 
The second were the equally large numbers of Arab Jews, from all across the Middle 
East who had hardly figured within European Zionism’s original compass. Yet they 
were effectively evicted or forced to flee in the late 1940s or early 1950s, in significant 
part in retaliation for the Nakba, mostly for Israel.54 Two groups of linked people 
ending up for years in tents, and doubly ironically with little or nothing to do with the 
forty years’ crisis. Might it all have been avoided if Western states had offered that other 
wing of Jewry – in other words those at its nub – the compassion, the humanity and 
the asylum they deserved? 
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The League of Nations, Refugees 
and Individual Rights
Barbara Metzger
In February 1921, Gustav Ador, the president of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), drew the League of Nations’ attention to the plight of over one 
million Russian refugees scattered all over Europe, in order to suggest the appointment 
of a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees.1 Nobody could foresee that this appeal 
would lay the foundations for an international refugee assistance system which exists to 
this day. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is today one 
of the central UN agencies, maintaining regional offices all over the world, providing 
emergency relief during wartime as well as promoting long-term repatriation and 
resettlement schemes. UNHCR monitors compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and forms a pillar of the contemporary United Nation’s human rights regime. 
The interwar years witnessed the beginning of international refugee law, initially 
in response to a series of humanitarian crises in the aftermath of the Great War. 
Subsequently, the League of Nations found itself at the centre of an ongoing debate 
concerning the role of the international community with regard to the obligations of 
states and the protection of individuals – particularly refugees who had been deprived of 
their citizenship. This chapter does not argue that the League’s achievements in the field 
of refugee protection and creation of refugee law are the source of the current human 
rights regime.2 Instead, the chapter looks at the emergence of refugee law during the 
interwar years and examines how both the successes and failures of the interwar refugee 
regime led to new thinking and advocacy with respect to individual rights. Even in the 
wreckage of the refugee regime in the late 1930s, we find voices who place the obligations 
of states to individuals at the centre of their response to the crises of their time.
This chapter builds on a number of insights in the existing literature. In his excellent 
study, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism 1918-1924, Bruno Cabanes 
suggests looking at the emergence of humanitarian rights (which he identifies as rights 
of victims to aid) in the light of the war experience. Cabanes proposes that instead of 
viewing the politics of rights in the 1920s as an incomplete version – less universal, less 
mobilizing, less efficient – of the ‘utopia’ of human rights as we know it today, it should 
be understood through the traumatic experience of the Great War. The emergence of 
protective, humanitarian rights in the 1920s is thus seen as a key moment in shaping 
attitudes and values.3 
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Dorothy V. Jones was one of the first scholars to take a new perspective on the 
League in the 1990s. She maintains that within the context of the League ‘protection 
was seen as an active and vital force in international affairs.’ She identifies as one of 
the lasting legacies of the interwar period the idea that protection is an international 
concern to be exercised on a regular and continuing basis and not just ‘when some 
outrage catches the public’s attention.’4 This chapter argues that, by setting up an 
institutional framework to accommodate the needs of refugees, the League created an 
institutional memory which documented the impact of state behaviour on individuals 
and the success of international action on behalf of refugees. This influenced the 
emergence of refugee law and enabled a new advocacy about the obligations of states 
to individuals, even amid the failures of the 1930s. 
The balance sheet of the League’s efforts to find durable solutions to the massive 
refugee flows during the interwar years is riddled with remarkable accomplishments and 
failures, particularly with regard to the European Jews in the 1930s. As a consequence, 
a large majority of those victims of German persecution perished. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of the League’s refugee regime is worth examining, particularly during 
the 1920s when the institutionalization of international cooperation enabled the 
development of innovative approaches and was part of an overarching peace agenda, 
as Claudena Skran maintains.5 
The High Commissioner for Russian Refugees
The initial appointment of a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees was the response 
of the newly founded League of Nations to enormous changes in the international 
system that rendered millions of people homeless and stateless. In 1921, over one 
million Russian refugees, members of the defeated White armies and civilians, were 
scattered all over the Balkans, Poland, the Baltic, Central Europe, Europe and the Far 
East, the majority living under appalling circumstances.6 After the First World War 
large multi-ethnic empires – Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian – collapsed 
and were transformed into nation-states striving for ethnic homogeneity, often forcing 
members of ethnic minorities to leave. In addition, dramatic changes like the Russian 
Revolution profoundly affected the entire social fabric of states, forcing many to flee.
The interwar period has been termed the ‘era of refugees’.7 Between 1919 and 1939 
at least five million refugees had to leave their homes in Europe. In the early 1920s, 
civil war and famine forced over one million Russian refugees to flee what became the 
Soviet Union. In the Near East, the 1921–2 Greco-Turkish war uprooted 1.5 million 
Greeks, 400,000 Turks and 300,000 Armenians. In addition, disputes between Bulgaria 
and its neighbours caused 225,000 ethnic Bulgarians to seek refuge in their mother 
country. In the 1930s, approximately 400,000 people escaped Nazi Germany, 10,000 
left Mussolini's Italy and 400,000 Spanish Republicans left Franco's Spain.8 
The rise of strict immigration controls across the world after the First World War 
and the universal acceptance of the norm that requires international travellers to carry 
passports made it increasingly difficult for refugees to cross international boundaries. 
John Torpey identifies the ‘development of welfare states and the rise of labor 
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movements seeking to control access to jobs and social benefits’ as playing their part in 
promoting immigration controls. The growing welfare state system made governments 
reluctant to accept refugees since they feared the financial obligations involved. 
Refugees were met with increasing hostility as they were viewed as political suspects 
and an economic burden.9 Refugee movements could no longer be easily absorbed and 
naturalized in the host countries.10 This brought home to policy makers that refugees 
had to be recognized as a matter of crucial international concern. Governments thus 
urged the League to take up the issue, regardless of the fact that its Covenant did not 
make any explicit reference to the protection of refugees. 
The appointment of a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees was initiated and 
strongly promoted by private relief organizations. A member of the former Russian 
Red Cross expressed the hope that ‘the League embodying the idea of solidarity and 
international justice is willing to accept the difficult task of defending the rights and 
interests of the Russian expatriates.’11 From the start, private refugee organizations sent 
reports to Geneva documenting the desperate refugee situation and encouraging the 
League to act.12 Although the League of Nations Council was originally concerned that 
governments might see the high commissioner as interfering with domestic affairs, it 
agreed to instruct the secretary general to gather relevant information from all refugee-
hosting countries.13 Following the standard League procedure, a questionnaire was 
sent out to all governments concerned to obtain information and suggestions. Most 
governments were strongly in favour of the League taking up the issue.14 The High 
Commission was assigned three tasks: to find a definition of the legal position of refugees; 
to organize resettlement or repatriation; and to coordinate the efforts for the assistance 
of refugees. All three aspects required international arrangements and cooperation.15 
In August 1921 the League secured the appointment of Fridtjof Nansen as its 
first High Commissioner for Refugees. Since the refugee problem was perceived as a 
temporary phenomenon the League only covered the administrative expenses of the 
high commission. Nansen had a small staff in Geneva and appointed delegates in refugee-
hosting countries to liaise with government officials, private voluntary organizations 
providing refugee relief and the refugees themselves. He often employed refugees as 
delegates, as they knew the languages and were familiar with the traditions and customs 
of the respective refugee community, thus giving some of the refugees a voice. 
As Nansen depended heavily on the funds and the expertise of private voluntary 
organizations, in 1922 he set up an Advisory Committee consisting of sixteen private 
organizations. By 1936, the Advisory Committee had expanded to forty members.16 
Nansen skilfully used the international diplomatic arena and the League Secretariat to 
seek international consensus and secure support for his work. 
The Nansen Passport
‘As things are, the Russian refugees cannot travel, marry, be born, or die without creating 
legal problems to which there is no solution,’ a League official remarked succinctly in a 
memorandum in 1921.17 Nansen’s main objective thus became to endow those in need 
with at least some rights, mainly the possibility to travel in order to find work and a 
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livelihood. Nansen’s position was difficult: he had to find ways to accommodate his 
humanitarian goals regarding refugees within a state system governed by the principle 
of national sovereignty. Each sovereign state had the right to regulate entry. 
To address the lack of legal protection suffered by the Russian refugees, Nansen 
convened in July 1922 an intergovernmental conference attended by sixteen 
governments. Nansen’s great invention was the creation of a special certificate of 
identity for Russian refugees, commonly called the ‘Nansen Passport’. The arrangement 
was eventually accepted by fifty-three states. It was not legally binding but served as a 
set of recommendations providing the refugee with a form of legal status. The Nansen 
Passport allowed its holder to travel to countries where he or she might be more likely 
to find work and a livelihood. Conversely, states could issue the certificate without 
having to grant citizenship rights. The document was valid for a year, certifying that its 
holder was a Russian national by origin. It contained no general definition of a refugee 
and no specification of the motivations for flight. The system proved so successful that 
in 1923 thirty-one governments recognized the model certificate for Russian refugees 
recommended by the high commission.18
When the plight of the Armenian refugees aroused international public opinion 
during the refugee crises in the Near East in the early 1920s, Nansen’s mandate was 
extended. From 1924, the ‘Nansen Passport’ system was applied to Armenian refugees.19 
Two years later a legal agreement was concluded. For the first time it provided a 
definition of refugee, no matter how limited, specifying that a Russian refugee was 
‘any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy the protection of the Government 
of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and who has not acquired any other 
nationality’. A similar definition applied to the Armenian refugees.20 By paying for the 
stamp on the Nansen Passport refugees became ‘stakeholders’. 
Until 1928, Nansen’s mandate covered only two national groups of refugees – 
Armenians and Russians. Despite the growth in the actual numbers of refugees 
covered under international law, individual political exiles, for instance, remained 
outside the system. The Italian refugees fleeing fascism were never included in the 
League’s protection scheme, as this would have meant indirectly criticizing a prominent 
member state of the League.21 The Russian émigrés, in contrast, could be designated 
with impunity in 1921 because the Soviet Union was outside the League until 1934.22 
The designation of refugee status was politically contentious and required a strong 
international consensus about assisting a particular group. The debate in the late 1920s 
to open the League refugee protection scheme to a wider range of national groups 
showed the difficulties. In 1926 the Belgian delegate called the attention of the Seventh 
Assembly to the plight of refugees not holding a Nansen Passport. The Assembly passed 
a resolution asking the High Commissioner for Refugees to investigate the extension of 
protection to other ‘analogous categories of refugees’, among them Assyrians, Assyro-
Chaldeans, Ruthenes in Austria and Czechoslovakia, a large number of stateless people 
in central Europe, Hungarians in Austria, France and Romania, Jews in Romania and 
some Turks in Greece who had been friends of the Allies. The Council decided to 
restrict its consideration to those people who had become refugees as a consequence of 
the war and events directly connected with the war. The governments were concerned 
about any additional cost that an extension of the refugees protected by the League 
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would incur. In the end the League only selected the Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans and 
the Turks from its long list of candidates in need.23 Thus, in 1928 the opportunity to 
extend the protection for refugees under the auspices of the League passed by. 
The coverage of the Nansen system was extended on only one further occasion. 
In 1935, about 7,000 refugees were forced to leave the Saar, when a plebiscite held 
in the region overwhelmingly favoured its return to Germany. Previously, under 
the administration of the League, the Saar had been an important political refuge 
for dissidents fleeing Nazi Germany. France, as the host country for those refugees, 
championed the case of Saar refugees inside the League and secured for them the 
use of the Nansen certificates.24 For the first and only time the reasons for flight were 
included in the definition of a refugee entitled to a Nansen Passport, and provisions 
were made within the Nansen protection system for people who potentially found 
themselves outside their home country, not as a consequence of war but of the actions 
of a nation-state. 
While the coverage of the Nansen system was never universal, the system was 
nevertheless highly innovative. In 1928 thirteen states signed an arrangement 
recommending that consular services for refugees be carried out by delegates of 
the high commissioner. This included the certification of the refugee’s identity and 
civil status, attesting to the refugee’s character and conduct, and recommendations 
of refugees to governments and educational authorities. Between 1932 and 1938 
the Nansen Office, the League’s refugee agency created after Nansen’s death in 1930, 
made an average of more than 18,000 interventions annually relating to the personal 
status of Russian, Armenian, Assyrian and Saar refugees.25 This arrangement was a 
remarkable development since it acknowledged the reliability and competence of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees and the working of this international system of 
refugee protection. Sovereign states gave an international organization administrative 
authority regarding refugee-related issues. This is a milestone in the emergence of the 
international administration of refugee rights and international governance in general. 
The 1928 agreement was also remarkable in giving substance to the notion of 
protective rights since it provided for the ‘physical protection’ of refugees. States 
acknowledged that refugees should not be expelled if this posed a threat to their life. 
Paragraph seven recommended that governments suspend measures to expel a Russian 
or Armenian refugee if it was impossible for the person to enter another country legally.26 
This norm reflected the frequent interventions of the high commissioner on behalf of 
refugees threatened with expulsion. A prominent case occurred, for instance, when 
the Polish government expelled 10,000 Russian refugees, predominantly Jews, in 1923. 
The destitute victims of this expulsion were trapped in no man’s land under appalling 
conditions. The League High Commissioner for Refugees successfully negotiated with 
the Polish government a suspension of the expulsions until the refugees could lawfully 
emigrate abroad.27 The 1928 agreement made a further noteworthy provision: refugees 
obtained permission to return to the country where the Nansen Passport had been 
issued.28
As the refugee problem continued, and the economic crisis rendered the life of many 
refugees more precarious than ever, the Intergovernmental Advisory Commission for 
Refugees proposed in August 1931 a formal convention which would ‘stabilise the 
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situation’ of refugees in light of the planned liquidation of the Nansen Office at the end 
of 1938. The ‘Nansen passport system’, the 1928 arrangement and the practical work 
performed by the high commission, as in the case of the Polish expulsions, paved the 
way for the first Refugee Convention adopted in 1933. 
The Refugee Convention of 1933
The Refugee Convention of 1933 was legally binding on its signatories and became 
a landmark in the codification of international refugee law. As the legal scholar Peter 
Fitzmaurice suggests, the 1933 Convention in many ways constituted the high-water mark 
of refugee protection between the wars.29 The most striking provision was the right to 
non-refoulement. This provision acknowledged the right to life of an individual refugee 
who on his return to his country of origin would have been in danger. The right to ‘non-
refoulement’ was later to become a fundamental provision in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
The 1933 Refugee Convention dealt with a broad variety of concerns ranging from 
identity certificates to expulsions. It granted refugees the enjoyment of civil rights, 
free access to courts of law, security and stability in their settlement and employment, 
facilities to work in the professions, in industry and commerce, freedom of movement 
and admission to schools and universities.30 It codified basic rights for refugees that 
were commonly granted to the citizens of the signatory country. It made provisions 
for labour conditions, industrial accidents, welfare and relief. Until 1938, it had 
been ratified by sixteen governments. A range of countries did not ratify the 1933 
Convention but applied it in practice. A crucial aspect of the Convention was that the 
signatories opened their national legislation to international scrutiny, later to become 
an essential feature of the contemporary human rights regime.31
Michael Hansson, president of the Nansen Office between 1936 and 1938, made an 
increase in ratifications one of his top priorities. The Convention set standards in many 
areas that required translation into national law. The French government, for instance, 
upgraded benefits to refugees in the area of medical assistance, unemployment 
insurance and pensions so that they would be equal to those aliens receiving the most 
favourable treatment under French law. Further, it established a special committee to 
inform refugees of their rights.32 In contrast to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which 
requires the refugee to prove a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’, the 1933 Convention 
did not elaborate on the reasons for flight. The group affiliation still decided upon 
the refugee status, thus providing protection only for refugees under the mandate 
of Nansen Office. Nevertheless, the 1933 Convention left a lasting legacy in the 
legal arena, and can in hindsight be recognized as an important contribution to the 
evolution of international human rights law. It established a standard that refugees 
should be accorded the same treatment given to aliens in the host country. The notion 
of reciprocity was waived for refugees as they had lost the protection of their country of 
origin. The guarantee of basic civil, legal and economic rights in law served as a direct 
precedent for both the refugee rights regime and various international human rights 
mechanisms. 
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The High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany
Whereas the 1920s saw a number of innovative approaches to finding long-term 
solutions to the refugee problems, the League’s efforts on behalf of refugees during the 
1930s present a less positive picture. Hitler’s rise to power and his challenge to the world 
order triggered a mass refugee movement that the League could not settle, particularly 
at a time when immigration restrictions were constantly being tightened in response to 
the Depression. Despite the devastation that ultimately arose from the events of these 
years, the failure of efforts within the League led to key actors advocating the centrality 
of the obligations of states to individuals, especially with regard to citizenship rights.
Prior to 1933, the League’s interventions with regard to refugees had been firmly 
rooted in crises arising directly from the Great War and its aftermath. In 1933, the 
League was forced to take a step beyond this: it used a minority protection treaty to 
challenge the main refugee-producing country – Germany – in a volatile political and 
economic context. It was a brief moment where the obligations of a major European 
power towards an individual person came sharply to the fore. Legal accounts usually 
only mention the so-called ‘Bernheim petition’ in passing, but Paul Gordon Lauren 
gives it a prominent role in his history of human rights.33 Soon after Hitler’s rise 
to power a series of anti-Semitic decrees commanded a public boycott of Jewish 
businesses, the discharge of Jewish civil servants, the exclusion of Jewish lawyers from 
the legal practice and the removal of Jewish physicians from medical practice for health 
insurance funds. Limits were placed on the admission of Jewish pupils into schools. The 
German government declared that all such measures came within the sphere of German 
national sovereignty and were out of bounds to foreign intervention. The World Jewish 
Congress challenged this view. It brought Germany’s discriminatory policies before the 
League, ‘transforming a domestic matter into an international issue’.34
Since Germany was bound by a minority protection treaty in Upper Silesia, the World 
Jewish Congress tried to convince the League that Germany’s discriminatory policies 
were in violation of her international obligations. A lawyer from Lemberg35 composed 
a petition, which Franz Bernheim, a young German of Jewish descent who ‘had been 
unfairly and illegally discharged from his job in Upper Silesia solely as a result of Hitler’s 
new decrees against Jews’, submitted to the League Council. 36 The petition maintained 
that Bernheim’s dismissal represented a clear violation of the minority clauses of the 
German-Polish Convention regarding Upper Silesia (1922), which guaranteed equality 
of all Germans before the law in respect to civil and political rights, equal treatment 
regarding employment, and protection of the life and liberty of all inhabitants without 
distinction or discrimination as to race, language or religion.37 The League could not 
ignore this petition and found itself forced to address the issue of international protection 
of minority rights, in the light of much public attention. While Germany tried to stall the 
debate, the Council spent considerable time and energy on it. In the end, the Council 
decided that the discrimination experienced by Franz Bernheim ‘represented a breach 
of treaty obligations’ and that Bernheim should receive compensation.38
The ‘Bernheim petition’ opened a unique debate in the Assembly in September 1933, 
which put the protection of individual rights at the core. The delegation from Haiti 
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took the initiative in proposing a universal regime for the protection of human rights. 
Speaking as its representative, Antoine Frangulis, the Greek jurist and diplomat, termed 
‘the delegate of the rights of man’,39 criticized the selective system for the protection of 
minorities as being far too limited, leaving ‘the most sacred rights of men and citizens’ 
often without respect. Frangulis referred to the ‘Declaration of the International Rights 
of Man’, which had been passed by the Institut de Droit International in October 1929. 
The Federation of League of Nations Unions endorsed this declaration in June 1933 
in Montreux. This document provided a catalogue of universal rights which Frangulis 
urged the League to adopt since 
there is not only one category of citizens of a State, described as a minority, which 
deserves attention, but ... all the citizens of which human communities are made 
up are entitled to the same freedom and the same protection, and the League of 
Nations must consider the problem as a whole from the aspect of the rights of 
man – that is to say, of the rights which men possess as such, whether they belong 
to a minority or a majority – and it must seek the solutions which are necessary. 40
Frangulis suggested that the League draft a comprehensive world convention for the 
protection of human rights everywhere.41 Not surprisingly, this initiative was met with 
stiff opposition from the champions of national sovereignty. It could be discussed in the 
plenary session but stood no chance of being translated into action in the committees. 
The majority of members of the League had no interest in a general convention that 
might be turned around to apply to them.42 
The conflict between national sovereignty and international action became even 
more distinct at the same Assembly, when the question of the German refugees was 
discussed. The League faced its classic dilemma: while it was obvious that some 
international response was necessary as refugees streamed from Germany into 
neighbouring countries, League delegations were concerned not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of a member state or thus criticize German policies. Enjoying great 
power status Germany could veto any action the League wished to take to assist 
German refugees.
There were countermoves, however, which drew on the institutional memory 
and successes of the Nansen Office. In September 1933, the Dutch delegate to the 
Assembly proposed that the League assist the German refugees through this office. 
This suggestion was immediately vetoed by the German delegation. What emerged 
from the following debate was a watered-down compromise: Germany was assured 
that the refugees would not be placed within the effective mandate of the Nansen Office 
but rather under the auspices of a separate organization. The High Commission for 
Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany had its headquarters in Lausanne 
to emphasize its separation from the League. This attempt to accommodate German 
sensibilities proved particularly futile since Germany announced her withdrawal from 
the League within a few days of the Assembly closing. 
In October 1933, the League Council appointed James G. McDonald to this new 
position. McDonald had an extensive foreign affairs background having served as 
the chairman of the Foreign Policy Association since 1919. He was well acquainted 
with highly placed Germans in Berlin, had visited the Dachau concentration camp 
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and believed himself under no illusions about Nazism.43 From the very beginning, 
McDonald's work was severely hampered by the separation of his office from the 
League and its dependence on private funds. James McDonald enjoyed little support 
from the League’s Secretary General Joseph Avenol, whose sympathies lay with the 
political right in Europe.44 The high commissioner had a small administrative staff 
as well as a governing body composed of government delegates and an advisory 
body constituted of representatives of the major private refugee organizations. Both 
bodies met regularly. The governing body, however, was frequently criticized for its 
ineffectiveness.45 McDonald frantically travelled the world in the hope to find countries 
willing to accept refugees from Germany.46 McDonald was at least partially successful 
in helping some German academics to find positions abroad.47 
Documenting the work of the high commission is difficult. The League archives 
are full of letters, pamphlets, appeals and press clippings which reached the high 
commissioner. They contain information on thousands of individual cases who saw 
the high commissioner as their last hope. It is a vast collection, bearing testimony 
to brutally destroyed existences and injustice suffered at the hands of the German 
government – as in the 1920s, the tragedy of the individual was reaching the League. 
One such example was the disturbing story of a German political activist who had 
managed to escape to Holland in 1933 where he lived illegally without valid papers. He 
wrote to McDonald that every single day he was petrified that he and his wife might be 
arrested and deported, which would mean ‘death in Nazi Germany’. He pleaded to the 
high commissioner: ‘Mr High Commissioner for Refugees, we appeal to you and incur 
your help and advice. Please show me a way out of this illegal and chased existence 
back into a legal life.’48 Another refugee begged the high commissioner for a Nansen 
Passport, unaware that these documents were not granted to German refugees.49 
Likewise McDonald received a remarkable collection of appeals from private refugee-
aid organizations, which narrated the horrific situation at first hand and begged him to 
act, although he was in no position to grant funds. They emphasized that the problem 
was an international one which had to be addressed by the League, and vehemently 
protested against the shift of responsibility onto the shoulders of private charity. 
All these instances brought home to McDonald the realization that he lacked the 
authority to effect change. Private organizations increasingly demanded that he address 
the refugee problem not only from a humanitarian but also from a political point of 
view. The president of the Basler Hilfe für Emigrantenkinder, Georgine Gerhard, was 
one of those untiring activists who regularly urged the high commissioner to make 
a political appeal to Germany. She emphasized the need to attack the root causes of 
the refugee problem rather than just to facilitate emigration. In December 1934, she 
suggested a widespread international appeal ‘to rouse the world’s conscience.’ This 
appeal ‘ought to bring home to the Germans what it means at a time like ours to turn 
about 80,000 people out of her territory.’50 She argued that ‘no nation has a right to put 
the subjects it does not like simply in thousands on to the backs of other nations, and 
this should be clearly expressed.’51 Those voices grew stronger and eventually provided 
the impulse for change.
During the early summer of 1935, different initiatives were launched to bring the 
high commission back into the framework of the League. Among them was a petition 
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submitted by the ICRC and refugee organizations, which argued that different refugee 
groups should no longer be dealt with under different protection schemes. Instead, 
a universal approach was postulated: all refugees should enjoy the same treatment 
regardless of the national group they belonged to. The petition also stressed that the 
refugee problem raised not only humanitarian but political considerations: the lack of 
effective measures for refugee assistance was a direct menace to peace.52 However, the 
closer the Assembly came, the more disillusioned McDonald became with the realistic 
prospects of reorganizing the League refugee system.53 Finally, the reorganization was 
discussed at the same Assembly as the Italian annexation of Abyssinia. While Haile 
Selassie was appealing to the Assembly to enforce the system of collective security, 
the Norwegian foreign secretary proposed that the League should create a central 
organization with responsibility for all refugees, whatever their origin. This proposal 
was met with singularly little enthusiasm.54 Instead of responding to the urgency 
acknowledged by some of the delegates, the majority decided to set up a subcommittee 
to study the question in further detail. 
James McDonald’s letter of resignation: an 
appeal to the world’s conscience to consider 
the root causes of the refugee problem 
James McDonald’s frustration grew. Inundated by desperate appeals from private 
organizations and individual cases, and unable to help since governments were 
adamant in refusing support, he realized the impossibility of his task. When in 
September 1935 the proclamation of the Nuremberg Laws caused even more refugees 
to flee Nazi Germany, it brought home to McDonald that Nazi policies had to be 
directly confronted. He was the first and the last high commissioner to urge the League 
publicly to deal with the root causes of the refugee problem. Whereas Nansen had tried 
to remain above politics and promoted pure humanitarianism, McDonald realized 
that he had to address the question of sovereignty. In his widely publicized letter of 
resignation in December 1935, he took a strong stand against the violations of citizens’ 
rights in Germany, contending that they could not possibly be ignored as domestic 
matters. He identified the violation of a state’s responsibilities to its citizens as a clear 
danger to international peace and security, rendering international action on behalf of 
the German refugees impossible if unaddressed.55
McDonald’s letter of resignation is a remarkable document for its time. It is a 
careful analysis of how the rights of citizens were systematically violated within a 
totalitarian state. The document is composed of a powerful letter of resignation urging 
the international community to reach beyond the concerns of ‘diplomatic correctness’, 
and a thirty-four-page analysis of how the Nazi disrespect for citizens’ rights gradually 
permeated German society. McDonald showed how the ‘rule of law’ had been perverted 
by a racial ideology. He argued that the racial policy of the Nazi government found 
expression in legislation, in court decisions, in the interpretation and application of the 
law by local officials and in extra legal measures taken by the National Socialist Party 
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and its leaders who directed the central and local governments of the country. The 
result was to deprive hundreds of thousands of German citizens of all standing in the 
community and any means of livelihood. More than 80,000 persons had been obliged 
to leave Germany, though the vast majority of those affected remained in Germany 
in the hope that the programme of racial discrimination would be abandoned or 
moderated. The Nuremberg Laws, which withdrew citizenship from persons of ‘non-
German blood’, had crushed this hope. The immediate effect of the Nuremberg Laws 
was that at least half a million people were deprived of their political rights and their 
civil status, rendering them into ‘guests or wards of the State’. 
McDonald’s approach was similar to the one used today when the United Nations 
examines human rights violations in any given country. He analysed the substance 
of the legislation and then illustrated its application. He showed that the German 
courts had not only failed to safeguard the rights of equality and liberty, which were 
the basis of all civilized legal systems, but they had transformed legal guarantees 
into instruments for the extension and application of the racial principle to matters 
unregulated by formal legislation or administrative decrees. The three cornerstones 
of judicial morality had been abolished: equality of all men and women before law; 
independence of judges; and the doctrine that only those acts are to come under the 
prohibitions of the law for which the law specifically provides. In McDonald’s words 
the Nazis rejected the fundamental guarantees of ‘civilized justice’. He also recalled that 
the German judicial system had departed from certain general principles that limit the 
arbitrary power of the sovereign or of the law itself, such as could be found in the US 
Bill of Rights.56 
McDonald was adamant that the Nuremberg Laws had initiated a fresh wave 
of repression and persecution of a kind not envisaged in 1933 and demanded a 
clear change of policy. Ceasing to choose his words to accommodate diplomatic 
considerations, he wrote:
One portentous fact confronts the community of states. More than half a million 
persons, against whom no charge can be made except that they are not what the 
National Socialists choose to regard as ‘Nordic,’ are being crushed. They cannot 
escape oppression by any act of their own free will, for what has been called ‘the 
membership of non-Aryan race’ cannot be changed or kept in abeyance.57
He was in no doubt that the League had to change its strategies towards Germany: 
‘Efforts must be made to remove or mitigate the causes which create German refugees. 
… It is a political function, which properly belongs to the League itself.’58 He called 
for ‘fresh collective action’. The moral authority of the League and its member states 
had to be directed towards ‘a determined appeal to the German Government in the 
name of humanity and of the principles of the public law of Europe.’ Turning to what 
could be done, McDonald proposed friendly but firm intercession with the German 
government. He made it clear that the German policy towards Jews was definitely 
a common concern for which the League had been established. He went on to use 
what has become a human rights argument: ‘When domestic policies threaten the 
demoralisation and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings, considerations 
of diplomatic correctness must yield to those of common humanity. I … plead that 
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world opinion, acting through the League and its Member-States and other countries 
move to avert the existing and impending tragedies.’ He was in no doubt that ‘the 
protection of the individual from racial and religious intolerance is a vital condition of 
international peace and security’.59
With this letter of resignation James McDonald took the step which other activists 
like Georgine Gerhard had demanded previously. The original League document was 
reprinted by the ‘Friends of Europe’ with a foreword by Robert Cecil.60 A Viennese 
publisher reprinted it in a German translation.61 Despite its wide distribution and strong 
media response, McDonald’s courageous appeal never generated direct intervention 
from the League. His letter of resignation remained the one and only direct political 
appeal of a League advocate to deal with root causes of the refugee problem. McDonald 
clearly spelt out the connection between the violation of individual rights and the 
refugee problem.
In organizational terms, the League drew some lessons from McDonald’s critique. 
His successor was brought back into the League. The League Council, however, 
carefully circumscribed the new high commission’s sphere of activity. It ended its 
autonomous status and subjected the high commission to the close scrutiny of the 
League’s secretary general, a mixed blessing given Joseph Avenol’s open right-wing 
sympathies. In direct contrast to what McDonald had demanded, internal German 
policy was declared out of bounds for the League.62
Sir Neill Malcolm, a retired British Army official, was appointed the new League 
High Commissioner for Refugees. Within his limits, he introduced a few legal 
improvements. Since the German refugees were not covered by the 1933 Convention, 
their legal status was highly insecure. In 1936, he convened an intergovernmental 
conference at Geneva where a Provisional Arrangement concerning identity and 
travel documents for German refugees was adopted.63 Most remarkably, it prescribed 
a ‘period of grace’ before a refugee was required to leave his country of refuge, which 
in theory limited the recourse to expulsion and established the legal standing and 
personal status of such refugees in the courts of such countries. This arrangement was 
followed by a ‘Convention relating to the Status of Refugees coming from Germany’ 
adopted by an intergovernmental conference on 10 February 1938.64 It confirmed the 
legal status of those refugees who had managed to leave Germany. It repeated previous 
measures of protection, improved conditions for refugees in countries of asylum and 
limited the recourse to expulsion. Signed by the major western European countries, it 
emerged at the last possible moment, just before a new flood of refugees was occasioned 
by the Anschluss. None of the governments who signed the Convention offered the 
ratification necessary to put it into effect.65 
Not surprisingly, in the political climate states were slow to accede to this 
instrument. In practice, stateless persons continued to live outside the law, and no 
state permitted international obligations to override the fundamental unwillingness 
to protect the apatrides. The system was considered useful enough, however, that in 
May 1938 the Council directed the secretary general and the high commissioner to 
request the governments to extend the Arrangement of July 1936 and the Convention 
of February 1938 to refugees from Austria. Michael Hansson, a Norwegian judge and 
president of the Nansen International Office for Refugees, continually highlighted the 
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inhumane nature of the expulsions, calling them ‘a game with the refugee as a human 
tennis ball’ and ‘one of the greatest scandals of our times’. 
In practical terms the success of the travel and identity system for refugees from 
Germany paled in comparison with the Nansen Passport system. In one crucial respect, 
the problem of the refugees coming from Germany in the 1930s was fundamentally 
different from the Russians and Armenians in the 1920s. While the latter were usually 
in their country of refuge, the major problem faced by German refugees was finding 
countries willing to permit them to enter at all. Without this willingness, international 
agreements on refugee certificates could do little to improve their desperate situation.66 
Katy Long argues convincingly that refugees during the interwar years were basically 
treated like protected migrants. The aim of the Nansen Passport was to facilitate their 
onward movement and enable them to become self-sufficient wherever possible. Thus, 
their protection was dependent upon economic criteria. And during the economic 
crisis of the 1930s it grew increasingly difficult to find a country of refuge as the reasons 
for flight were not given consideration in defining refugee status.67
The Evian Conference 
Having appointed the former League High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from 
Germany, James McDonald, as acting chairman of his advisory committee for political 
refugees,68 the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, took a last initiative to find new 
solutions to the German refugee problem just before the outbreak of war. In July 1938, 
he convened an intergovernmental conference in Evian-les-Bains on the French shore 
of the Lake Geneva. Switzerland had refused to host the conference in Geneva.69 The 
conference aimed at facilitating the immigration of political refugees from Germany 
and presumably Austria, but at the same time it was emphasized that ‘no state would 
be expected to receive greater numbers of emigrants than is permitted by its existing 
legislation’.70 
The proceedings at Evian were depressing and the historian Shlomo Katz captured 
the mood by coining it the ‘Jewish Munich’.71 While the League in its refugee work 
had always sought constructive dialogue and cooperation with private refugee 
organizations, in Evian this cooperation was expressly avoided.72 This was a very 
different approach to the League refugee work which had heavily relied on the input of 
the refugees themselves. The outcome of the Evian Conference was that no government 
committed itself to accepting large numbers of refugees but rather agreed to create 
an Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) in London. The novelty of 
this committee was that it was authorized to concern itself with ‘actual and potential 
refugees from Germany (including Austria)’. At last, it was acknowledged that German 
Jews who had not crossed the border yet had – in language of today – a ‘well-founded 
fear of persecution’ and deserved support from this newly created international body. 
Twenty-seven states were represented on the IGCR. George Rublee, a US Department 
of State official, was appointed director of the IGCR’s permanent secretariat. The idea 
was that Rublee, since he was not connected with the League, could negotiate with the 
German government directly.73
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Despite the sorry proceedings of the Evian Conference, voices still emerged 
questioning long-established concepts of sovereignty, arguing the need for an 
international protection of individual rights and linking it to discourses which later 
grew strongly in influence after 1945. The Colombian delegate, for instance, raised the 
question of principle:
Can a State ... arbitrarily withdraw nationality from a whole class of its citizens, 
thereby making them Stateless persons whom no country is compelled to receive 
on its territory? Can a State ... pour upon other countries masses of citizens of whom 
it wishes to get rid, and can it in this way thrust upon others the consequences of a 
fatal internal policy? The whole tragedy of those thousands of unfortunate people 
who are driven from country to country [is that] all their tragedy arises from the 
fact that this preliminary question was not settled in time.
He was under no illusion that as long as this question of principle was not solved, 
little would be done for the refugees. He suggested the creation of a committee 
which would study the ‘essential problem of the right and duties of the State towards 
its own nationals, and particularly the question of whether the organisation of the 
international community is or is not based upon the principle that every individual has 
the right to belong to any particular nation and not to be deprived of his nationality 
without automatically acquiring another’. This committee would consider the question 
of granting to refugees a passport or some other paper of international validity, which 
would enable them to proceed normally from one country to another. It would also 
have to devise a full legal status for denationalized political refugees. 
The Colombian delegate also drew the attention of his audience to the ‘Declaration 
of the International Rights of Man’, which had been adopted by the Institut de Droit 
International at its meeting in New York in 1929 as well as by the International Federation 
of League of Nations Unions in Montreux in 1933. Together with the Covenant of the 
League and the great principles of modern international law, he described this as ‘the 
constitutional charter of the contemporary world’. The declaration, signed by the most 
authoritative legal institutions, declared in its first article: ‘It is the duty of every State to 
recognise the equal rights of all persons to life, liberty and property, and to grant to all 
within their territory the full and complete protection of those rights without distinction 
of sex, race, language and religion.’ Article 5 prohibited discrimination saying: ‘The 
equality referred to must not be nominal but actual and effective: no discrimination, 
either direct or indirect, will be tolerated, and in particular it will not be permissible 
for any State arbitrarily to withdraw its nationality from those, who for reasons of 
race, language or religion, it would wish to deprive of the rights of its nationality.’74 
Myron Taylor, the US representative, also used the vocabulary of human rights when 
he concluded: ‘I need not emphasise that discrimination and pressure against minority 
groups and the disregard of elementary human rights are contrary to the principle of 
what we have come to regard as the accepted standards of civilisation.’ He added that 
disrespect for human rights actually posed a threat to peace and security.75 Though 
this debate had little effect and initiated no action, these speakers placed the state’s 
responsibility for individuals at the centre of their arguments, particularly with regard 
to citizenship, race, language and religion. 
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At Evian, the authority with regard to the refugee question shifted away from the 
League and to the newly created IGCR. The Evian Conference failed to grant protection 
to the dramatically growing numbers of refugees, but even in a situation of highest 
political tension where the belief in national sovereignty was dominant, the need for a 
new thinking about individual rights was, if cautiously, displayed.
Conclusion
During the interwar years large refugee flows became symptomatic of the ills of a 
state system where individuals could be deprived of their citizenship and lose their 
fundamental rights at a stroke. The plight of those refugees resonated strongly with the 
international community. The League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and 
Fridtjof Nansen in particular enlarged the sphere of international responsibility for 
refugees. As the League’s work was heavily reliant on a strong cooperation with refugee 
relief organizations, the refugees themselves were given a voice in this institutional 
context. In some cases, individuals who had become the victim of domestic law were 
heard and their needs considered in the international arena. The League Assembly 
debates of the 1920s contributed to the internationalization of the refugee problem. 
More than one million refugees benefited in some form from the League-sponsored 
international refugee regime.
The introduction of the ‘Nansen Passport’ and the 1933 Refugee Conventions can 
be judged as outstanding accomplishments in the development of international refugee 
law and, in hindsight, to human rights law. Even though the actors in the international 
refugee regime did not develop a system of universal protection for refugees during 
the interwar period, they left a lasting legacy in the legal arena. Refugee protection 
remained dependent on national affiliation – yet, the numbers of national groups 
covered increased notably. A comprehensive body of rules developed governing refugee 
identity and travel, economic and social well-being, and notably ‘physical protection’. 
Building on the practical experience of the League High Commission for Refugees 
during the 1920s, physical protection against expulsion and refoulement became part 
of international refugee law and is included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
The story from 1933 onwards is largely one of failure, but it is the responses to that 
failure and the surrounding discourse which resonate today. With James McDonald’s 
resignation as high commissioner the global understanding of the refugee problem 
deepened. Even if his widely publicized letter of resignation did not have the desired 
effect, it was a remarkable attempt to identify the root causes of the refugee movement. 
No High Commissioner for Refugees before McDonald had the courage to show how 
the legal practice of a great power had systematically discriminated against a group of 
its own citizens and, in doing so, posed a threat to international peace and security. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it becomes evident that McDonald was one of the first 
people to advocate international measures to protect the basic rights of individuals 
inside a state. He believed that the abuse of basic rights was fundamental to the 
refugee problem and thus concerned the entire international community, not just the 
government involved. Although we see echoes of these views at Evian, they gained 
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widespread acceptance only after the Second World War, and were embedded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which has become a point of reference 
ever since. The Refugee Convention which in part builds on the 1933 convention was 
adopted in 1951 and forms the basis for all contemporary refugee protection.
Although one cannot speak of a ‘human rights regime’ during the interwar years, 
the League’s intervention in refugee issues inevitably led to new thinking on the limits 
of sovereignty, the responsibilities of the state to the individual, and the need for 
international protection of the individual under threat from the state. Unusually for 
the times, this thinking was born out of practice as much as ideology – the League’s 
practical experience during the humanitarian crises of the early 1920s with handling 
millions of refugees, including tens of thousands of individual cases, led it to attempt 
action in the 1930s. Throughout, the international community had been forced to 
consider the needs of large numbers of refugees scattered all over Europe. There is no 
doubt that the majority of states guarded their sovereignty at all costs. Nevertheless, 
they accepted international legal agreements and obligations towards refugees in order 
to relieve the plight of the displaced. While minority and national rights undoubtedly 
received greater attention during the interwar years, an emphasis on individual rights 
emerged inexorably from both the success and failures of the League’s refugee regime.
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The Myth of ‘Vacant Places’: Refugees 
and Group Resettlement
Matthew Frank
This chapter examines the origins, aims and legacy of mid-twentieth-century 
group resettlement schemes for refugees with particular reference to US 
president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘M’ Project of the early 1940s, a sprawling, 
quasi-academic study on migration and settlement, whose disappointing results 
hid its far more ambitious designs. Although most group resettlement schemes 
were hopelessly impractical owing to the prohibitive costs involved, the difficult 
political compromises that needed to be brokered to make them possible and 
the reluctance of refugees themselves to fit into a schematic blueprint (as well 
as the hostility and resistance of the local population in areas of resettlement), 
these plans were nevertheless highly revealing of contemporary elite and popular 
assumptions about the refugee problem and problem-solving at an international 
level more generally. Moreover, the attraction of these schemes lay not only in the 
possible solution they offered for alleviating both the plight of refugees and the 
refugee problem politically. Group resettlement was also viewed as a potentially 
powerful tool for reinvigorating colonial development overseas, and, closer to its 
source, for a more far-reaching reengineering of the distribution of populations 
within Europe. The chapter argues that the legacy of these schemes lay less in their 
practical implementation or in any lasting footprint left in the ‘vacant places’ or 
‘empty lands’ where resettlement was meant to take place than in demonstrating a 
readiness to contemplate the vast reordering of populations in response to and in 
anticipation of refugee crises.
*
Writing in October 1938, former British colonial administrator, international civil 
servant and director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) Refugee 
Survey, Sir John Hope Simpson, outlined three methods for resolving the European 
refugee problem. None of what later generations of scholars and practitioners in the 
field of refugee studies would call the ‘conventional trinity’ of ‘durable solutions’ –1 
repatriation, local integration and resettlement – alone could provide a magic fix to a 
problem that in the past six months, with the German annexation of Austria and the 
Sudetenland, threatened to go from ‘difficult’ to ‘unmanageable’.2 Returning refugees to 
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their country of origin (‘repatriation’), while it seemed in theory an ‘obvious’ solution, 
required that there was a state for the refugees to return to and that this state would 
agree to take them back. That was as unlikely for refugees from Nazi Germany in the 
1930s as it had been for those from Bolshevik Russia in the 1920s. Repatriation had in 
fact had, according to Simpson, such ‘little effect’ in reducing the number of refugees 
since the First World War that it could be ‘ignored as an important element in any 
future programme of international action aiming at practical liquidation of the existing 
refugee problems’.3 The integration of refugees in countries where they had found 
temporary refuge (‘absorption’) faced a series of legal, political, economic and cultural 
obstacles, not least the attitude of government and society in these countries of asylum, 
which had become increasingly restrictionist by the late 1930s owing to the economic 
depression and the rise of anti-foreigner sentiment. Lastly, the ‘planned redistribution’ 
of refugees through organized migration in a third country (‘resettlement’), whether by 
the ‘infiltration’ of single individuals and families into existing communities as part of 
colonization schemes already underway or through more ambitious ‘large-scale schemes 
for group resettlement’, including ‘pioneer settlement in undeveloped lands,’ offered 
potentially the greatest contribution given how all other avenues seemed to be closed 
off. But Simpson cautioned against getting carried away with the allure of grandiose 
schemes for overseas mass resettlement, which would require substantial capital outlay 
– both financial and political – to make them work. ‘The hope-inspiring words “wide-
open spaces” and “empty lands” obscure the dismal fact,’ he concluded, ‘that the wider 
open the space and the emptier the land, the less room there is for the person who does 
not have behind him the great capital machinery of a metropolitan country’.
Compiled between September 1937 and July 1938, the RIIA Refugee Survey was 
the most comprehensive study of the refugee problem ever undertaken. It brought 
together the combined expertise of several bodies which had been involved in 
the international management of refugees over the past fifteen years,4 ever since 
the ‘refugee’ first became a matter of international responsibility in the wake of the 
First World War and intergovernmental machinery was established to deal with 
this supposedly temporary phenomenon on an ad hoc basis.5 Conceived initially as 
a ‘compact statement of the origins of the post-War movements [of population]’ in 
Europe and the Near East and an inquiry into the status of refugees who were or might 
become a responsibility of the League of Nations,6 the survey was soon overtaken by 
a series of events which expanded the scale of the already complicated problem of 
‘refugees coming from Germany’ as Europe faced a Jewish refugee crisis of ever-greater 
proportions and receiving countries struggled to cope with existing refugee numbers 
and placed barriers in the way of further refugee flows.7 The preliminary findings 
of the survey were published in July 1938 to coincide with an intergovernmental 
conference convened by the United States in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first 
(but by no means last) attempt to provide leadership and direction in response to the 
European refugee problem.8 Any hopes that this conference would result in a ‘more 
courageous, competent, coordinated, inclusive, and practical plan … of constructive 
international action’ were, however, soon dashed.9 The Evian Conference highlighted 
the unwillingness of western European states and countries of overseas immigration to 
receive refugees in any numbers or to tackle the problem at its source.10 
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Delegates from the thirty-two states who assembled in the French resort town 
on Lake Geneva did not completely ignore the call for ‘action’ made by Simpson 
and others, and responded as the international community had when faced with the 
successive refugee crises over the previous two decades by creating a new international 
organization with a limited mandate to pursue a discrete refugee problem.11 The 
so-called Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was handed the task 
henceforth of coordinating the organized migration of refugees and of negotiating 
with receiving countries for suitable sites of resettlement as well as with refugee-
generating countries for their orderly departure.12 With existing countries of asylum 
and traditional sites of immigration such as France and United States closed to refugee 
absorption or resettlement, attention turned to less obvious or previously overlooked 
destinations among the ‘many comparatively vacant spaces on earth’s surface where 
… European settlers c[ould] live permanently’.13 The conference inspired a series of 
new and revived schemes for what was termed group or collective refugee settlement. 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Tanganyika and Angola were touted as sites of ‘permanent 
refuge’ that could support hundreds of thousands of European refugees, as were 
British and Dutch Guiana, Alaska and the Dominican Republic, North Borneo and 
parts of the Philippines, among several others areas.14 With one exception – the Sosúa 
colony in the Dominican Republic – none of these schemes ever came to fruition.15 
Despite the considerable evidence weighing against it, the idea that group settlement in 
‘vacant places’ could provide a long-term solution to the population problems Europe 
faced – of which the refugee problem was just one interlocking part – nevertheless 
continued to be promoted from the late 1930s well into the 1940s. ‘Nothing could 
be more plausible as a solution for the troubles of a persecuted minority than the 
concept of group settlement in an uninhabited land,’ remarked one American scholar 
in a leading US social science and policy journal around the time that Simpson’s RIIA 
report appeared: 
Victims of expulsion are to some extent impelled … to seek refuge in an area 
where a similar sense of national homogeneity may be nurtured. History is by 
no means lacking in examples of migratory movements from which new political 
entities have sprung. It is consequently not at all surprising that projects for mass 
settlement should now be appearing in print in large numbers.16
Even those who knew better recognized that the idea could not be dismissed. ‘The 
magnitude of the problem,’ Simpson had concluded in his RIIA report, ‘compels the … 
consideration of proposals for mass settlement in hitherto undeveloped areas’.17 
*
Plans for group resettlement could by the late 1930s draw on a number of recent practical 
examples which demonstrated that large-scale resettlement schemes were possible and 
desirable if certain conditions and commitments were met. Interwar Greece provided 
the most convincing demonstration of the practicality and desirability of mass refugee 
settlement. The influx of 1.2 million Greek Orthodox refugees from Turkey and the 
Caucasus into a country of 5 million people in the wake of the Russian Civil War and 
the collapse of the Greek military campaign in Anatolia in autumn 1922 threatened 
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to lead to state implosion, revolution and Bolshevization.18 Foreign intervention in 
the form of a great power-brokered population exchange treaty, which provided the 
political and legal cover for the removal of the bulk of the Muslim minority from 
Greece in exchange for the non-return of Greek refugees to Turkey, and the raising of 
an international loan as well as the creation of a League of Nations-backed organization 
– the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC) – to administer this in liaison with the 
Greek government, brought much needed assistance within the framework of new 
and expanding international agencies of the day.19 Transmission of technical as well 
as financial assistance through the RSC in supporting the rehabilitation of displaced 
populations was part of an internal colonization and development scheme which 
transformed economically, physically and ethnically the territories of the ‘New Greece’ 
acquired over the previous decade – Macedonia, Western Thrace and southern Epirus 
– as well as the urban centres of the Old.20 Although the claims made for Greek refugee 
settlement in retrospect were sometimes overstated and downplayed the considerable 
problems involved – the legacy of which continued to trouble Greece for generations to 
come – the pace of settlement was rapid and the work undertaken could not but impress 
observers.21 Perhaps more than anything the Greek experiment invited emulation as 
well as admiration owing to the remarkable improvement in relations with Turkey 
and the wider pacification of the Near East as a result of the elimination of minorities 
in the region, in addition to the practical demonstration of a technical solution to the 
resettlement of large numbers of refugees on the land in a timely and cost-efficient 
manner with extensive and sustained international involvement and cooperation.22 The 
Greek experiment was ‘decisive’ from a development perspective not only in helping 
promote the merits of ‘large government-backed schemes for group resettlement’ in 
‘new’ territories (and by extension European colonies),23 but also in establishing the 
case for the dispossession of the indigenous population in ‘marginal lands’. Viewed 
as an economic asset rather than a burden, refugees could provide the stimulus for 
the development of territory that was ‘marginal’ – both in economic terms and in its 
relationship politically with the centre – and therefore help raise the ‘civilizational’ 
level of areas that had to all intents and purposes been ‘vacant places’ by virtue of their 
lack of economic exploitation or backwardness.24
Greece was not the only demonstration of the advantages of internationally assisted 
refugee resettlement and of how migration problems could be ‘scientifically handled’ if 
the necessary expertise, planning and technologies were applied.25 Refugee resettlement 
schemes were also undertaken in Bulgaria, the Soviet Armenian Republic, Syria and 
Turkey during the 1920s and 1930s. All of these had to a greater or lesser extent an 
‘international’ dimension whether through the involvement of the League of Nations 
or a colonial power (or both) in financing and providing technical assistance for 
resettlement.26 While these involved what with hindsight would seem relatively limited 
numbers of people (in the tens or low hundreds of thousands in each case) and met with 
very mixed results, even the spectacular failures of the period – most notably the aborted 
initiative by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, to 
replicate the Greek success story for the Armenians – underscored how essential sufficient 
financing, international backing, great power sponsorship and local cooperation were for 
group resettlement schemes to have any chance of practical realization.27 
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But if the reasons for the failure of initiatives such as Armenian resettlement were 
mainly political, interwar setbacks to such schemes also pointed to the ‘exceptional 
conditions’ and ‘uniquely advantageous factors’ that had prevailed in the Greek and 
to some extent in the Bulgarian and Turkish cases, too.28 The refugees had come 
from ‘contiguous or nearby areas’, sufficient financial resources were secured for the 
movement and settlement of refugees, and ‘expert supervision’ and ‘reasonably well 
developed’ areas of resettlement were provided with already some government and 
social services in place. But most importantly, these were ‘national’ refugees who had 
been resettled ‘back’ into their titular ‘homeland’.29 Within the logic of twentieth-
century nationalism – which at its root posited the ever-closer alignment of the 
frontiers of nation and state – these group resettlements became ‘inverted repatriation 
movements’, as Simpson termed them, aimed at the consolidation and homogenization 
of the nation-state in areas of east-central Europe that had until very recently retained 
a high level of ethnic and religious complexity and diversity.30 Resettlement in these 
instances was about concentrating refugees nationally rather than dispersing them 
internationally.
Overseas group resettlement was another proposition entirely. By the time of the 
Evian Conference, the idea of resettling refugees in specially created colonies outside 
of Europe had still not been attempted on anything but the smallest of scales. Russian 
refugees were resettled in South America with the assistance of the League of the Nations 
and the International Labour Office – which assumed the League’s responsibilities for 
refugee employment and resettlement in 1924 – but only in very limited numbers and 
with disappointing results, owing partly to the undercapitalization of these schemes.31 By 
the mid-1930s, the League again had its sights on South America as a place of settlement 
for new groups of refugees (Saarlanders and Assyrians) that had come under its care. 
Much of the refugee movement to South America was in any case through individual 
‘infiltration’, not group settlement. Of the eight to ten thousand Jewish refugees who 
reached the continent by the late 1930s, for example, only an ‘infinitesimal’ proportion 
did so as part of projects coordinated by organizations such as the Jewish Colonization 
Association,32 which since its creation in 1891 had established – primarily in South 
America – over 500 settlements and 18,000 families of mostly eastern European Jews 
fleeing persecution in the Pale of Settlement and then the newly independent Poland, 
and provided training for agricultural life as well as capital for land purchase.33 Other 
large-scale interwar colonization efforts by Jewish organizations, although not initially 
or primarily involving refugees or carried out collectively, nevertheless offered lessons 
in the possibilities of settlement in ‘marginal lands’. Between 1933 and 1939 Jewish 
immigration to the British-administered Palestine Mandate – which had already 
doubled to around 175,000 over the previous decade – reached 250,000 or an average 
at its height of over 41,000 per year from 1933 until 1936, many of them refugees from 
central Europe. This new influx of population brought with it significant capital inflows 
(which partly made settlement on this scale and under these conditions possible), but 
also generated severe communal tensions with the Arab population, who feared the 
political implications of the dramatic increase in the Jewish population of the Palestine 
– from just over 10 per cent to just under 30 per cent between 1922 and 1939 – and 
led the British government with its White Paper of May 1939 to declare an effective 
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moratorium on Jewish mass immigration to the Mandate.34 For a very brief spell in the 
1930s, especially once immigration to Palestine became ever-more restricted from the 
mid-point in the decade following the 1936 Arab revolt, Birobidzhan in the Soviet Far 
East, where a Jewish Autonomous Region had been established in 1934 on the Amur 
River, also became the focus of Jewish emigration efforts. Ambitious plans were made 
by the Soviet government for the settlement of one million Jews and for establishing 
the region as a global centre for Yiddish culture that would also attract non-Soviet 
Jewish colonists. Numbers never got anywhere near this and the project fell victim to 
the purges, the suppression of national autonomy and heightened national security 
concerns about neighbouring Japanese-controlled Manchukuo in the late 1930s.35 
In outline if not in practice, however, Birobidzhan, like Palestine and Greece, was a 
project of national and economic development through mass settlement that relied 
on the same faith in planning, science and technology that underpinned Soviet break-
neck industrialization as well as US New Deal regeneration projects of the 1930s.36
Optimism about the seemingly limitless opportunities which the world’s ‘vacant 
places’ offered for resolving Europe’s population problems, however, was at odds with 
the direction in which academic opinion on migration and settlement was moving at 
the time.37 Over the course of the 1930s geographers and demographers engaged in 
developing the ‘science of settlement’ were busy challenging ‘the common fallacy … 
that space means opportunity’.38 ‘Nations can no longer hope to solve or even much 
alleviate their difficulties by shifting people around the globe,’ wrote the Australian 
author of The Myth of Open Spaces soon after the outbreak of the Second World War:
We cannot approach the post-war world settlement with the comforting idea in 
the back of our minds that if other solutions go wrong we can always fall back on 
oversea[s] settlement. … Great social problems cannot any longer be solved by the 
flight of the unfortunate or the world-wandering of the adventurous. … Migration 
and settlement must be regarded as at best a minor avenue of international 
adjustment. The real problem is to afford occupation for the energies of massed 
populations in their own countries.39
As the standard pre-war work on the subject – Limits of Land Settlement published in 
1937 – concluded, the prospects for ‘pioneer settlement’ that characterized the mass 
migrations of the nineteenth century from Europe overseas were now almost zero. 
The most suitable land for agricultural settlement had already been utilized. What was 
left was ‘marginal land’: marginal not only in terms of the inferiority of the land or 
climate but also its distance from markets and transportation networks.40 Overseas 
settlement therefore was not just about ‘space’ – finding vast seemingly empty regions 
on a map and populating them – but about ‘development’ and the need to recreate 
many of the necessities of mid-twentieth-century urbanized life in areas without 
any modern amenities. None of this made the resettlement of refugees in ‘marginal 
lands’ impossible, but the investment required meant that it only made sense if it was 
carried out on a large scale on the basis of community or group settlement. ‘The earth’s 
tolerance has been vastly widened by modern science,’ argued the American geographer 
and sometime adviser to FDR, Isaiah Bowman, in Limits of Land Settlement. ‘Experts 
are now required to plan out measures in advance if colonization is to be rational.’41 
The Myth of ‘Vacant Places’: Refugees and Group Resettlement 127
The application of scientific methods and planning could only go so far, however, in 
making these schemes practicable. Ultimately, the barriers to group resettlement were 
financial and political not technical.
‘Men, money and markets’ was the mantra of the Australian governments of the 
1920s in their largely unsuccessful attempts at promoting rapid population growth 
and economic development.42 ‘For settling people successfully in new homes,’ wrote 
Dorothy Thompson, the New York Times correspondent sometimes credited with 
breathing life into FDR’s refugee initiatives in early 1938, ‘one needs money, money 
and again money.’43 Overseas group resettlement schemes were, in other words, 
prohibitively costly. Estimates by the late 1930s put the price of resettling a family 
overseas at anywhere between US$1,000 and $20,000, depending on location.44 The 
total bill for wholesale resettlement of European refugees at this point was somewhere 
in the region of US$1–1.5 billion (roughly $17–20 billion in today’s money).45 But 
none of the estimates included, even at the upper limit, the capitalization required 
for building the basic infrastructure needed to establish the communities in which 
individuals could settle permanently. Where would the money come from? Most 
certainly not from the private sector, at least initially. Colonization schemes run on 
commercial lines had rarely ever succeeded from the investor’s point of view.46 Any 
group resettlement scheme was likely to operate at a substantial financial loss. Even in 
the case of Greece, the western European investors who underwrote the loans that made 
the highly vaunted work of the RSC possible were ‘clear losers’.47 ‘Profit’ or ‘gain’ had to 
be calculated in social or political terms, not by economic or financial measurements. 
The huge capital outlays involved would need to be ‘regarded as endowments rather 
than investments’.48 While philanthropic organizations and individuals might have been 
willing to provide financial assistance on these terms, the enormity of the undertaking 
far exceeded the resources they had at their disposal.49 Only government – or more 
precisely governments working collaboratively – could help realize expensive schemes 
in far-flung regions. ‘Government makes up for submarginality,’ argued Bowman. 
‘Once it shows the way … private capital and initiative follow.’50 Yet everything within 
the existing international refugee regime conspired against support for expensive 
resettlement schemes. Governments were reluctant to enter into any lasting or serious 
financial commitment on behalf of refugees. The international refugee regime that 
emerged in the 1920s had been set up on a shoestring and was run on a very tight 
administrative budget; part of Nansen’s supposed ‘genius’ as the first League of Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees was his attention to unit costs and his proven ability 
to tap into private sources of funding, which by the late 1930s had been exhausted.51 
There were important political objections, too. Governments baulked at the idea 
of importing foreign minority problems, fearing that large homogenous groups of 
newcomers would establish ethnic enclaves, which would become unassimilable 
and the object of resentment and hostility from the local population. The fear of 
stoking anti-Semitism and of creating a ‘Jewish problem’ where none had previously 
existed was repeatedly cited by potential countries of immigration as a reason for not 
supporting group resettlement in the late 1930s. ‘As we have no real racial problem,’ 
declared the Australian Minister of Trade, Colonel C. W. White, at the time of the 
Evian Conference, ‘we are not desirous of importing one by encouraging any scheme 
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of large-scale foreign migration’.52 The same arguments could be used for blocking the 
resettlement of non-Jewish groups as well, especially if they were regarded as overtly 
political in outlook and potentially sources of enemy subversion. Resistance to group 
resettlement therefore dove tailed with national security concerns, which characterized 
broader immigration debates of the mid-century.
By the outbreak of the Second World War there were still too few practical 
examples of recent overseas group resettlement schemes to form any reasonable 
assessment of the merits of these experiments. The great hope of British Guiana had 
proven illusory. Having already been identified as a possible destination for a different 
group of refugees (Assyrians) in the mid-1930s, the South American colony in 1939 
was again being promoted by the British government, this time as a solution to the 
Jewish refugee crisis that did not involve Palestine.53 More encouraging and lesser 
known than the other small-scale refugee colonies that were established at this point, 
such as the experiment at Sosúa in the Dominican Republic – Trujillo’s attempt to 
curry favour with the United States and line his pockets at the expense of refugees 
and their backers – was the settlement of two groups of anti-Nazi Sudeten German 
refugees in northern Canada in summer 1939.54 With the financial assistance of the 
British government through the Czech Refugee Trust Fund and in cooperation with 
the Canadian government and the two principal Canadian railroad companies, 1,054 
Sudeten German refugees (307 families and 72 single men) were established in two 
settlements: on abandoned farms at St Walburg in west-central Saskatchewan; and 
on bush land at Tupper in the Peace River region of British Columbia bordering on 
Alberta.55 The experiment suffered from undercapitalization, drift to the cities, and 
lack of suitability and training for agricultural life, and was only rescued by the arrival 
of the industrial economy in the form of the Alaska-Canada Highway, which provided 
work for the settlers and a market for their goods.56 In retrospect, however, it was 
judged as a remarkable Canadian success story,57 even if it seemed far from being so 
mid-point during the war.58 As with other refugee initiatives such as the British Guiana 
ploy, its significance at the time was not in demonstrating what states were willing to 
do, but what actions such as this allowed them not to do. ‘If we could take a substantial 
number of them,’ the Canadian prime minister, Mackenzie King, declared in December 
1938, when arrangements post-Munich were being made for the relocation of these 
Sudeten German refugees, ‘it would put us in a much stronger position in relation to 
later appeals from and on behalf of non-Aryans.’59 King need not have worried: the 
outbreak of the war in Europe further limited the scope for such projects involving 
Jewish and non-Jewish refugees alike – only 15 per cent of the 2,000 Sudeten German 
Social Democrat families slated for resettlement in Canada, for example, ever made it 
across the Atlantic – even if it brought into stark relief the outline of existing and future 
refugee problems.60
*
‘When this ghastly war ends there may be not one million but ten million or twenty 
million men, women and children belonging to many races and many religions, living 
in many countries and possibly on several continents, who will enter into the wide 
picture – the problem of the human refugee,’ declared FDR on the occasion of an 
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IGCR meeting at the White House on 17 October 1939.61 ‘It is not enough to indulge 
in horrified humanitarianism, empty resolutions, golden rhetoric and pious words,’ 
Roosevelt argued: 
We must face [the problem] actively … and start … a serious and probably a fairly 
expansive effort to survey and study definitely and scientifically this geographical 
and economic problem of resettling several million people in new areas of the 
earth’s surface. We have been working, up to now, on too small a scale, and we 
have failed to apply modern engineering to our task. We know already that there 
are many comparatively vacant spaces on the earth’s surface where from the point 
of view of climate and natural resources European settlers can live permanently. 
Some of these lands have no means of access; some of them require irrigation; 
most of them require soil and health surveys; all of them present in the process of 
settlement, economic problems which must be tied in with the economy of existing 
settled areas. The possible field of new settlements covers many portions of the 
African, American and Australasian portions of the globe. It covers millions of 
square miles situated in comparatively young republics and in colonial possessions 
or dominions of older nations.62
Issued against the advice of the State Department and his own advisers, including his 
personnel emissary on refugees,63 FDR’s statement was a recognition of the broadening 
complexity of the problem of displacement created by the war and its anticipated 
aftermath that involved not only pre-war refugees. It also acknowledged the need for 
long-range and ambitious planning to tackle these problems and the timidity of existing 
plans. ‘Somebody has to breathe heart and ideals on a large scale into this whole subject 
if it is to be put into effect on a world-wide basis,’ FDR informed the State Department 
after yet another IGCR report had failed to ‘stimulate [his] imagination.’64 FDR was 
suspected of having ‘a gigantic plan in mind, something world-wide in scope.’65 Soon after 
the United States entered the war in December 1941, FDR began laying the groundwork 
for extensive population redistribution on a global scale by initially commissioning a 
comprehensive study of migration and settlement opportunities worldwide.
The immediate origins of what became the ‘M’ Project lay in a meeting held at the 
White House on 23 May 1942 between FDR and the Czech-American anthropologist 
and curator of the physical anthropology collections at the Smithsonian, Aleš 
Hrdlička.66 There was nothing remarkable about the meeting per se. Since 1938, a 
series of advisers had provided FDR with counsel on the refugee problem, in which the 
president seemed to display an ever-closer interest. That FDR had a ‘definite slant’ on 
the refugee problem and that this lay in the possibility of large-scale group resettlement 
in ‘uninhabited and sparsely inhabited … agricultural lands’ were well known by this 
point,67 as were his struggles with restrictionists in the State Department and Congress 
over the loosening of immigration quotas that limited the scope for providing sanctuary 
for refugees in the United States and forced him in the direction of mass resettlement 
schemes elsewhere.68 FDR used the meeting to reiterate his belief in the need for a 
worldwide redistribution of populations,69 and Hrdlička outlined for FDR three ways 
in which this ‘large and difficult problem’ could be tackled: first, as a strictly academic 
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exercise, which would clarify the ‘basic questions’ relating to the ‘scientific principles 
of demographic movements and race mixtures’; second, as a fact-finding mission 
by a small body of experts who would determine the prospects for resettlement and 
establish the ‘foundation for rational selection and direction of the migrants’; and third 
– and more ambitiously – through the creation of an executive body to ‘institute, direct 
and supervise’ planned migrations, initially Pan-American in scale, but potentially 
forming the kernel of a ‘World Organisation for Emigration’ within a ‘new “League 
of Nations”.’70 Not much came of the White House meeting initially – Hrdlička began 
working independently without further guidance or direction from the president –71 
until mid-July 1942 when an FDR fixer and go-between, the journalist Jack Carter, 
brought Hrdlička together with the Anglo-American anthropologist and department 
store heir, Henry Field, who had been working under Carter’s direction on a number 
of secret White House research projects, to put into practice Hrdlička’s second idea of 
constituting a ‘small, informal committee of leading anthropologists’ from the Western 
Hemisphere to conduct exploratory discussions of the ‘anthropological problems 
anticipated in post-war population movements’.72 As it soon became apparent that 
Hrdlička intended to use this committee to settle professional scores and viewed the 
proposed ‘Institute of Population’ as a means of furthering his own narrow research 
agenda rather than the president’s wider aims,73 FDR issued a directive on 7 August 
1942 with fresh instructions.74 Gone was the idea of a broadly constituted Americas-
wide committee of investigation and instead a much smaller and informal in-house 
triumvirate was formed comprising Hrdlička, Field and Bowman, with Carter as White 
House liaison. The remit of the ‘M’ Project was now set. The committee was asked 
by FDR to answer two broad questions: ‘1) Where are the vacant places of the earth 
suitable for post-war settlement? 2) What type of people could live in those places?’
Although this ‘anthropological committee’ focused initially, at least while Hrdlička 
remained nominally in charge, on a narrow set of sub-questions relating to ‘racial 
admixtures’ and the ‘scientific principles involved in the process of miscegenation’,75 
others involved in the ‘M’ Project grasped from the outset the wider ambitions that 
informed FDR’s initiative. ‘The[r]e are present day examples of redistributions of 
populations born under the psychology of war and undertaken for selfish reasons 
without regard for higher purposes,’ noted an early State Department commentary on 
the ‘M’ Project. ‘[But the future] might promise a redistribution under happy omens, 
with humanitarian purpose and under the scrutiny and direction of science.’ An 
‘organized effort to actually distribute people’ had never been properly undertaken, 
the State Department concluded: ‘No systematic, scientific effort has been put forth to 
redistribute … populations.’76 Here, then, was an opportunity to deal with population 
maldistribution – too many (‘surplus population’) or the wrong type in the wrong place 
(minorities) – as well as displacement. ‘The demographic unbalance [sic] resulting 
from this War will render the problem of migration sharply acute,’ observed an early 
‘M’ Project steering paper of May 1943: 
World War I set in motion large-scale migrations. After World War II – it must be 
presumed – the number of people to be resettled or repatriated will be even greater. 
For World War II [has] affected more countries, is fought more destructively, and 
The Myth of ‘Vacant Places’: Refugees and Group Resettlement 131
has set in motion the greatest migration in history of refugees, exiles, and forced 
workers. The shift from war to peace economy and the impoverishment of large 
parts of Europe will create additional problems in migration. Thus the economic 
reconstruction of Europe and Asia requires the formulation of resettlement policies 
now [emphasis in original]. If migration is accepted as vital to international growth 
and as a corrective of demographic unbalance, then apologetic discussion of what 
is termed ‘refugee problems’ must give way to a more vigorous and comprehensive 
treatment of the entire complex of migration questions. … As long as settlement 
schemes are undertaken without making them part of an international program, 
they are always in danger of failure.77
A ‘world-wide demographic engineering job,’ as one FDR aide put it, was what was 
needed,78 which encompassed all four of these groups – pre-war international refugees, 
wartime displaced, minorities and surplus populations.79 ‘I think … [FDR] had one 
object in view,’ recalled Carter in the mid-1960s, ‘namely, that all displaced persons 
were not Jewish. It was a wider problem. The whole world should be canvassed; and the 
whole world should have the responsibility.’80
Financed through White House special funds, the ‘M’ Project was formally 
approved on 1 November 1942.81 By May 1943, the Hrdlička-Field-Bowman 
‘informal confidential committee’ on ‘ethnological and resettlement studies’ was well 
established,82 with a budget of $34,900 and a staff of seven,83 who between them had 
command of eight European languages and were themselves a reflection of older and 
more recent waves of European forced migration.84 Hrdlička was soon ‘in merciful 
absentia … permanently’,85 Bowman periodically descended to provide guidance on 
the nature of the project,86 and Field delegated the day-to-day running of the project to 
others.87 Situated within the recesses of the Library of Congress – Study Room 115, just 
up the hall from the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime predecessor of the Central 
Intelligence Agency – the ‘M’ Project team spent the next three years assembling a 
vast amount of material – 666 ‘Studies on Migration and Settlement’ covering the 
‘greater part of the habitable world’ –88 with the ambitious goal of establishing the 
‘pathology of modern settlement’ and making a ‘world-wide survey of potential areas 
of settlement.’89 During the early stages of the project, staff saw it as being much more 
than an academic exercise; ‘M’ Project reports, they claimed, were ‘not destined for 
scholarly consumption: their purpose [wa]s to provide a basis for action’.90 At the end 
of 1943, the research team was already in a position to map out a ‘tentative “Blueprint 
for Settlement”’.91 By this stage, however, the limitations of what the project could 
conceivably achieve under the two strict stipulations made by FDR – that the ‘M’ 
Project remained a secret and did not duplicate work being done by any other agency in 
Washington – were all too clear.92 Lacking official status and barred from entering into 
direct relationships with groups within the US bureaucracy, the ‘M’ Project team found 
itself in an ‘organizational and human vacuum’,93 just as the war was ‘entering a period 
when political decisions w[ould] have to be made and [… [the] group … [needed to] 
consider the political angles of migration and settlement problems’.94 ‘As we disposed 
of no confidential data and had no means of ascertaining recent trends,’ concluded 
Robert Strausz-Hupé, who in January 1944 had taken over day-to-day direction of 
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the project, ‘our approach was necessarily academic in nature.’95 The ‘Blueprint’, whose 
‘grand strategy of settlement’ included a proposal for the creation of an ‘International 
Settlement Authority’ that would work alongside ‘existing development and lending 
agencies’ to facilitate the ‘planned coordination of … manpower and capital supply 
with local demands’, was considered not to have produced ‘any unusual findings’,96 
Henceforth, the team was under instructions to operate solely as a ‘regional study 
group’ as it was thought that they did not have enough data to produce a ‘timely 
survey of international settlement and refugee problems’ and they were not considered 
‘competent to study policy’.97 
The ‘Blueprint’ was shelved. Instead, the team began working on a ‘Handbook for 
Settlement’ containing a ‘review of practical settlement experiences and a compilation 
of maxims for the guidance of future projects’.98 During 1944, its work continued to 
concentrate on the Far East, the USSR and the American republics.99 As the war drew 
to a close, it tried to remain relevant, coordinating the preparation of studies with the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the international 
organization responsible for coordinating post-war refugee relief, as well as processing 
and distributing studies that might be of value to intergovernmental meetings, such as 
the preparatory conference for the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco 
between April and June 1945.100 The ‘M’ Project initially survived not only a change 
of administration with FDR’s death on 12 April 1945 – being given ‘the shining, 
clear green light’ to continue operating through to June 1946 – but also the end of 
the Second World War in Europe and Asia.101 ‘Like Eisenhower’s armies,’ Bowman 
wrote Field in March 1945, ‘your reports gain valuable ground each month.’102 In May 
1945, the secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, recommended not only extending the 
project but also increasing its funding.103 With the growing interest in ‘M’ Project 
reports from the myriad agencies involved in post-war relief and reconstruction, by 
October 1945 there were ‘elaborate plans’ to expand operations and undertake more 
extensive studies of the Far East.104 Only a month later, however, the Bureau of the 
Budget pulled the plug on the ‘M’ Project.105 ‘We believe that detailed studies on world-
wide population problems, the movement and settlement of displaced persons and 
the possible development of thinly settled areas should be continued in a permanent, 
centralized and coordinated unit within the government,’ went Field’s final plea for 
reprieve.106 There was talk of creating a ‘Population Research Center’ to continue the 
work of the ‘M’ Project.107 ‘[We are of] the firm belief,’ concluded Field in his last report 
on the project, ‘that we should keep well informed on all foreign population problems 
– more than ever in the Atomic Age.’108 Jack Carter, who was tasked with winding up 
the ‘M’ Project and other related White House wartime ‘political intelligence activities’, 
expressed the hope that ‘in the near future we may be able to resume this program 
with adequate backing and friendly reception in the appropriate quarters in this city 
of dreadful haste’.109
Carter’s hopes were not fulfilled. A home was hurriedly found for the ‘M’ Project 
materials in the Department of Geography vault at Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore.110 The ‘M’ Project then ‘slipped into the Twilight Zone of “file and forget”’.111 
It very briefly came out of the shadows when in June 1947 UN World published a 
sensationalized account of the ‘M’ Project by the Hungarian-American journalist 
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Ladislas Farago, which contained ‘many errors of fact and deduction’ and grossly 
overstated the strategic value and the originality of the project’s findings.112 If the article’s 
aim in attempting to disperse the ‘smokescreen of official secrecy’ that surrounded the 
‘M’ Project had been to draw international attention to documents which ‘held the key 
to one of the world’s most persistent international issues’, then the reaction to it only 
underscored the rapid obsolescence of the ‘M’ Project and official indifference to it. 
Both the State Department and the White House ‘professed no connection or interest 
in it’.113 International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was set up in June 1946 
primarily with the aim of resettling the million or so Displaced Persons who could 
not or would not be repatriated, remained unaware of its findings.114 The project was 
rescued from historical oblivion by Field himself in the early 1960s after the studies 
were finally declassified and he was encouraged by the historian Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr and the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn to give his account of the work of this 
then still unknown aspect of American wartime activity.115 There was subsequently 
some cursory academic interest in the ‘M’ Project as part of the reassessments of 
1930s American refugee policy undertaken by historians in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.116 More recently several scholars have found in the existence of the ‘M’ Project 
further clues as to the shape of mid-century thinking on population management 
and international networks of expertise as well as the racial essentialism and neo-
imperialism underpinning it.117 But the full story of the ‘M’ Project itself remains 
largely untold, its studies unread, its records untapped. Partly this is because it proved 
so inconsequential, even as an academic exercise. It produced no original research or 
new findings.118 The proposal for an ‘International Settlement Authority’ was itself far 
from innovative.119 For Bowman, the value of the work at the time lay ‘chiefly in the 
translations made from other languages … . and in … enterprising scouting for out-
of-the-way material’.120 
But even if the ‘M’ Project is seen as nothing more than a rapidly obsolescent 
database of often obscure research, in its inception and aspirations it is also a study of 
many of the contemporary biases, preoccupations and obsessions on migration and 
settlement, and the enduring myth of ‘vacant places’ that had inspired its creation. As 
a huge intellectual vanity project that satisfied a later-life interest in population politics 
and development economics, the ‘M’ Project provides further insight into FDR’s way of 
operating and thinking as well as his ambitions for the post-war world. In determining 
the extent to which FDR actually took a close and sustained interest in the work of the 
‘M’ Project – rather its broadest outlines – we really only have the word of ‘M’ Project 
staff to go on.121 Yet FDR did make sure to the end of his life that the project received 
the necessary funds and authorization to continue operating, a lifeline that he did not 
extend to all of his secret projects.122 For the staff on the ‘M’ Project, and those outside 
of it who were aware of its existence, its significance became clearer with hindsight. 
FDR was ‘prophetic’ in anticipating the future dimensions of the refugee problem, 
the broader population problems it formed part of and the need for large-scale and 
long-range coordinated action through international agencies to tackle it.123 The ‘M’ 
Project, then, was further demonstration of his greatness as a president, war leader 
and humanitarian, and of his determination to provide a ‘New Deal for the World’, 
riven by war, as he had for a United States cast down by economic depression.124  
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‘If FDR had lived,’ Field wrote in the mid-1970s, ‘he would have implemented these 
[“M” Project] proposals … on each of the five continents.’125 But the work of the ‘M’ 
Project also reflected more broadly held assumptions that informed group settlement 
proposals: the durability of the popular myth of ‘vacant places’, which defied 
academic opinion; the faith in the transformative power of modern science, planning, 
technocratic expertise and the bureaucratic state to harness, channel and apply the 
resources needed to overcome the challenge of settling vast numbers of people over 
huge distances in these ‘vacant places’; the attraction of mass refugee resettlement as 
a development project, which was as appealing to American New Deal modernizers 
as it was to European powers interested in opportunities for exploiting colonial 
possessions more effectively and reviving the colonial project more generally; and the 
racial essentialism that underpinned the whole debate on group resettlement, from 
questions of the suitability of the tropics for White settlement to the very notion of 
‘empty lands’ when applied to areas with established indigenous populations.126
Ideas that preoccupied the ‘M’ Project also inspired the way in which with Europe’s 
displaced populations were handled by international organizations post-war. UNRRA 
dealt with the relief and repatriation not the resettlement of populations, and was an 
ad hoc international organization, which, as with its interwar forebears, was created 
to tackle what was seen as a temporary problem. But the very fact that there was a 
concerted international effort to handle displaced persons in the aftermath of the war 
and that the preparations for this were made well before the end of the hostilities spoke 
of the impulse for planning and coordinated action, which was also at the centre of ‘M’ 
Project thinking.127 Neither UNRRA nor its successor IRO resembled the permanent 
international migration agency for coordinating worldwide migration (including the 
resettlement of refugees and ‘surplus population’) that the ‘M’ Project had called for.128 
Both UNRRA and IRO, moreover, dealt with only one aspect of Europe’s population 
problems and just a part of the wider refugee problem. The increasing emphasis on 
resettlement by the late 1940s as a durable solution to the ongoing ‘DP’ problem, as 
the Cold War made the repatriation politically unacceptable and refugees as potential 
immigrants more ideologically palatable, nevertheless established the logistical 
networks and institutional framework for the assisted migration of just over one million 
refugees between 1947 and 1951 under IRO auspices, the vast majority of whom were 
settled outside of Europe once the US, Canadian and Australian DP Acts of 1947–8 
and the creation of Israel in 1948 opened up possibilities for overseas resettlement that 
were unthinkable in the 1930s, and had been distant possibilities when the ‘M’ Project 
was examining the issue.129 
The idea of group resettlement, however, did not play a part in this increasingly 
globalized solution to the European refugee problem. It was as individual migrants 
that these European refugees were admitted to countries of immigration outside 
the Continent. Even if there was still a preference for agriculturalists as potential 
immigrants, it was nevertheless to established sites of settlement, not to marginal lands 
or ‘vacant places’, where these refugees were directed. If anything, then, the post-war 
period further underscored the limits of group resettlement. For all their work in 
seeking out potential areas of settlement worldwide, researchers on the ‘M’ Project 
had understood almost from the outset that the contribution that group resettlement 
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could make to Europe’s population problems would be extremely limited. By amply 
demonstrating the continuing impracticality of such schemes and the fallacy of the 
idea of ‘vacant places’, the ‘M’ Project was essentially engaged in a time-consuming 
‘process of elimination’ of ‘regions … being persistently extolled as havens of the 
uprooted peoples of Europe … which seem[ed] to have little more to recommend 
them as areas of prospective settlement than the lack of interest heretofore showed [sic] 
by the colonial powers.’130 Having quickly realized that there were in fact few places 
suitable for European mass settlement overseas – and with those that supposedly 
were (East Africa or Australia, for example) ruled out for political reasons –131 staff 
on the ‘M’ Project understood that efforts at coordinating and managing international 
migration had to be focused on directing individual migrants to existing areas of 
settlement. As one of the project’s earliest summaries pointed out, ‘A revision of the 
immigration policies of the great immigration countries [wa]s [therefore] the only 
means for accommodating the bulk of would-be overseas emigrants.’132 
Post-war Europe nevertheless did see group resettlement on an unprecedented 
scale, but this occurred within the Continent and was primarily aimed at redressing 
the maldistribution of population in Europe that had arisen as a consequence of the 
redrawing of frontiers at the end of the First World War and the continued presence 
of large, dispersed national minorities who had been the object of irredentist designs 
and the cause of international tension and conflict – so-called ‘geopolitical problem 
children’ in ‘M’ Project terminology.133 Agreements reached between Nazi Germany 
and its allies, including the Soviet Union, between 1939 and 1941, and the Soviet Union 
and its western neighbours and allies shortly before the end of and in the aftermath 
of the Second World War for the resettlement of national minorities in east-central 
Europe (so-called ‘population transfers’) drew on the same thinking that informed 
schemes for overseas group settlement – a rational and planned, state-directed and 
scientific handling of a population problem – even if the focus was on, as in the 1920s 
with Greece (which partly served as model for these transfers), the concentration 
rather than the dispersal of population in order to engineer more homogenous nation-
states.134 A willingness to move whole population groups en masse and a preparedness 
to justify this on political and humanitarian grounds were shared by authoritarian and 
liberal states alike by the 1940s. Given his enthusiasm for group settlement projects 
and the very existence of the ‘M’ Project, it should therefore come as no surprise that 
FDR readily endorsed wartime proposals for the mass transfer of minorities within 
Europe.135
As a result of mass transfers of national minorities and the creation of new 
categories of refugees with the onset of the early Cold War, just as many new refugee 
problems were caused within Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War as were 
solved through international initiatives to re-home the wartime displaced. Post-war 
displacement within Europe, moreover, not only underscored how interconnected 
these movements of populations were but also prompted further debate about the 
need for long-range solutions that looked beyond the Continent to tackle Europe’s 
broader population problems of which these post-war displacements formed part. 
The mass flight, expulsion and transfer of 12–14 million Germans from east-central 
and south-eastern Europe into the reduced territory of occupied post-war Germany 
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raised acute concerns within western Europe – particularly among the French – about 
German ‘surplus population’ and led to revived interest in group settlement schemes. 
Most notably, this found expression in the proposal by the French foreign minister, 
Georges Bidault, at the Moscow Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 
March 1947, that steps be taken by the United Nations to provide for the assisted 
settlement of several million Germans overseas in order to reduce the threat to 
European security and economic and political stability caused by overcrowding in 
western Germany.136 The so-called ‘Bidault Plan’ – which included an offer to take in 
up to two million Germans into France – came to nothing, but ongoing anxieties about 
new population imbalances in Europe exacerbated by post-war population transfers 
on the Continent ultimately led to initiatives like the Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration (ICEM) in the 1950s, which in an unwitting nod to the work 
of the ‘M’ Project dealt with the interconnected problem of wartime refugees, ‘surplus 
population’ and displaced former minority groups through overseas resettlement on 
an individual basis.137 In the case of the millions of Germans displaced since the end of 
the Second World War, however, the number of people who found a new life overseas 
thanks to ICEM was just a fraction of the total absorbed into the German Federal 
and Democratic Republics.138 As critics of large-scale overseas group resettlement 
and the myth of open spaces and ‘vacant places’ had long pointed out, the European 
refugee problem would eventually have to be resolved within Europe or at least within 
the industrialized world.139 It was as immigrants in crowded places, therefore, not as 
pioneer settlers in empty lands, that a ‘durable solution’ was found for refugees during 
Europe’s forty years’ crisis.
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Old Wine in New Bottles? UNRRA and the 
Mid-Century World of Refugees
Jessica Reinisch
By the end of the Second World War, millions of people had been forcibly displaced from 
their homes. Malcolm Proudfoot, who served in the headquarters staff of the Allied 
Supreme Command in Germany, estimated in 1945 that over 60 million Europeans 
were involuntarily moved during the war and the immediate post-war period.1 Well 
over 10 million forced labourers of Allied nationality found themselves stranded on the 
territory of the defeated German Reich. In addition, around 13 million ethnic Germans 
were being expelled from countries in Eastern and Southern Europe.2 The numbers of 
uprooted people created by the war exceeded those of any previous crises.
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration – UNRRA in short 
– was the first international body set up during the Second World War to make 
arrangements for the care and return of some of these uprooted people to their home 
countries. UNRRA was not created specifically as an agency to tackle refugee problems, 
but its work with displaced persons was crucial to its overall mandate to manage the 
transition from war to peace and to create the foundations for a new, peaceful world. 
Throughout the ‘forty years’ crisis’ reviewed in this book, a series of organizations, set 
up by both governments and voluntary private groups, attempted to handle refugee 
problems. By the time of its creation in 1943, UNRRA was the biggest, boldest, best-
funded international organization working on refugee matters the world had seen. 
In its five-year lifespan it organized the repatriation of millions of people, provided 
them with food, housing, welfare and health care, and opportunities for training and 
employment, and administered hundreds of DP camps – and thereby helped to define 
and redefine mid-century approaches to rehabilitation, repatriation and resettlement.
The scholarly literature on UNRRA’s work with refugees has grown significantly 
in the last decade. We have by now a wealth of academic studies, including those 
on experiences by particular national groups and in particular DP camps,3 as well 
as broader surveys.4 This chapter draws on this work and UNRRA’s own sources so 
as to place the organization into the framework of the ‘forty years’ crisis’ developed 
in this book. UNRRA existed as an organization in a long line of largely piecemeal 
and provisional organizations, instruments and mechanisms. The chapter seeks to 
understand it as one particular solution, or set of solutions, to the seemingly perpetual 
refugee problem in Europe, developed at a crucial hinge point within the four decades 
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after the end of the First World War. The chapter discusses how UNRRA’s work with 
refugees was planned and prepared during the Second World War on the back of these 
earlier efforts, and identifies features that marked it out from both its predecessors and 
successors.
Planning for peace
UNRRA was a direct product of Allied discussions about a world after and without 
war. By the early 1940s, when post-war planning began in earnest, influential 
assessments ascribed the world’s descent into economic depression, famine, ruthless 
racial conflicts and a second bloody world war to a number of factors. Chief among 
them was the United States’ retreat to isolationism and resulting absence from the 
international institutions created after 1919. Analysts pointed to shortcomings not just 
of existing political institutions of the parliamentary democracies, but of the post-1919 
international structures much more generally. The League of Nations had evidently 
failed to transcend the great powers’ national interests, and as a result failed to secure 
agreement on collective problems such as disarmament and migration. Other factors 
included the Allied powers’ failure to formulate an effective policy on Germany; 
European states’ failures to manage ethnic heterogeneity, particularly German 
minorities across Europe; and states’ widespread lack of engagement with regional 
underdevelopment, poverty and food insecurity.5
When American and British planning staffs began to prepare for likely post-war 
scenarios, they were reminded that the mistakes of the aftermath of the First World War 
were not to be repeated. They rejected the idea of formally resurrecting the old League 
early on, and instead started to draw up blueprints for a new international organization 
that could be created in its place. This new body would have to be supported by the 
‘Four Policemen’: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China. Efforts to 
commit both big and small powers to a new international organization were boosted 
in January 1942, when twenty-six governments signed the ‘Declaration by the United 
Nations’, pledging to uphold the Atlantic Charter and agreeing not to accept a separate 
peace with the Axis countries. For the rest of the war, the term ‘United Nations’ 
described the joint efforts by the Allied nations to defeat fascism and Nazism. 
Much of this preparatory work focused on creating a permanent new successor 
to the League of Nations. In autumn 1944, the Big Four agreed the first blueprint of 
the new formal United Nations organization during the Dumbarton Oaks conference. 
Further details of the new United Nations were debated and finalized at meetings in 
the following year, and in April 1945 the United States was born in San Francisco. The 
Preparatory Commission of the United Nations was established a few months later to 
make practical arrangements for bringing such a vast new body to life. Its Executive 
Committee met for the first time in August 1945 in London.6 
But in the course of discussions about the permanent new international diplomatic 
and peace-keeping structures, it became clear that no collaborative effort, however 
ambitious, could even begin to implement any grand new vision for a world without 
war while millions of people were still uprooted, homeless, undernourished, sick and 
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without hope for a better future. With a range of academic studies and data at their 
disposal, several Allied organizations began to prepare for likely post-war scenarios, 
and drafted programmes for the immediate emergency phase – expected to last from 
the moment of liberation of the territories under Axis control until at some point 
after the armies were demobilized and the majority of civilians had returned to their 
homes. Most important among them was the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War 
Requirements (known as the Leith-Ross Committee, named after its Chairman Sir 
Frederick Leith-Ross), established in London in September 1941, which tabulated the 
needs and requirements of the liberated territories in Europe.7 The Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the US Department of State (OFRRO) was 
established in November 1942 under the leadership of Herbert H. Lehmann (former 
governor of New York) to coordinate the provision of basic supplies to civilian 
populations; some hoped that it would recreate Herbert Hoover’s relief missions after 
the First World War.8 OFRRO provided relief in French North Africa, though on a 
relatively small scale. A year of this work provided ample evidence that the enormous 
problems of relief in war-torn areas would require international collaboration on a 
much wider platform than hitherto present.
UNRRA’s immediate origins lay in these deliberations. British and American 
planners were coordinating agendas at least since the creation in 1941 of the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, responsible to both the American president 
and British prime minister.9 By April 1943, when OFRRO’s director Herbert Lehman 
and his special assistant Hugh Jackson went to London to meet with a range of Allied 
civilian and military representatives, including from the Soviet government, those 
channels of communication were well established.10 George Woodbridge, UNRRA’s 
official historian, credits these early meetings with laying the foundations for a ‘mutual 
understanding of the preparations for the postwar relief program on both sides of the 
Atlantic’.11 Both the Leith-Ross Committee and OFRRO assembled sizeable groups of 
expert advisers. OFRRO, in particular, proved to be ‘a magnet for progressive reformers 
originally drawn to Washington by the New Deal’.12 
UNRRA was founded on 9 November 1943 in Washington, when forty-four nations 
formally agreed on the structure of a new relief organization. Its main tasks were to 
‘plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the 
relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations 
through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical 
and other essential services’.13 It was to offer countries assistance in the resumption of 
urgently needed agricultural and industrial production, and the restoration of essential 
services. Finally, it was to make arrangements for the return of prisoners and exiles 
to their homes.14 The ‘Agreement’ gave UNRRA the authority to plan, coordinate and 
implement measures for the relief of war victims in areas liberated from Axis control. 
In areas still under military control, UNRRA was obliged to obtain consent from 
the military authorities. Elsewhere, UNRRA had to be invited by the government of 
the area concerned; UNRRA would then negotiate an agreement, which specified 
the kinds and amounts of supplies it would bring and the services it would provide. 
National governments were UNRRA’s clients and it worked through and for them, and 
only at their request.15
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Administratively, UNRRA was an extension of a number of other bodies. Particularly 
in its infancy in Washington, before the beginning of any practical field work or the 
growing importance of UNRRA’s regional headquarters, the US State Department 
in general and OFRRO in particular provided UNRRA with staff (not least Herbert 
Lehman, whom Roosevelt appointed as UNRRA’s first director general), ideas and 
plans. In UNRRA’s Washington headquarters, both the ‘layout of offices and of major 
positions within them’ drew significantly on plans drafted by OFRRO staff.16 OFRRO, 
in turn, relied on League of Nations’ experts – by now a group of them had moved to 
Princeton – for advice on staff recruitment and the management of relations between 
the various international organizations.17 OFRRO bequeathed a ‘vast body of material’ 
to the US delegation to UNRRA, which, according to Woodbridge, ‘exercised a major 
influence on the work of the Council in its First Session and subsequent developments 
within UNRRA, if not directly, at least by virtue of the fact that many of the individuals 
who worked on its preparation also had key positions on the various committees of 
the First Session and later in the Administration.’18 OFRRO was, in essence, UNRRA’s 
‘path-breaker’, and soon turned into the US component of UNRRA.19 Nonetheless, 
while UNRRA’s structural and administrative origins were reasonably clear, the heritage 
of its ideas about relief and rehabilitation, and, importantly, its refugee mission, were 
more complex.
UNRRA and the DPs
While the war was still being fought, UNRRA’s staff of planners and relief workers 
in Washington and London spent much of their time anticipating, planning and 
preparing for likely scenarios, and presenting them at Allied conferences. For as long 
as much of the continent was still under Axis control they had little to do other than 
theoretical planning. Planners read academic studies about the state of Europe and 
its uprooted peoples, along with news, intelligence reports and statistics coming from 
the occupied territories. By late 1943, a number of detailed studies of the European 
refugee problem had been published and widely circulated. Among them was a survey 
compiled in 1938 by Sir John Hope Simpson, the former vice president of the Greek 
Refugee Settlement Commission, on behalf of the Royal Institute for International 
Affairs, which discussed the consequences, in population terms, of the First World 
War, Russian Revolution and the ongoing persecution of German Jews. In this and 
subsequent reports he identified three groups of refugees who demanded attention: 
those Russians, Armenians and others who had come under the aegis of the original 
Nansen Office; the refugees fleeing Nazi persecution in Germany and Austria who 
now came under the auspices of the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany; 
and Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and other refugees fleeing persecution at home, who 
lacked any kind of international protection and support.20
In the future, Simpson argued, economic development in rural stretches of eastern 
Europe would be a crucial ‘prophylactic treatment’ for preventing Jewish (and other) 
emigration from those areas. But for those masses of existing refugees for whom any 
such economic development would come too late, Simpson argued, the League had to 
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radically extend its scope if it was to continue to be the main refugee agency. One point 
was clear, he argued: ‘The main lesson emerging from a study of League assistance 
is the overriding necessity to treat the refugee service as primarily technical, and to 
minimise the political features of its existence. Extraneous political interests have 
repeatedly invaded the refugee work of the League.’ In any future arrangement, divisive 
political positions of leading officers and ‘political sectionalism’ had to be avoided. The 
refugee problem was ‘clearly so political in character that it can never be treated as 
entirely neutral and technical’. But it was ‘all the more important for that reason that 
every administrative and constitutional step possible should be taken to minimise its 
political associations and to emphasise its technical character’.21 This sentiment was to 
become one of UNRRA’s guiding themes. Listening to Simpson lecturing on the subject, 
Norman Bentwich, a former attorney general of Mandatory Palestine and director of 
the League’s High Commission for Refugees from Germany, thought the talk had given 
him ‘the strongest impression … that the refugee problem was manageable’.22
Another scholar offering pertinent insights into the refugee problem in Europe was 
Louise Holborn, a German-born émigré political scientist who worked as a research 
analyst for the US Office of Strategic Services during the war, and published a series of 
papers, including on the League of Nations’ arrangements for the protection of certain 
groups of refugees.23 In a 1939 survey of the international organizations which took 
an interest in refugees, she noted that because the League had become ‘too weak’ to 
stand up to Germany and Italy, ‘the weight of moral and political authority’ for the 
protection of refugees had shifted to the newly created Intergovernmental Committee 
on Refugees (IGCR).24 The IGCR was set up in the aftermath of Germany’s annexation 
of Austria in the previous year, as a continuation of the efforts of the conference at 
Evian in July 1938 to find solutions for the thousands of Jews in Germany and Austria 
trying to emigrate.25 It was the first international refugee agency to be created outside of 
the League’s apparatus. It was also the first to be set up on a ‘permanent’ basis (though 
finally disbanded in 1947), and the first to include a mandate for ‘potential’ refugees: 
people who had not yet been displaced, but whose displacement in the face of ongoing 
discrimination and ethnic conflict was likely and imminent. Holborn could not yet 
know that a reorganization of the IGCR in 1943 would introduce government funding 
for refugee maintenance ‘for the first time in the history of international refugee 
assistance’.26 But already in 1939 Holborn was hopeful that the IGCR was able to 
manoeuvre in ways other existing organizations had not been able to. Nonetheless, she 
went on, the legal apparatus for the status of refugees created by the League remained 
crucial, and the IGCR could only be successful if it coordinated closely with other 
existing bodies and drew on ‘the experience and accumulated knowledge of those who 
have been engaged in the work for refugees’.27
The new Allied planning organizations also began to pay closer attention to the 
problem of refugees as a key component of any post-war scenarios. Among the steady 
output of papers by the Leith-Ross Committee was a preliminary study of the immediate 
post-war period, published less than a year after it began to meet, which reviewed a 
series of issues to consider in the planning of relief operations. One of them concerned 
population movements. The movements of both war refugees and foreign prisoners 
in Germany, it proposed, would have to be regulated as soon as hostilities had ceased, 
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‘if serious disorders are to be avoided’. The report provided few concrete details or 
numbers of likely population movements, but insisted that refugees would have to be 
treated in the broader context of post-war relief and rehabilitation measures. Its main 
recommendation concerned the administration of the refugee problem: a new body 
would have to be created specifically ‘to deal with problems affecting expelled persons, 
recruited labour, and, so far as they are not covered by existing bodies, refugees; in other 
words, with all those stranded at the end of the war’. In order to be at all effective, such 
an agency would have to be launched by the ‘principal Allied Powers, and authorised 
(i) to apply to the competent authorities of the Occupation for the necessary supplies 
and priorities; and (ii) to enlist the cooperation and where necessary coordinate the 
activities of existing organisations’. A ‘Director of international standing’ would have 
to be appointed to lead it, and he would have to be advised by both the Allied powers 
and the ‘important existing organizations, voluntary or international. … The nucleus 
of the League of Nations Secretariat remaining at Geneva might perhaps be invited to 
co-operate in this task’.28
A few months after this report was released, a meeting at the Fabian Society in 
London aired further predictions and proposals by a number of well-known British 
public intellectuals, among them Harold Laski and Julian Huxley. In the published 
report, one author, Kenneth G. Brooks, gave dire warnings about the scale of the refugee 
problem – ‘the biggest human problem with which we shall be faced in re-ordering the 
world after the end of the war’ – the magnitude of which was ‘such as to cause the 
heart to sink and beside it the re-organization of the world’s economic life may well 
seem a simple matter’.29 Although most of those uprooted would wish to return home 
as soon as they could, Brooks argued, repatriation would have to be tightly controlled, 
in the interest of preventing both the spread of infectious diseases and transport 
bottlenecks that could mean starvation for communities dependent on food imports. 
Like Holborn, Brooks thought about the agencies best placed to manage this crisis, 
and he concluded that the existing piecemeal, ad hoc organizations were no longer 
appropriate for a problem of this magnitude. Thirty-nine voluntary organizations 
dealing with refugees from Germany had been represented at Evian and were in close 
contact with the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees and the IGCR. However, 
he went on: ‘The work of the voluntary organisations has been mostly of a case-work 
nature and although the need for the sympathetic and individual help they have been 
able to give will continue, it is clear that the time has come for international direction 
on a governmental level.’30 After the war, the return and resettlement of the displaced 
people would best be managed by an inter-allied body ‘working in close conjunction 
with the Supreme Economic Council which will be set up as the directing authority 
in the reorganisation of European economy.’31 Ultimately, the vast refugee problem 
was part of an even bigger problem of the rehabilitation of European agriculture and 
industry. Regardless of whether it could ultimately be solved through repatriation on 
one hand or ‘colonization and assimilation’ on the other, both required significant 
amounts of capital for rehabilitation and economic development.32
Perhaps the most influential study available to UNRRA’s planners was Eugene 
Kulischer’s The Displacement of Population in Europe, commissioned and published by 
the International Labour Organization in 1943.33 Drawing on an enormous range of 
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sources, Kulischer estimated that over 30 million Europeans had been displaced since 
the beginning of the war, including at least 6.5 million foreign labourers employed in 
Germany. To that number had to be added the millions of men serving in the Axis 
military, many of them stationed abroad or taken prisoner, as well as an un-estimated 
number of people drafted to work in the fascist-occupied territories, and millions of 
Germans and Italians evacuated from bombed cities. Elsewhere, Kulischer and others 
estimated that those around 6.5 million civilian workers were joined by at least 2 million 
prisoners of war working on German soil.34 ‘If all these movements could be properly 
taken into account,’ Kulischer continued, ‘the result would certainly be a grand total of 
over forty million.’35 By breaking down this mass displacement into different categories of 
people on the move, Kulischer hoped to ‘indicate … the magnitude of the task involved in 
straightening out the population tangle caused by war and occupation’. This was crucial 
because, he added, the ‘permanent resettlement of all these uprooted people will be one 
of the most urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction. It is an undertaking which will 
require the greatest possible amount of international organisation and collaboration.’36
Although ‘resettlement’ in principle could involve a move to either old or new 
countries, Kulischer argued that repatriation to their countries of origin would be the 
‘obvious solution’ for most refugees – but it would require great effort and coordination 
of strained transport systems and competing needs of occupation armies, civilians 
and economic rehabilitation. If they were not repatriated quickly, he explained, 
‘the highways of Europe’ would be ‘blocked by long processions of destitute exiles, 
enduring every kind of privation in an effort to return unaided to their homes’. Even 
once returned, repatriates would continue to require assistance to find housing, 
training and work. As such, repatriation required a long view that was part of a much 
bigger problem of rehabilitating the liberated countries – comprising ‘not only the 
reconstruction of the devastated areas, the re-equipment of industry, and restocking 
with cattle, seed, fertilisers and raw materials, but the reorientation of economic life as 
a whole’.37 UNRRA took this on almost word for word. 
Soon after its formal creation, a number of committees and expert groups were formed 
within UNRRA and began to make more concrete preparations.38 An early example, 
which allows glimpses into how UNRRA policy and procedures was taking shape, is 
a report by the ‘Sub-Committee on Policies with respect to Assistance to Displaced 
Persons’ submitted after the first session of UNRRA’s Council – its policy-making organ 
– in Atlantic City in November 1943.39 The committee brought together well-known 
experts on refugee matters. Its chair was the Cuban Gustavo Gutierrez Sanchez;40 
other members included the British diplomat Sir George Rendel,41 and the US State 
Department’s Adviser on Displaced Persons and Refugees, George L. Warren.42 The 
report began by sketching out ‘the various categories of persons likely to be affected 
by the repatriation activities of UNRRA’. They included, as Kulischer had already 
identified, UN nationals who had left their homes ‘because of the war’ and were now 
stranded on liberated or conquered territory, as well as people displaced within their 
own countries. Only ‘enemy nationals’ were formally excluded from UNRRA’s reach at 
this stage. The report estimated that in Europe alone there would be ‘tens of millions of 
displaced persons who will need to be repatriated to their homes’. 
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There was no doubt about the urgency of their repatriation. The report’s authors 
assumed that the displaced populations would attempt to return home as soon as their 
current or previous homes were liberated from enemy control, even before any ‘adequate 
machinery to control or organise it’ could be set up. The greatest danger was chaos. 
UNRRA’s most important job was to organize these movements, in liaison with the Allied 
military authorities, and ‘to establish some uniform system of dealing with these persons, 
during both the military and the subsequent periods’. The other reason for urgency, the 
report added, came from ‘the medical aspect of the problem’, already explained in the 
Leith-Ross findings, and UNRRA’s work with the displaced had to proceed ‘in the closest 
association’ with that of its medical and health staffs. Overall, UNRRA’s purpose was one of 
overseeing, coordinating and organizing mass movements, and bringing people ‘home’.43
In the following months, as Allied manuals supplemented these insights with 
further instructions, they suggested that UNRRA should be guided by a basic division 
between ‘refugees’, a label here given to civilians uprooted by war but still within their 
own countries, and ‘displaced persons’, or DPs – a term in wide circulation by 1943 – as 
civilian refugees of Allied nationality uprooted and outside their countries.44 UNRRA’s 
DP operation was to focus on the latter kind of person, while at the same time, though 
not spelt out here, UNRRA’s missions in the receiving countries were undoubtedly 
going to encounter the former.45
One issue – already raised by Holborn in 1939 and periodically touched on by 
UNRRA’s planners, but far from conclusively solved by 1943 – concerned UNRRA’s 
relationship with the various existing agencies active in refugee work. How could all 
this work be coordinated, and what was UNRRA’s place within it? As one UNRRA 
memorandum from November 1943 explained, at the time, there were at least ‘four 
official international bodies and one semi-official agency concerned with the problem 
of displaced persons’: the International Labour Office (sic, ILO) and its Migration 
Section; the High Commissioner for Refugees coming under the Protection of 
the League of Nations; the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. And, it continued, in both function and 
organization they would appear to overlap.46 
The memorandum went on to highlight just how much the refugee problem in 
Europe had generated piecemeal, fragmented and provisional solutions, and a string 
of organizations with remits broken down into particular refugee groups as defined 
by nationality and circumstance. Indeed, it explained, ‘The term “refugee” has varied 
meanings. There are, for instance, the so-called Nansen refugees resulting from World 
War I, central European refugees who are mostly Jewish and stateless, and war refugees 
who have fled from military action.’ Similarly, the term ‘displaced person’ included 
‘prisoners of war, political prisoners, forced laborers, civilian internees, evacuees, 
displaced populations and eventually residuals of these groups of those for whom 
new places of settlement must be found’. UNRRA had to grapple with the fact that 
‘each of these categories of refugees presents a different problem requiring different 
treatment’; and ‘each of the foregoing organizations has come into being to meet a 
specific need’: ILO’s main interests lay with migrant labourers’ conditions of work. The 
high commissioner represented the original so-called ‘Nansen refugees’ as well as those 
fleeing Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland. The League had ‘always considered its 
Old Wine in New Bottles? 155
interest in refugees of a temporary nature and with a few notable exceptions has never 
assumed responsibility for relief to refugees. Its services have been predominantly that 
of improving the legal status of refugees through provision of Nansen certificates and 
of securing rights of residence and work and the benefits of social security legislation’. 
One ad hoc solution led to another: Because the high commissioner had a restricted 
mandate of dealing only with refugees already outside of their countries of origin, the 
Evian Conference then created the IGCR, with its focus on the Jews still inside Germany 
and Austria and likely to become refugees soon. At this stage, the memo concluded, 
UNRRA was the ‘logical body’ to be responsible for all matters of repatriation and 
provision of relief to refugees, and only the ‘residuals’ would eventually be passed 
back to the IGCR. Above all, the current situation demonstrated just how much of 
a need there was for a new international body charged with ‘developing plans which 
Governments may support’.47
The question of UNRRA’s relationship with other organizations with overlapping 
interests in refugees continued to cause confusion, in spite of further attempts to 
explain it.48 Often the division of responsibilities hinged on artificial remits or technical 
definitions that were difficult to enforce in practice. Eventually, two principles were 
established: UNRRA’s work was to be defined by a focus on repatriation, and UNRRA 
was to be given the authority to supervise and coordinate the work of other relevant 
organizations. The IGCR was to step into action only for those refugees not falling 
within UNRRA’s remit, who could not be repatriated and for whom new host countries 
had to be found. As Sir Herbert Emerson, director of the IGCR since January 1939, 
explained to George Warren, the IGCR was supplementary to UNRRA. ‘In countries 
where UNRRA has not a programme of general relief, but is carrying out special 
measures of assistance to displaced persons,’ Emerson explained, ‘the definition of a 
displaced person as laid down by the Council of UNRRA is a person who has been 
displaced as a result of the war. There are, therefore, many persons displaced before the 
war who are not eligible for relief by UNRRA, but who do come within the mandate of 
the Intergovernmental Committee, and are in desperate need of assistance.’ Moreover, 
Emerson added, since UNRRA was likely to be active only in the short term, IGCR 
could always pick up again after UNRRA’s closure. He seemed to assume that the 
refugee problem was likely to continue beyond UNRRA’s existence.49
From its inception, then, UNRRA drew on and synthesized a number of 
assumptions about the nature of past and present refugee crises, as articulated by 
Simpson, Kulischer, Holborn and others. A first assumption concerned the fact that 
any large and disorganized movements of displaced people and refugees would have 
disastrous consequences. They were likely to harm the ongoing war effort and post-war 
demobilization of troops, contribute to the spread of diseases and put millions of 
lives at risk, and significantly limit any possibility of the rehabilitation, recovery and 
reconstruction of Europe and the world after the war. By the mid-1940s, nobody had 
to spell out (but some did) that refugees in general meant trouble and a drain on 
resources. For these reasons, any refugee movements had to be anticipated, limited and 
coordinated as much as possible. A single organization – UNRRA – had to coordinate 
the work of the myriad of organizations with diverse interests in refugees, and, crucially, 
provide essential relief, chiefly food, shelter, clothing, medical supplies and transport.
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Second, a necessary consequence was that any solution of the refugee problem 
could not be limited to individual countries, but instead required a broad treatment 
of the whole of Europe – or indeed the world. Reports by the Leith-Ross Committee 
were at pains to emphasize that ‘Europe’ would have to be treated ‘so far as possible as 
a whole from the beginning’, even if such a perspective would ‘demand an important 
intellectual and moral effort of the more favoured peoples’.50 In Washington, George 
Warren agreed that ‘the problem’ was 
European in scope and should be dealt with as European. The displaced persons 
come from most European countries, south and west as well as east, so that a 
plan which covers only part of Europe will not be a satisfactory settlement as it 
will leave large numbers of discontented aliens still displaced, a probable source 
of international disturbance and of political dispute between governments. The 
problem in western Europe is comparatively manageable to that of eastern Europe 
where questions of boundaries and confusion with respect to nationality will 
arise. The desideratum of agreement on a European scale can only be met with the 
agreement of the Soviet authorities.51
Importantly, although to many this appeared to be a clear and convincing tenet, the 
extent to which such a wide and deliberately ‘non-political’ geographical scope would 
be feasible in the post-war world of trials, retribution and reparations was, at this point, 
before the end of the war, still up for discussion. Many relief workers soon pointed 
to a basic contradiction in UNRRA’s remit: although relief was to be distributed 
internationally as a means of treating and eradicating causes of poverty, ethnic conflict 
and war, the nations and nationals politically and geographically at the centre of the 
war were excluded from its reach. No amount of urging by Simpson, Leith-Ross and 
UNRRA’s planners that refugees were best dealt with as a ‘technical’ problem and to be 
kept away from destructive politics could disguise the fact that the political realities of 
a defeated Germany were paramount. Similarly, the question of how far multilateral or 
unilateral action on refugee matters was possible or even desirable, and just how much 
the United States should not just provide the bulk of funds and personnel but also 
dictate the terms remained a matter of debate. George Warren later remembered that 
he ‘disagreed with Governor Lehman who insisted that this problem of refugees had to 
be handled through the country organizations that UNRRA now was setting up. I said, 
“Governor this is an unusual problem that supersedes any country interest. You’ve 
got to handle it with a separate organization, directly responsible to you.”’52 In 1943, 
Lehman and others won the case for a multilateral arrangement, but the argument was 
repeated in the creation of UNRRA’s successors, with different results.
Third, at least since the Bermuda Conference in April 1943 most planners assumed 
that the vast majority of those displaced by the war would seek to return home as soon 
as possible; UNRRA’s main function was to oversee their repatriation.53 Although the 
dream of a mass resettlement of uprooted peoples to new countries or newly colonized 
land never went entirely off the table, repatriation to their countries of origin appeared 
to be a more desirable, feasible and realistic option for the bulk of refugees under 
review in a world where sovereign states would very likely still form the basic unit of 
the international order.54 The principle of repatriation then became further entrenched 
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by the agreements at the Moscow Conference in October 1944, and again at Yalta 
in February 1945, that Soviet citizens were to be returned to the Soviet Union at the 
earliest moment, against their will if necessary, and by a widely shared understanding 
that nation-states had a right to demand the return of their citizens, and that it was 
the moral duty of citizens to return and take part in their country’s reconstruction.55 
UNRRA’s planners also tended to assume that nationality would surpass ethnicity 
or religion, particularly as far as displaced Jews were concerned. As far as UNRRA 
was concerned, the problem was a logistical one, requiring above all the physical 
restoration of transport networks and the coordination of different and clashing needs. 
In practical terms, UNRRA was ‘grafted onto’ existing arrangements for allocation and 
procurement of supplies.56
To be sure, even in UNRRA’s early preparations there were hints at the complexity 
such an insistence on repatriation would entail, particularly for the Jewish survivors of 
the war. ‘To assume that all displaced persons may desire to return to their countries 
of origin will undoubtedly prove to be an oversimplification,’ an early memorandum 
warned. 
Even though nationality may be restored to the stateless, memories of the horrors 
and privations of expulsion from their home countries will remain. It is to be hoped 
that those who find their families scatted in many countries and who desire to 
rejoin them to start life anew in some other country will not be forced against their 
will by the operation of rigid procedures to resume residence in a country which 
offers no attractions or opportunities for them. The opportunities of immigration 
in the postwar world may admittedly be limited, but it will be a sorry world indeed 
if places cannot be found for those so situated.57
Others pointed to the host of legal and definition problems involved.58 Nonetheless, it 
was its focus on repatriation that defined UNRRA’s mandate and distinguished it from 
other organizations such as the IGCR. Relief workers were given clear instructions 
about the agency’s remits: it was to gather up the Allied DPs and organize their return; 
along the way, repatriates had to be fed, clothed and given medical aid, and until 
transport was feasible, provided with welfare services, training and employment.
Finally, Simpson, Kulischer and others had begun to suggest just how much the 
problem of mass displacement was part and parcel of bigger problems of economic 
development, particularly in Europe, but also further afield, and had to be treated in 
conjunction. Without the repatriation or resettlement of the mass of uprooted people, 
no post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes could hope to succeed, 
and another war would surely be on the horizon. In this way, UNRRA’s conception 
of the refugee problem as ultimately an economic one was quite different from earlier 
attempts to identify and tackle the ‘root causes’ of migration, which had foregrounded 
primarily the League’s responsibilities to prevent war, protect ethnic minorities and 
secure certain rights.59 In reality, the stipulation, right from the beginning of UNRRA’s 
existence, that the agency was to be a temporary one, active only in the twilight zone 
between war and peace, and without the option of assuming ‘continuing responsibility’ 
in the longer term, created severe limitations on such broad and ambitious proposals 
from the start.60 Nonetheless, even in its temporary life UNRRA was to take on the 
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refugee problem, as far as it concerned those displaced by the war, as part and parcel 
of the problem economic development and agricultural and industrial rehabilitation.
Into the field
UNRRA’s work with DPs began in earnest in May and June 1944, when it took over 
the British-run refugee camps in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, containing mostly 
displaced Greeks, Yugoslavs and Poles waiting to be repatriated.61 In the following 
spring, just weeks before Germany’s unconditional surrender, UNRRA ‘spearhead 
teams’ accompanied General Eisenhower’s staff (the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF) into Germany, and, after SHAEF’s dissolution in July 
1945, the individual American or British Army groups. As a direct consequence of the 
geography of the Third Reich’s wartime exploitations, the vast majority of DPs found 
themselves on German soil. By late April 1945, more than fifteen UNRRA teams had 
gone ‘into the field’ to find them; by June there were 322 teams, ready to start their work. 
At the same time and in parallel, UNRRA’s country missions made their way 
into the receiving countries – sixteen of them in total, 12 of them in Europe, most 
of them setting up shop in late 1944 or the first half of 1945. All of them organized 
the reception and rehabilitation of the returning DPs. They also encountered other 
refugees; everywhere, people were ‘out of place’ and ‘not yet returned’. The Polish 
mission, for example, was heavily involved in the reception of Polish citizens returning 
from abroad and their subsequent integration into Polish life. It also assisted the Polish 
government’s efforts to resettle the over one million ethnic Poles from the Eastern 
Borderlands to the so-called Recovered Territories in the West.62 Nonetheless, some 
missions were more preoccupied with explicitly ‘refugee questions’ than others. Most 
of the receiving countries’ governments went to UNRRA on the one hand for supplies 
for their home populations (including returned DPs), and on the other for the care and 
repatriation of their own citizens still abroad – but not for matters which concerned 
refugees of other nationalities still on their territories. The Yugoslav government, for 
example, tended to bypass UNRRA entirely in its dealings with the foreign DPs on 
Yugoslav soil. Its methods were, by one account, ‘direct and designed to eliminate 
camps. The refugees were simply sent to their countries of origin without delay or 
enquiry beyond that necessary to determine their home place’.63 
All parts of UNRRA thus dealt extensively with refugees and the millions of 
displaced, uprooted, often homeless people of the war’s aftermath. But only UNRRA’s 
DP operation is usually identified as a ‘refugee agency’ as such, in that it did not concern 
itself with other population groups. This DP arm of UNRRA’s activities – also the focus 
of this chapter – was by far most active in the western occupation zones of Germany, 
but it also ran smaller operations in Austria and Italy. It did not operate at all in the 
Soviet zones of Germany and Austria; no official DP camps were set up there since 
refugees of Allied nationality were expected to be repatriated quickly. UNRRA’s DP 
headquarters were set up in Hoechst, near Frankfurt, and placed under the command 
of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Operations in Germany and 
former Deputy Chief of Staff of SHAEF.
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For the arriving UNRRA teams in Germany, the first and most urgent task was to 
begin the process of gathering up the uprooted people of non-German nationality still 
roaming the countryside, and to take stock of who they were, what category of ‘refugee’ 
they fell into and where they should go next. UNRRA’s formal responsibility, as defined 
initially, concerned those UN nationals who had been forced to flee their homes or 
deported to the Reich during the war, and excluded enemy nationals. Subsequent 
Council Resolutions extended this eligibility to ‘ex-enemy and stateless persons 
who had been displaced by the action of the enemy “because of their race, religion, 
or activities in favour of the United Nations”’.64 But most former enemy nationals, 
including the ethnic German expellees, never became eligible for UNRRA care, nor 
did those of other nationalities for whom there was evidence that they had collaborated 
with the Axis powers. In practice, before UNRRA screening boards could get to work 
to identify their ‘DPs’ from the others, the mass of displaced humanity had to be moved 
out of the way of military traffic and congregated into camps (formally referred to as 
‘assembly centres’), where they could be registered, fed, deloused and vaccinated, and 
their future transport planned. Camps made use of whatever housing facilities were 
available, and as a result they varied greatly in physical size, type of accommodation 
and DP population.65 They were often extremely makeshift in character, ‘frequently 
an euphemism designating an open field, or a bomb-gutted building, or a few tents’.66 
There is by now an extensive historiography on how these camps came into being, 
how they were run and eventually – though later than anticipated – dissolved, and how 
the DPs themselves organized their lives while in UNRRA’s care.67 For the purposes of 
this chapter, it is worth noting primarily the sheer size and scale of the DP operation. 
The numbers of DP camps fluctuated continually, as small units were consolidated into 
larger ones, and as groups of DPs left and new ones arrived. In December 1945, there 
were roughly 252 camps in operation in Germany and Austria; a year later the number 
had risen to 951. By the time UNRRA withdrew from the field in June 1947, there 
were still 762 camps in operation, including 8 in Italy.68 UNRRA was responsible for 
the majority of these camps. By the end of December 1945, UNRRA supervised about 
263 of the total 323 assembly centres, and was responsible for the vast majority – 81.4 
per cent – of the camp population, as well as a significant share of DPs not resident in 
camps.69 An enormous number of staff were required to carry out this work: over 8,000 
so-called Class I personnel (those recruited outside Germany) worked at UNRRA’s DP 
operation in its first year in Germany. They were assisted by over 2,000 Class II (locally 
recruited staff) and Class III personnel (staff loaned from voluntary agencies), as well 
as over 100,000 displaced persons ‘actively engaged in the administration of more than 
300 camps with a population of nearly 800,000’.70 According to UNRRA’s own figures, 
in July 1945 UNRRA cared for close to 2 million DPs in Germany alone.71
In 1945, this was the largest refugee relief programme to date. However, the scale of 
war, foreign occupation and ethnic conflict had not only convinced planners that an 
organization such as UNRRA was vital, but also presented challenges not encountered 
by previous or subsequent refugee organizations. Some of those challenges were no 
doubt similar to those faced by other bodies, even if experienced by UNRRA on a 
different scale. For example, like many of the projects emerging from the Allied 
wartime planning machinery, UNRRA’s work in the field was shaped by a fundamental 
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mismatch between planners’ instructions and aspirations on one hand, and the 
post-war realities they encountered on the other.72 Part of this mismatch stemmed 
from contradictory impulses. UNRRA was supposed to enact an internationally 
coordinated solution to Europe’s refugee crises, strictly taken out of the realm of high 
politics, while at the same time it was subject to political decisions, many already made 
before 1943, on those refugee categories that were deemed to fall into its remits and 
those that were not. Other problems arose because many aspects of UNRRA’s DP 
operation did not seem to have been planned at all, and in practice were the product 
of an almost constant process of improvisation. This necessarily created a few U-turns. 
To mention one, although earlier reports had been clear about the undesirability of a 
reliance on voluntary organizations’ limited, ‘case-worker’ approach, by 1945 UNRRA 
did not only work with, but also outsourced responsibilities to, precisely such voluntary 
organizations. Formally, it coordinated the activities of dozens of voluntary welfare 
agencies, including the Red Cross, the Friends Ambulance Unit, the Joint Distribution 
Committee, the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training, and many others – 
and by the end of 1945 they were given growing opportunities to work independently.73
But perhaps the biggest source of problems, at least initially, stemmed from the 
nature of UNRRA’s relationship with the occupying armies, or the practicalities of a 
non-military relief project of this scale in countries under military occupation – and in 
this feature, UNRRA was unique.74 ‘I always did wonder,’ wrote one frustrated UNRRA 
worker after almost two years in Germany, ‘whether the UNRRA high pontiffs who 
conceived the plan of forming such heterogeneous teams were most childish optimists, 
or whether they lacked even the most elementary conceptions of the very special and 
difficult conditions under which teams in the field would have to work and live.’ As a 
‘civilian undertaking’ whose aims were not ‘even remotely connected with the military 
occupation,’ the commentator went on, problems were inevitable from the start.75 In 
reality, it was less a case of planners’ optimism and more one of their attempts to shelve 
questions that could be dealt with at a later time, but the resulting complications were 
undeniable.
On paper, the instructions were clear enough. On their way into the field, relief 
workers were briefed that they and their organization were subject to the authority of 
SHAEF in all newly liberated areas. In areas under Allied military control, UNRRA 
was to operate ‘only for such a time and for such purposes as might be agreed with the 
military authorities, and subject to their control’.76 The assumption that this could not 
be otherwise, at least for an interim period, had already been made in earlier policy 
instructions about the armies’ role in so-called ‘civil affairs’, which predated UNRRA. 
As US secretary of war, Henry Stimson explained to Herbert Lehman (as director of 
OFRRO) in June 1943: 
During the period of military government complete responsibility for all matters 
within the theatre of operation is necessarily vested in the Commanding General 
of the theatre. This does not, however, preclude delegation by the Commanding 
General, at any time in his discretion, of administrative authority to civilian 
agencies. … In regard to supply, transportation and distribution arrangements, 
there is full appreciation of the fact that these must come under the control of the 
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military, and that all communications during the period of military government 
must pass through military channels.77
The DP camps thus remained formally under military government control, who were 
responsible for organizing the required housing, supplies and transport. 
In practice, this meant a severe limitation of UNRRA’s supposedly vast scope and 
promise, far from the notion of an all-powerful organization dreamt up as an answer to 
the problem of mass displacement and the limitations of existing piecemeal solutions. 
One commentator in 1945 pointed to ‘a considerable whittling down in the scope of 
UNRRA since the days of its planning by American and British officials in 1942 and 
1943’. Although UNRRA ‘was first conceived of as an agency of more or less supreme 
authority, empowered to assist in large-scale industrial and agricultural rehabilitation 
projects’, he went on, it was already clear that it ‘has only marginal authority, first 
because it operates only at the request of both military authorities and liberated national 
governments and, secondly, because it lacks supplies whose allocation must wait upon 
decisions of national supply agencies and the Combined Boards of the United States 
and Great Britain’.78 In administrative terms alone, this was a difficult undertaking. 
UNRRA was ‘at best a “junior partner”,’ one relief worker observed in 1947. Field 
personnel had to take orders simultaneously from the armies’ DP-PWX branches and 
military government detachments, and UNRRA’s headquarters. As a result, the ‘teams 
had to serve two “masters”…, a condition that was never resolved in UNRRA’s favour’.79
UNRRA nonetheless carried out the bulk of practical relief work by providing the 
personnel for running the DP camps and the so-called ‘services’ – such as health and 
welfare, recreation, education and training – which were well out of the military’s 
remits. Relief workers did not just ‘clothe and feed and house’ the DPs, ‘as the military 
might have done,’ but rather attempted ‘to teach them to organize themselves and 
to build up their interest in life and their sense of self-respect, and to provide and 
promote education facilities, medical attention, and care of children’.80 Some scholars 
have argued that UNRRA’s greatest achievement concerned the institution of a ‘system 
of democratic self-management’ within the DP camps.81 DPs were recruited from the 
start to co-run their own affairs, and ‘national leaders’ were appointed or elected to 
represent their cohort, giving rise to a fiction of DP camps as ‘model community of 
nations’.82 Their care became a formidable task once repatriation slowed down, and 
the ranks of the DPs were swelled with new arrivals from countries now under Soviet 
control.
UNRRA’s relationship with the military authorities nonetheless remained strained 
for the duration of their coexistence. One source of friction concerned the requirement 
that all field personnel sent into a military area were required to wear uniform. Army 
officials were quick to criticize the relief workers’ ‘lax attitude’ (including, in the face 
of clothing shortages, their mixing and matching of UK and US uniforms), while 
relief workers resented having to comply with army regulations.83 From UNRRA’s 
perspective, a constant strain were also the accusations that relief personnel were 
engaged in black market activities, which became, according to one report, ‘a form 
of folk-lore among military personnel’ and ‘persisted throughout the operation’, even 
though periodically proven as unfounded.84 
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Relief workers also resented the military’s lack of empathy with the DPs, which 
seemed to grow in direct proportion with the occupation troops’ prospering 
relationships with the German population. Captain C. E. Jack from the American 
zone’s DP headquarters observed that 
through no fault of his own, the D.P. makes a poor outward impression on [a 
military government] officer. His wardrobe is usually what he wears plus a few 
pieces of clothing stuffed in a bag. He has developed a defensive attitude as 
protection against German brutality. He has learned to steal to supplement the 
German starvation diet. He has learned to distrust promises and pieces of paper. 
His world revolves around food and shelter. In American slang he looks and acts 
like a ‘bum’. In contrast, the German is well-dressed, better fed and is living in a 
home. He is very correct in his manner when addressing an American Officer.85
In this light, UNRRA’s field workers in Germany increasingly defined themselves as 
advocates for the DPs, many of whom had survived horrific treatment at the hands 
of the Nazis, they pointed out, and now deserved special care. ‘The original principle 
that the DPs were to be given preferential treatment by the occupation authorities was 
seldom given more than lip service even under terrific pressure from UNRRA,’ one 
relief worker noted, ‘and quite officially, even though indirectly, this original principle 
was forgotten.’86 At the same time, the army pointed out that their units had ‘neither 
the training or interest in the D. P. problem. Tactical unit Officers were trained for 
combat and do not consider that it is appropriate for them to be engaged in welfare 
work. Furthermore, their sole interest is in going home.’87 Unlike UNRRA, as Major 
General John H. Hilldring explained to the US State Department, ‘The Army is not 
a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy 
on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs 
administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission.’88
The UNRRA-military clashes were perhaps ultimately a problem of UNRRA’s own 
public relations. Although UNRRA considered ‘public information’ as crucial for 
its success, and a staff of several hundreds of people were dedicated to persuading 
Western taxpayers to keep funding UNRRA, in practice they had a rough ride. Public 
information officers struggled to bring across the limits of UNRRA’s responsibilities 
and room for manoeuvre. The organization was repeatedly criticized for shortages and 
bottlenecks in transport, shelter and supplies over which it had no control. In reality, 
as one report concluded, a large share of the blame lay with the military authorities, 
who ‘were constantly changing their policies, inviting UNRRA to come in and then 
countermanding the request, and later, when they did want UNRRA, failing to secure 
for it the necessary support from the local commanders who controlled transport. At 
the same time they were always ready to blame UNRRA if anything went wrong and 
to complain of its inefficiency’. In practice, ‘The military authorities found UNRRA 
a useful dumping-ground for problems – especially that of the Displaced Persons 
with which they found it impossible to cope.’ Ultimately, ‘UNRRA saved the military 
authorities from much work and worry which they were less fitting than UNRRA to 
perform, but with which, for humanity’s sake and for the preservation of order, they 
would have had to try to grapple if UNRRA had not been in the field.’89
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There were a string of other problems that periodically threatened to derail 
UNRRA’s DP operation. But perhaps none was as contested and intractable as the 
issue of repatriation. Partly this was because the prioritization of refugees’ nationality 
over their religion and ethnicity was ill-suited to several population groups, most 
obviously the millions of displaced Jews who were unwilling to be repatriated 
to their former eastern European homes, and instead demanded a new move to 
Palestine. The case of the Ukrainians also gave the UNRRA authorities significant 
headaches. Ukraine had not been recognized as an independent state before the war, 
as a result of which Ukrainian DPs were not recognized as a separate nationality 
by the Western military authorities (and therefore not by UNRRA either). Instead, 
Ukrainians were classified by their formal nationality, which for most of them 
was Polish or Soviet. A number of Soviet Ukrainians attempted to evade forced 
repatriation by claiming to be of Polish origins, and forged documents accordingly. 
UNRRA screening boards were instructed to probe into their real origins, but often 
struggled in practice.90
Apart from these conceptual dilemmas, the main problem of repatriation initially 
seemed to be one of organization and logistics in a world still shaken by war, with many 
transport and communication networks still severely disrupted and overloaded by 
demobilizing troops.91 However, most of the transport logistics were solved relatively 
easily through heavy reliance on military resources, and repatriation proceeded 
very quickly during the first weeks after the end of war. By early July, 2,326,000 of 
the 5,800,000 counted DPs in Germany had been returned to their countries of 
origin.92 But while the repatriation of western European nationals proved relatively 
unproblematic, it soon appeared that a sizeable portion of the DPs of Polish, Baltic and 
Soviet origin refused to be repatriated to areas now under Soviet or communist control. 
What was more, during the spring and summer 1945, the DPs already in Germany and 
Austria were joined by thousands fleeing westwards from eastern European countries, 
seeking to qualify for the DP status. Faced with the prospect of never-ending streams 
of newcomers for whom ‘repatriation’ was patently not a solution, but unwilling to 
impose a blanket ban on them, UNRRA’s mandate was redefined to cover the care and 
maintenance of those who were ‘displaced’ by a certain cut-off point in the summer of 
1946: all refugees who entered the American occupation zones before 1 July 1946 were 
granted the DP status if they otherwise complied with the eligibility criteria; in the 
British zones the cut-off was 1 June 1946.93
This redefinition resulted in confrontations between the representatives of the 
Western and Eastern member governments within UNRRA’s Council. As one report 
put it, UNRRA ‘was blamed in the West for repatriating displaced persons to what 
was described as an uncertain fate in Eastern Europe; it was excoriated in Eastern 
Europe for caring for collaborationists and quislings.’94 Soviet representatives insisted 
on the repatriation of all Soviet citizens, regardless of their arrival dates in Germany, 
reminding delegates that Roosevelt and Churchill had already agreed with Stalin at 
the Moscow Conference of October 1944 that all Soviet citizens would have to be 
returned, forcibly if necessary. Other member states pointed out that repatriation was 
also necessary from a financial point of view, since UNRRA did not have resources to 
run the DP camps for an indefinite period of time. 
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Nonetheless, by the summer of 1945, almost 1.5 million refugees had expressed 
their unwillingness to be repatriated.95 By December 1945, UNRRA still supervised 263 
of the total 323 assembly centres in Germany, and had responsibility for 57.4 per cent 
of all DPs in Germany. It also contributed to the care of 17,000 DPs living in camps 
administered by the British, and to the cost of repatriating those who chose to return 
to Poland.96 Twelve months later, repatriation slowed almost to a standstill. In February 
1947, there were still 264,000 DPs in the British zone of Germany, 367,000 DPs in the 
American zone and 36,000 in the French zone.97 Instructions to UNRRA staff that the 
repatriation of Soviet citizens was a matter of internationally agreed policy, and had to 
proceed ‘without regard to their personal wishes and by force if necessary’, did little to 
solve the immediate dilemma.98 As one order to UNRRA workers in Germany spelt out: 
UNRRA and military authorities are in agreement on the advisability for speedy 
return of the greatest possible number of displaced persons to their homelands 
as quickly as possible. This policy represents the substance of resolutions under 
which UNRRA now operates and is in keeping with the Yalta Agreement, and the 
projected plans and draft Constitution for an International Refugee Organisation.99
The Soviet authorities claimed that UNRRA assistance in fact encouraged DPs to resist 
repatriation, and demanded that UNRRA desist from giving aid to those who refused 
to return.100 But even UNRRA’s institution of a Sixty Day Ration Plan, according to 
which all DPs willing to be repatriated were issued with food rations for a period of 
two months at the frontiers of their home countries, had little effect.
As it became clear that many of the refugees would stay longer than anticipated, relief 
workers in the DP camps began to emphasize ‘care’ over ‘repatriation’.101 The camps 
were turned into more permanent installations and equipped with nurseries, schools, 
vocational training centres, shops, hospitals and specialists clinics, and UNRRA 
became a major employer of DPs. DPs no longer took part in educational or training 
courses to ease their impending integration into their home countries or simply to 
pass the time, but to make themselves employable and appealing to new countries of 
resettlement, often with good effect.102 The tensions between the Soviet Union and 
the Western Allies on this and other issues eventually led London and Washington to 
conclude that repatriation was no longer a viable solution to the refugee problem. The 
only means left open was resettlement, which was out of UNRRA’s remit. In response, 
the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was created as a new, non-permanent, 
specialized agency of the United Nations that picked up where UNRRA had left off.103
Old wine in new bottles?
UNRRA’s work with refugees was marred by a number of problems, most of them 
already present in some form from the early planning stages. It was a temporary 
organization with a limited brief and mandate but an enormous set of tasks; it had to 
negotiate a crowded field of organizations with overlapping remits; it depended on the 
goodwill of often unwilling military authorities, to whom it was subordinated; it was 
supposed to enact a technocratic and internationally coordinated solution to Europe’s 
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refugee crises while subject to political decisions on the refugee categories it was to 
work with. Its basic brief of repatriating the millions of Allied nationals who had been 
displaced as a result of the war became rapidly unpopular and unfeasible in the early 
Cold War frost. Whereas by some measure, UNRRA, ‘as a kind of international Santa 
Claus, was almost above ordinary criticism,’104 its DP operation came under heavy fire 
almost from its inception. As Woodbridge noted, no part of UNRRA’s work received as 
much publicity (positive or negative) as its work with DPs: 
No other field operations were to require the employment of so many people. 
Yet in no operation was so small a portion of the funds of the Administration 
used. No operation was so misunderstood within the Administration, by member 
governments, and by the public. In no operation was the early organizational 
control of the Administration so unsatisfactory. Yet again in no operation did the 
members of the Administration show such individual initiative and, it may justly 
be said, display such heroism.105
By some criteria, UNRRA fits neatly into a history of refugee organizations that stretches 
from the first Nansen Office to the UNHCR. UNRRA’s work with the DPs in Europe 
was conceived as an exemplar of a rational, technical and primarily logistical solution 
to the problem of mass displacement, which, by shared procurement and distribution 
of supplies, could supposedly sidestep political minefields and save millions of lives. 
In this manner, although it conducted this work on what was at the time an entirely 
new scale, it continued prevalent functionalist approaches to population questions. 
UNRRA, like its predecessors and successors, also lacked a universal category of 
‘refugees’, but defining refugees as a product of war made the refugee problem appear 
to be an ultimately temporary and solvable one. This continuity was no coincidence. 
UNRRA worked with a sizeable body of refugee and relief experts, and built on their 
insights. In the headquarters and policy committees, people like George Warren had 
worked as specialist advisers on refugee matters in a number of different setups before 
advising UNRRA, and continued to do so after UNRRA’s demise. On the ground, a 
significant proportion of relief workers had worked with refugees during and after 
the First World War, and continued to conduct what they perceived as fundamentally 
similar work with UNRRA.106
But in crucial ways this work was different from earlier and later refugee 
programmes. The scale and nature of the problems faced by UNRRA – indeed which 
prompted UNRRA’s creation – was without precedent, and so was the political and 
financial commitment to solve at least one particular set of population upheavals. It 
is important to remember that UNRRA’s overall significance did not lie primarily in 
its work as a refugee agency. Rather, it lay in its uniquely ‘connected’ approach, which 
emphasized that broken infrastructures, economic and agricultural underdevelopment, 
lack of expert knowledge, and mass displacement were all aspects of the same set of 
problems highlighted and magnified by the war. Any solutions had to address them 
in a coordinated, consolidated manner, based on a ‘total plan’.107 In practice, the 
connections between the different parts of UNRRA’s field missions may not always 
have been entirely clear to everyone on the ground. Members of various country 
missions at times accused their colleagues in the DP operation that their hesitance 
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about repatriation was harmful to ‘the long view’ that demanded the integration of 
returned refugees into rehabilitation and reconstruction projects at home. Without the 
returned DPs, many receiving countries could simply not be rebuilt and developed.108 
But this long view was nonetheless central to UNRRA’s entire existence.
Driven by fear about a potentially catastrophic fallout from the bloodshed, 
destruction and racial conflict of the war, the Allies poured unprecedented resources 
into UNRRA. The body became a uniquely large and capacious vessel for ‘wartime 
idealism’, as Ben Shephard notes,109 but one that was able to accommodate a range 
of different priorities, ambitions and preparations for the future. Many thought that 
UNRRA represented what the Allies had fought for: ‘freedom from fear, and freedom 
from want.’110 UNRRA was one particular product of the fantasies that had also 
brought to life the M Project and other dreams about overcoming the piecemeal, ad 
hoc approaches to refugees that had hampered work for decades.111 But unlike other 
visions, UNRRA was no mere a pipe dream. Its implementation was possible only at 
that brief moment in the last years of the war, after the meetings at Casablanca and 
Tehran in 1943, and during the immediate post-war years, before the wartime alliance 
was broken up and the tone of all international endeavours fundamentally changed. 
Unlike its immediate predecessors and successors, UNRRA provided a joint forum for 
the representatives of big and small nations, including the Soviet Union and the United 
States. It was explicitly designed as an experiment in international collaboration and as 
a placeholder for the future United Nations. As William Warbey, Labour MP for Luton, 
argued in the House of Commons in 1946, UNRRA was ‘a working link between East 
and West’.112
As a result, UNRRA had financial and political resources that dwarfed any previous 
organizations’ budget for refugee work. Whereas in June 1939, less than three months 
before the outbreak of war, Herbert Emerson still tried and failed to convince the 
leading powers of the benefits of international collaboration and agreements on the 
refugee problem,113 by 1943 that was no longer under question. Emerson had been 
allotted measly funds that covered only his salary and a small amount for the office 
and travelling expenses of a small number of staff in Geneva and London.114 By 
contrast, UNRRA’s DP operation had operating expenses of over $82 million, and drew 
on an amenity supply programme of a further $7.5 million,115 and this expenditure 
represented only a fraction of UNRRA’s overall budget. Although the financial 
and material resources could never be enough, and although the United States’ 
unwillingness to continue to fund it meant it had to wind up long before the twilight 
phase was over, this nonetheless began a new trend of significantly increased funds 
and political will put at the disposal of organizations working with refugees. UNRRA’s 
resources for DPs were immediately dwarfed by the IRO’s annual budget of four 
times that of the UN, amounting to $155 million annually.116 This kind of escalation 
of resources casts in a new light Zara Steiner’s observation in this book that ‘neither 
individuals nor governments learn from experience. New institutions may be created 
but they do not generally develop greater competencies than the ones they replace’.117 
UNRRA is evidence of a deliberate and concrete (if short-lived) attempt to build on 
previous institutions and learn from their mistakes, at the key mid-century moment 
when everything still seemed possible.
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UNRRA and its DP operation were disbanded in June 1947, and with it UNRRA’s 
self-consciously multilateral approach to relief came to an end. Subsequent 
arrangements were significantly narrower in scope, vision and extent of political 
support. The various components of UNRRA’s activities were broken up: work with 
(certain kinds of) refugees was parcelled out to the IRO and later UNHCR; health 
to the World Health Organization (WHO); children to the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF); culture and education broadly conceived to the UN’s Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); reconstruction (in some western and 
southern European countries) to the Marshall Plan; development to the World Bank, 
and, later, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). IRO initially had 
fewer than half of UNRRA’s member states on board; no Eastern bloc country or the 
Soviet Union was ever represented.118 It was a Cold War organization par excellence, 
and in crucial ways very different from UNRRA, particularly on the subject of eligibility. 
UNRRA differentiated between refugees who were entitled to the DP status and those 
who fell out of its remits, but did not deny that the Polish refugees arriving in Germany 
after the cut-off date in 1946, or even the German expellees, were ‘genuine’ refugees by 
some measures, even if, for political and financial reasons, they could not be ‘DPs’. By 
contrast, IRO’s mandate explicitly identified so-called ‘bona fide’ or ‘genuine refugees 
and displaced persons’, for whom it was to arrange registration, care and maintenance, 
legal and political protection, transport, repatriation or resettlement into countries 
that were able to house them – thereby making abundantly clear that there were others 
who were not ‘genuine’ or ‘bona fide’.119 In these terms, IRO introduced an entirely 
new approach to eligibility, namely, in Daniel Cohen’s words, ‘the obligation for 
asylum seekers to solely bear the burden of proof in their claim of “genuine” political 
persecution.’120 IRO operations ended in Germany in 1952. The closing of the last DP 
camps thus coincided with the signing of the 1951 Convention on Refugees, which 
defined a ‘refugee’ in explicitly political terms, and enshrined the distinction between 
‘genuine’ political refugees and all others (including those fleeing poverty) in law. The 
era of Allied cooperation, multilateral and ‘connected’ arrangements of refugee care 
represented by UNRRA, was by then only a distant memory.
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The United States and the Forty Years’ Crisis
Carl J. Bon Tempo
In the wake of the Great War, one of the most admired men in the United States and 
around the world was Herbert Hoover. He earned this appreciation largely through 
his efforts to help the Europeans displaced by the conflict. Hoover, of course, entered 
the history books mainly for other reasons, and while his countrymen and women 
were aware of the population pressures and problems that wracked Europe in the 
decades after 1918, they never viewed them as vital to, or determinant of, their 
country’s future.1 
Yet, Europe’s mid-century population problems of refugees and displaced persons 
– making up what this book calls ‘the forty years’ crisis’ – ultimately played a decisive 
role in the history of the United States’ policies towards newcomers. This chapter first 
explores three larger themes – immigration affairs, foreign policy and domestic politics 
– that set the background to American engagement with the forty years’ crisis. It then 
addresses how the United States confronted the Continent’s population problems, 
arguing that the United States’ history with the crisis occurred in two eras: 1919–1945 
and 1945–1959. Finally, it interrogates the relationship between the United States and 
the forty years’ crisis by answering two questions. First, how did the forty years’ crisis 
influence American policies towards newcomers? Second, how did the United States 
shape the course of the forty years’ crisis? 
The answer to the first question is more readily apparent. In the decades after 
1945, the United States birthed a formal refugee aid and resettlement policy regime, 
a development that largely grew from the country’s experiences with the forty years’ 
crisis. Quite simply, there would not have been an American refugee regime without 
the European refugee problems of the mid-twentieth century.
The second question is trickier to answer, in large part because the United States 
had so little interest in Europe’s population problems from the 1920s through the early 
1940s. But after the Second World War, the United States determined that it could 
no longer afford such inattention. In those years, in subtle and not so subtle ways, 
the United States did influence the forty years’ crisis. First, through its leadership 
and resources, the United States did much to shape the physical, legal, diplomatic 
and ideological architecture of the post-war refugee crisis. Second, the United States’ 
central role in the Cold War and in the refugee crisis helped meld those two phenomena 
together, with the former exerting incredible influence upon the latter. 
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Historical background to American 
engagement with the crisis
A few larger factors formed the background to the American response to, and 
engagement with, Europe’s refugee crises between 1919 and 1959.
The first, and most important, element was the politics of newcomers in the 
United States. The onset of Europe’s population problems coincided with the United 
States constructing the most restrictive immigration laws in its history. During the 
1920s, the US Congress passed a series of laws that limited both the numbers of 
newcomers entering from the Eastern Hemisphere (to about 150,000 annually) and 
the countries from which they could emigrate. This new system greatly favoured the 
entry of migrants from north-western Europe while severely restricting those arriving 
from eastern, central and southern Europe. Immigrants from the rest of the Eastern 
Hemisphere faced even higher barriers to entry.2 
This opposition to newcomers – and these laws – reflected deep concerns with 
the ethno-national origins of immigrants. Opponents of newcomers in the 1920s 
assumed that the immigration to the United States in the preceding three decades 
– coming increasingly from outside north-western Europe, which prior to 1890 had 
been the region that supplied the most immigrants – endangered the nation’s identity. 
Restrictionists contended that only immigrants from north-western Europe could 
become true Americans who honoured the nation’s past and built a worthy future. 
‘There is little or no similarity between the clear-thinking, self-governing stocks that 
sired the American people,’ asserted Representative Fred Purnell in the early 1920s, 
‘and this stream of irresponsible and broken wreckage that is pouring into the lifeblood 
of America the social and political diseases of the Old World.’3 While ethnicity and 
national origins formed the basis of anti-immigrant sentiment, it was backstopped by 
concerns about the arrival of political leftists (communists and socialists) and anti-
Catholic and anti-Semitic sentiments. The economic troubles that consumed the 
United States in the 1930s and periodically reappeared in the 1940s and 1950s added 
further fuel to the restrictionist fire.
The restrictionist fever only broke in the late 1940s, but in peculiar and incomplete 
ways. On the one hand, the laws of the 1920s remained on the books until 1965, so 
the fundamental intent and structure of American immigration law remained the 
same. Moreover, even as political and policy elites in the mid-1960s launched the 
successful drive to reform those immigration laws, public opinion polls showed 
one third of the public supporting a decrease in immigration to the United States – 
indicative of an ardent restrictionist core in American politics.4 On the other hand, the 
xenophobia of the 1920s and 1930s receded, replaced in part by a more pluralist and 
frankly cosmopolitan conception of the American nation that welcomed immigrants 
from all of Europe, and even parts of Asia.5 Nobody better summarized this change 
than President Harry Truman, who in 1952 decried the laws of the 1920s as ‘utterly 
unworthy of our traditions and our ideals’. He went on to assert that Italians, Turks, 
Greeks, Poles and Asians all deserved a chance to come to the United States and that 
they would all make fine citizens.6
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The second vital factor was the United States’ changing place in global politics 
during the mid-twentieth century. In the decade after the Great War, the United 
States was powerful, but not deeply engaged in global political, diplomatic or military 
affairs. (American participation in the global economy did not retreat, it should be 
noted.) The Americans never joined the League of Nations, despite its birth at the 
hands of President Woodrow Wilson. American observers did participate informally 
in almost every major League discussion in the 1920s and 1930s, and were sometimes 
energetically involved when it came to social, humanitarian or scientific issues. But 
this was not the same as assuming leadership on pressing global concerns. Likewise, 
as Europe’s fragile peace collapsed in the second half of the 1930s, the Americans 
remained on the sidelines. Indeed, Congress passed a series of laws – the so-called 
Neutrality Acts – designed to limit American exposure to the combatants. Public 
opinion, President Franklin D. Roosevelt learnt, needed to be educated and cajoled 
into assuming global burdens, a task the White House took up with some alacrity and 
increasing effectiveness as the 1930s came to a close.7 
The Second World War, and the Cold War that followed, changed the United 
States’ posture in international affairs. Rather than retreat from the stage, as in the 
aftermath of the Great War, US diplomats constructed a post-war order. American 
foreign policymakers began judging their country’s interests in the light of events in 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, of course, but their attention in the decade after 
1945 never wavered long from Europe. American efforts like the Marshall Plan helped 
rebuild the continental economy. The US-led North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) 
embedded American military power in Europe. Through methods fair and foul, the 
United States supported its political allies in Europe. Finally, American consumer 
goods flooded European markets and American corporations were held up as models 
of economic development. From the American point of view, the goal was clear: a 
stable, democratic, capitalist Europe serving as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and 
communism.8 Creating a stable Europe meant working to solve Europe’s population 
problems – a relationship that policymakers understood acutely in the post-war years. 
In this sense, American engagement with global politics begot engagement with the 
forty years’ crisis in the post-1945 period. 
A third factor worth considering, though not as important as the first two, were 
changes in American politics. While Congress led the turn towards immigration 
restrictionism during the 1920s, power in the political system generally begin to 
shift towards the president in the next decade. Roosevelt’s New Deal invested the 
Executive Branch and the White House with new prerogatives and strength, a trend 
that only accelerated with the crises of the Second World War and the Cold War. One 
manifestation – though certainly not the only one – was presidents more willing to craft 
immigration legislation and policy, and even to bend the immigration bureaucracy 
(traditionally fairly responsive to Congress) to their wills. In short, empowered 
presidents took a more active role in immigration and refugee affairs after 1940.9 
At the same time, white European ethnics became more important to, and more 
active in, American politics. The onset of mass immigration to the United States in the 
late nineteenth century brought large numbers of ethnic Americans into the political 
system, a trend that led both major parties to develop nationality divisions to court 
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those voters and their leaders. While these divisions began their work in the 1880s, 
it only became very apparent how important these voters were in the 1930s, when 
FDR integrated them into his powerful democratic coalition. (In turn, this political 
acceptance surely helped produce the cosmopolitanism described earlier.) By the 
1940s, both the Democratic and Republican Parties were fighting hard for these white 
ethnic voters – and immigration and refugee legislation was one way to appeal to 
them. These ethnic groups, moreover, had developed powerful political organizations, 
complete with sophisticated leadership and finely tuned lobbying efforts, educational 
outreach, and large and cohesive memberships. All of these advances allowed them to 
more effectively make their case for the entry of newcomers in the post-war years.10 
A tale of two eras
The historical development of immigration affairs, US foreign policy and domestic politics, 
if viewed in concert, suggest that American involvement in the forty years’ crisis should be 
understood as occurring in two distinct time periods: 1919–1945 and 1945–1959. 
In that first era, the European population problem arose out of the First World War, 
its aftermath and the reconstruction of the European state system. War and nationalism 
transformed the political geography and state structures of Europe and the Near East, 
resulting by the mid-1920s in somewhere between ten and twelve million refugees.11
During the war’s early years, private American funding underlay the efforts of 
the Committee for Relief in Belgium (CRB) to help those in France and Belgium, 
whether they were refugees or those harmed by the war. Once the United States 
officially declared itself a combatant in 1917, the American government offered nearly 
$100 million in cash and supplies to CRB. In the wake of the war, President Wilson 
created the American Relief Administration (ARA), led by Herbert Hoover. The ARA 
distributed over a billion dollars of relief supplies (mainly agricultural products) to 
the hungry and desperate in over twenty countries. When the government stopped 
funding the ARA, it soldiered on as a private aid organization, though Hoover had to 
work miracles to win what private support he could. American policymakers, as well 
as some of the public, supported the ARA programme as much out of self-interest (it 
found markets for excess agricultural production, which in turn stabilized farm prices 
in the United States) as from any sustained interest in European reconstruction or deep 
concern with population pressures. The CRB and ARA were joined by other groups – 
like the American Red Cross and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
– who had much the same mission.12 
It is important to recognize that the United States’ efforts were of a peculiar 
character: often organized, financed and implemented by private actors (rather than 
the US government) and often focused on offering aid to the suffering and hungry 
in Europe (rather than offering entry to the United States). As such, this aid did not 
target refugees per se, but the larger populations wrecked by the war. Yet, the acclaim 
that Hoover and others received were just rewards. All in all, during the war and 
in its immediate aftermath, the United States played a vital role in ameliorating the 
tremendous suffering in Europe and the Near East. 
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In other areas, and as the war became more of a memory, the American record 
was not as strong. This point becomes clearer when one considers the United States’ 
peripheral participation after the war, and throughout the 1920s, in the League 
of Nation’s efforts to solve Europe’s population problems.13 Fridtjof Nansen, the 
organization’s High Commissioner for Refugees, made herculean efforts to address 
the Russian, Armenian and Greek refugee flows (even as the League offered him only 
administrative assistance). Hoover and Nansen both searched for solutions to the 
Russian problem, while the Armenian genocide and refugee catastrophe eluded any 
solution. The Americans provided help at the margins in both cases. In a different vein, 
the Greek refugee flows of the early 1920s garnered the most American attention and 
action. Americans energetically contributed to Greek refugee aid in the early 1920s 
and the Harding White House helped secure funding for the Greek Refugee Settlement 
Commission, a League operation headed by the American Henry Morgenthau Sr. that 
sought to resettle Greeks fleeing upheaval in Turkey. Morgenthau came to the effort 
through a long background in humanitarianism – both in the United States and while 
he was ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the Great War and witnessed the 
persecution of the Armenian population. The public’s attachment to the plight of 
Greek refugees is harder to explain, though advocates for Greek refugee aid were well 
organized and well connected. More important, they proved quite adept at generating 
sympathy and support through a variety of public efforts.14 
The League’s efforts in each of these cases were, in reality, not as great as the task 
at hand, and American assistance was minimal, except in the case of the Greeks. To a 
great degree, the Continent’s population problems and the European and international 
efforts to solve them ran headlong into the United States’ post-war desire to remove 
itself from foreign entanglements and seemingly intractable global challenges. The 
larger point, though, is clear: at the birth of the forty years’ crisis, the Americans offered 
financial aid – though it decreased dramatically once the immediate post-war years 
passed – rather than active and engaged leadership aimed at solving the burgeoning 
refugee crisis.
The United States did even less in the critical area of refugee resettlement. The key 
factor explaining America’s failure to offer refugees entry during the 1920s was changes 
to immigration law: just as the population problem exploded in Europe, the United 
States began to shut its doors. In 1924, the year the most restrictive immigration law 
passed Congress, over 706,000 immigrants came to the United States. Through the rest 
of the decade, annual arrivals never topped 336,000 – and they collapsed below 100,000 
per year throughout the 1930s. Even more insidious, those Europeans who would have 
benefited most from admission to the United States were precisely those nationalities 
that the new laws excluded. In this political, policy and cultural environment, as 
regular immigration channels narrowed considerably, proposals for special admissions 
of refugees independent of immigration quotas had no chance of passage.15 
As Zara Steiner notes in her chapter, the European population and refugee crisis 
entered a new phase in the 1930s with the rise of fascism. Hundreds of thousands 
of Germans fled the Nazis (and many more undoubtedly wanted to) as the regime’s 
policies became more virulent in the mid-to-late 1930s. Hitler’s conquest of the 
Continent led millions more Europeans to look to escape. The outlines of the most 
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notorious refugee catastrophe are well known, as is the failure of a global response. 
The nascent international refugee regime proved no match for the growing numbers of 
homeless and helpless. The League set up the High Commission on Refugees in 1933, 
led by an American, James G. McDonald, to expedite departures from Germany and 
find resettlement opportunities. By all accounts, the hardworking and humanitarian 
McDonald acquitted himself well in a nearly impossible situation. The League 
limited the High Commission’s mandate and powers, and Germany unsurprisingly 
had little interest in cooperating with McDonald. In the United States, McDonald’s 
contact with the State Department and representatives of the Roosevelt White House 
revealed the American government’s fears that cooperation with the high commission 
would have one result: the arrival of at least tens of thousands of Jewish refugees. 
McDonald’s high commission, then, produced few results and he resigned in 1935, 
but not without making his signal contribution. In a public letter announcing his 
departure, McDonald called attention to the Nazis’ frightening abuse of minorities, 
warned that the situation in Germany would doubtlessly worsen and strongly called 
for the League of Nations to press for modification of Nazi policies. Writing with 
morally charged language that left little doubt as to the stakes, McDonald identified 
the dynamics at work all too well, and in some ways predicted the tragedy that ensued 
in the coming years.16 
McDonald’s countrymen, of course, paid as little heed to his warning as the rest 
of the world. The triumph of immigration restriction in the 1920s was the single 
most important factor that foretold American inaction. Year after year in the 1930s, 
supporters of European refugees sponsored legislation in Congress to admit those 
fleeing the terror. Those efforts failed every time, brought low by objections that a 
refugee programme would denude the national origins quota immigration system, 
further harm the economy and bring un-American newcomers to the United States. 
With no special programme to admit refugees, regular immigration procedures 
were the chief avenue for entry. The law allowed only 25,957 Germans to enter annually, 
a relatively large number compared to the quotas for other countries falling under the 
Nazi yoke; the Austrian quota was just over 1,400 and the Czech quota was about 
2,800. In any event, those quotas soon were not large enough to accommodate all who 
wanted to come. Equally problematic, State Department officials had little interest in 
admitting refugees. Motivated by anti-Semitism and xenophobia, they argued for a 
continuing the Hoover administration’s strict enforcement of the ‘likely to become a 
public charge’ clause in immigration law, which effectively blocked the entry of refugees 
from Germany. President Roosevelt, concerned with domestic politics, a restrictionist 
Congress and surging anti-Semitic attacks on the New Deal, left the State Department 
to its devices during his first term. Only in 1937, safely re-elected and with some new 
faces in the State Department such as Sumner Welles, did FDR order the bureaucracy 
to admit more Germans. From 1938 till 1940, the quotas were substantially filled, 
but key years had been lost and by that late date the line of Germans, Austrians and 
Czechs hoping to come to the United States had lengthened considerably. Ultimately, 
the opposition to newcomers so powerful in American politics and culture in the first 
half of the twentieth century, and embedded in key portions of the government, helped 
determine the weak American response to the crisis of the 1930s.17 
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Foreign policy concerns also played a role. Those in Congress who wanted to help 
refugees, as well as President Roosevelt, who sympathized with their plight, were loath 
to challenge isolationists who contended that any aid would ensnare the United States 
in Europe’s accelerating conflict. Such thinking was part of the State Department’s 
justification for leaving the quotas unfilled, and it was especially important in scuttling 
special legislation that would have admitted European refugees outside the quotas. The 
constraints of US foreign policy also hamstrung efforts to craft diplomatic solutions. 
The Americans brought together dozens of states for a conference at Evian, France in 
1938 – where good intentions led to paltry results. The Americans pleaded that they 
wanted to help resolve the European population problem, but refused to take concrete 
steps that would have admitted refugees. It should be noted that the other attendees at 
Evian followed the same line.18 
After the United States entered the war in 1941, immigration from Europe slowed 
to a crawl. Between 1941 and 1945, a total of just over 53,000 Europeans came to 
the United States. This figure is somewhat misleading and overstates American 
contributions to offering aid when one considers that 13,000 of those arrivals were 
of English descent.19 There was a well-publicized effort to bring almost 1,000 Jewish 
refugees from camps in Italy to the United States in 1944, but this programme was 
obviously of little consequence given the flood of displaced in Europe as the war began 
to wind down.20 In any event, the United States seemed most concerned with winning 
the war rather than admitting refugees. Yet, there were signs that the Americans would 
be more interested in population policy and the fate of refugees after the war: the United 
States took the lead in 1943 in forming the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), tasked specifically with tackling the post-war problems of 
refugees and the displaced that were sure to arise.21 
Post-war planning during the war proved tragically accurate. The Second World 
War produced a human catastrophe across the globe, and just as surely in Europe. 
The Continent’s population problems in the wake of the war were as great – if not 
greater – as they had been at any time in the twentieth century. Anywhere between 
7 and 11 million Europeans were displaced. Estimates held that of that population, 
around 225,000 were Jews in Germany, Austria and Italy, the vast majority victims of 
the Nazi extermination campaign and in extremely dire straits. The problem was not 
static, either. As the homeless made their way back home, or to new homes, others 
took their places – often fleeing the imposition of Soviet control in eastern Europe or 
the anti-Semitic pogroms that flared after the war. Thus, the population problems long 
outlasted the conflict and even its immediate aftermath. With the Continent’s political 
and economic institutions wrecked, and the social fabric sundered completely, care 
for the refugees fell to the United States, its allies and a series of infant international 
organizations.22
The Americans responded with a substantial set of programmes to aid the homeless 
and to resettle them in the United States. It is important to make a distinction, however. 
Any frank assessment would admit that the Americans could, and perhaps should, 
have done more in light of the immensity of the suffering and the population problems. 
This judgement is more powerful when one considers the unmatched economic and 
material resources the Americans possessed. But, even with this caveat, the US post-
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war efforts were remarkable, viewed against the historical record of the 1920s and 
1930s. They also were of a certain cast and type, which illuminated their shortcomings.
In terms of aid delivered to Europe and helping refugees ‘on the ground’, the Americans 
backed – sometimes quite significantly – several international organizations. The first 
was the aforementioned United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 
Three Americans led UNRRA and the United States contributed about 70 per cent 
of its budget. During its five years (1943–8), it rebuilt infrastructure, provided food 
and shelter to the hungry, constructed and staffed refugee camps, and repatriated 
the displaced. This last mission of repatriation put the United States in open conflict 
with the Soviet Union (another UNRRA member) when the Americans and British 
decided to halt the return of those Soviet citizens who desired to remain in the West.23 
Despite this controversy, UNRRA managed to shrink considerably the refugee and DP 
population to something on the order of 1–1.5 million persons. 
The International Refugee Organization (IRO) succeeded UNRRA from 1947 to 
1952 – though without the participation of the Soviets. Formed by 25 nations and the 
United States, the Americans contributed just over $237 million to its budget, about 
half of the IRO’s total expenditures and played key roles in its leadership. Much like 
UNRRA, the IRO ran refugee camps and organized and assisted in resettlement, but 
it also made stronger efforts to rehabilitate the displaced through an extensive set of 
social welfare programmes such as job training. Besides American participation in the 
IRO’s management, a multitude of US-based non-governmental organizations helped 
care for and resettle the displaced.24 
Finally, out of the ashes of the IRO came the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), which began operations in 1951. According to historian Louise 
Holborn, the UNHCR offered refugees legal and political safety but, at the United 
States’ insistence, no material help. As a result, the UNHCR was vital in expanding 
definitions of ‘refugee’ and studying the global refugee problem, but less effective at 
ameliorating refugee flows and populations. The American objections to an expansive 
UNHCR mission symbolized the country’s lack of interest in funding large-scale 
refugee assistance programmes (like the IRO) by the early 1950s, though US dollars 
continued to be a key part of the organization’s budget through the Cold War.25 
Instead, the Americans increasingly concentrated on bringing select refugees to the 
United States. On its own, this decision represented a turning point. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the Americans provided material and financial aid to refugees massed in Europe 
and the Near East, all the while largely blocking their entry to the United States. This 
financial and material aid continued to a degree, as we have seen, in the post-1945 era. 
But the new emphasis on refugee admissions was clear, as a series of ad hoc policies 
and programmes brought hundreds of thousands of European refugees to the United 
States, beginning in the late 1940s. 
Shortly after the conclusion of hostilities, American military officials made 
President Harry Truman aware of the population problems in Europe, and especially 
the camps that housed hundreds of thousands of Displaced Persons and refugees. By 
the end of 1945, Truman ordered that half of all immigration admissions from Europe 
go to refugees, and that immigration officials ease their standards to expedite entry. 
The immediate effects were paltry – about 5,000 Europeans entered via the programme 
The United States and the Forty Years’ Crisis 185
– but that failure led Truman to push for his more ambitious Displaced Persons 
legislation.26 After a long battle, Truman won Congressional passage of the Displaced 
Persons Act in 1948. Straightforward in the sense that it provided for the admission of 
200,000 refugees over two years, it required that those admissions count against future 
quotas and that refugees had to be registered in camps by 1945 (which had the effect 
of lowering the number of Jews and eastern Europeans eligible for the programme). In 
1950, Congress renewed the programme for two more years. When the DP Program 
ended in 1952, about 400,000 Europeans had come to the United States – the vast 
majority of whom arrived from IRO camps.27 
Clearly, the first five years after the war were a departure in the United States’ 
engagement with the European crisis. But why? The vital change came in American 
foreign policy. As the war ended, a sense developed among US leaders that the country 
would have to be involved in rebuilding Europe. UNRRA – followed by the IRO 
and the UNHCR – signified recognition of this reality. In this sense, UNRRA (and 
its successors) arose from the same impulse as the welter of post-war international 
and American-led agencies and organizations, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, which set out to reconstruct Europe. It also explains 
– along with a sense of humanitarianism and justice – Truman’s motivation for his 
December 1945 order. By 1948 and the Displaced Persons programme, the impetus 
to be engaged in Europe had a new powerful rationale: the Cold War. Policymakers 
believed the admission of refugees and the displaced would bolster American allies on 
the front lines of the battle against communism. Equally important, it would serve as 
a demonstration of American values and munificence in the face of Soviet oppression, 
and thus constitute a major propaganda victory. In a sense, the DP Program was both 
backward- and forward-looking. It was inspired both by the desire to ameliorate the 
suffering created by the Second World War and the perceived post-war threat of the 
Soviet Union and communism.28
The DP Program, though, also grew from changes in American politics. Jewish 
groups launched an impressive campaign to win the legislation, one that might not 
have been possible in the first half of the twentieth century before the ethno-national 
discrimination of national origins policy – and overt and virulent anti-Semitism – 
had been discredited by Nazism. Working largely behind the scenes – to avoid 
opening the legislation up to anti-Semitic attacks (which came in any event) – Jewish 
organizations assembled a broad coalition of support that stretched across religion, 
ethnicity and class. Equally important, they couched their support of the DP Program 
in new ways. They made clear the Cold War benefits of admitting European refugees 
and emphasized the anti-communism of newcomers. At the same time, American 
Jews framed refugee admissions as a ‘social justice’ issue, in the words of historian 
Maddalena Marinari, that gave the campaign a universalist appeal while also thwarting 
attacks that the programme would only benefit one or two religious or nationality 
groups. It was a sophisticated effort that bore fruit and showed how ethnic and 
religious organizations had become vital and effective players in immigration politics 
and drivers of immigration policy.29 
The Cold War cast of American engagement with the forty years’ crisis only 
deepened in the 1950s. In that decade, the Americans launched two signature 
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refugee programmes. The Refugee Relief Program of 1953 brought just over 200,000 
refugees to the United States. The rationale for the programme was distinctly Cold 
War-coloured. President Eisenhower lauded ‘escapees who have braved death to 
escape from behind the Iron Curtain’ and asserted that those ‘searching desperately 
for freedom look to the free world for haven’.30 The programme privileged refugees 
who were victims of communism – even defining an ‘escapee’ as a person who fled 
the Soviet Union or communist-dominated territories. Finally, the programme aimed 
to help ‘friendly’ European nations burdened by refugees, who were described as an 
‘economic and political threat of constantly growing magnitude’. Unsurprisingly, then, 
the vast majority of admissions came from Germany and Italy.31
As the Refugee Relief Program ended in late 1956, another refugee crisis began 
as Hungarians started pouring out of their country, following the failed anti-Soviet 
revolution of that summer and fall. With great public support, Eisenhower launched 
an emergency programme that admitted nearly 40,000 Hungarians over the next few 
months. The Hungarians were hailed as brave ‘freedom fighters’ whose dreams of 
democracy and freedom had been crushed by Soviet armed force. These victims of 
communist aggression deserved a new life in the United States, Eisenhower and others 
contended.32
In each of these cases, the Cold War and foreign policy prerogatives pushed the 
United States to admit refugees. But it was also clear that particular political and 
cultural conditions eased the acceptance of these policies and programmes. Advocates 
of immigration reform backed refugee admissions as a way to subvert the nation’s 
restrictive immigration laws; if they could not overturn what they believed were 
overtly discriminatory and harsh laws, then they believed refugee admissions would 
chip away at the edifice of restriction. Moreover, as with the DP Program, ethnic and 
religious groups pushed hard for the 1953 admissions – so hard that it earned the 
moniker ‘the church bill’.33 
These admissions, tellingly, came in the era of the Red Scare, when muscular 
anti-communism dominated American politics. Supporters of refugees harnessed 
anti-communism as a powerful rationale for refugee admissions. (It should be noted 
that opponents of refugee admissions were equally vociferous in their contention 
that refugee entry would risk the arrival of communists and Soviet saboteurs.) 
Advocates like Representative Manny Celler painted newcomers in 1953 as ‘refugees 
streaming in across the line into West Berlin … from East Germany, coming in from 
Czechoslovakia, from Poland, and from other subjugated countries’. Celler continued: 
‘They understand the meaning of liberty’ and ‘they would be only too happy to come 
here and understand, know, appreciate all the more, freedom of speech, freedom of 
press, freedom of religion.’34 In short, Celler made the case that these refugees deserved 
admission because of their opposition to communism. It was not the politicians and 
policy experts alone who picked up this thread. In describing the Hungarians, the 
popular weekly magazine Look declared that the Hungarian refugees would be ‘New 
Americans’ in no time. The key to this easy transition was not only political, but also 
their embrace of American material and consumer culture – again the antithesis of 
life behind the Iron Curtain.35 Those explaining why the United States should admit 
refugees had never before possessed such resonant arguments. 
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The end of the forty years’ crisis in Europe coincided with one final push by the 
United States. In 1957, Congress passed the Refugee-Escapee Act, aimed at bringing 
thousands of victims of European communist regimes to the United States. A few 
years later, Congress enacted the ‘Fair Share’ Refugee Act of 1960. Designed to show 
American sympathy with the United Nation’s World Refugee Year (one of whose goals 
was closing the European camps that housed hard-core refugees), the law provided for 
the entry of about 5,000 Europeans, an amount that the United States determined a 
‘fair share’, considering the size of admissions offered by other states.36
By many accounts, the forty years’ crisis came to a close in 1959 – and that year 
marked something of a new era in American refugee affairs as well. The catalyst was 
the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro. As refugees began fleeing Cuba and 
pressing to come to the United States, they became the centre of American refugee 
policies. About one million Cubans came to the United States in the fifteen years 
after 1959. As the Cuban flow slowed in the early 1970s, Indochinese refugees fleeing 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos emerged as the focus of American refugee efforts. None 
of these refugees was from Europe, obviously, and American attention would never 
again be focused so intently on the problem of European refugees as it was in the 1940s 
and 1950s.
 The crisis and the shape of American 
engagement with refugees
The largest and most important legacy of the forty years’ crisis, in regard to the United 
States, is crystal clear: the American refugee regime. That regime emerged with two 
distinct parts, and at two distinct times, but altogether in response to the forty years’ crisis. 
In the decade after the Great War, the Americans began – mostly with private money 
– to aid refugees in Europe. Those private groups stayed deeply involved in refugee aid 
ventures during the Second World War and the early years of the Cold War. But in the 
post-1945 era, the American government assumed a huge financial responsibility, as 
well as an important leadership role, in refugee aid efforts. The American government 
emerged as the financial engine behind international refugee aid programmes.
The other part of the regime – refugee admissions – came fully into view in the post-
war years. The United States had no coherent entry policies, other than shutting them 
out via immigration procedures, towards refugees in the 1920s or 1930s. Yet, during 
the next two decades, the United States developed a series of ad hoc programmes and 
policies that allowed certain refugees to enter. In the decades that followed, those 
ad hoc measures transformed into an annual pledge to bring refugees to the United 
States. That transformation took place in two stages: in 1965, as part of immigration 
law reform, the United States permitted about 10,000 refugees to enter annually; in 
1980, under the Refugee Act, that number grew to about 50,000. 
The key period in this story was the 1940s and 1950s, as the European crisis entered 
its third decade, and American policymakers and politicians determined they could no 
longer avoid the forty years’ crisis. As we have seen, a volatile and historically contingent 
mix of foreign policy, immigration and domestic political concerns produced an 
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environment conducive to action. The policymakers,’ politicians’ and public’s response 
– an increased financial and resource commitment and refugee admissions – truly 
birthed the policy regime that exists to this day, and thus stands as the United States’ 
entry point into global migration issues.
Constructing and implementing a set of refugee policies required moulding the 
American state to those purposes. This state-building project was multifaceted and 
another long-term legacy of American engagement with the crisis. Both the State 
Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), often with 
input from the White House officials charged with the immigration and refugee 
policy portfolio, established the mechanisms by which refugees would be selected, 
interviewed, admitted, transported and resettled. Two examples of this state-building 
stand out. First, American officials designed a set of security checks designed to 
prevent the entry of politically dangerous refugees. In the Cold War era, this meant 
denying entry to communists or socialists through rigorous background checks, 
interviews, and investigations of a refugee’s personal and political history. During the 
Refugee Relief Program of the early 1950s, the barriers to entry were quite high. Those 
standards lowered in the decade that followed, but they remain a part of American 
refugee policies today, as can be witnessed in the challenges faced by refugees trying 
to enter from the Middle East or Africa in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.37 Second, the 
US government developed a fruitful relationship with private sector non-government 
organizations, especially religious groups, to help with the admissions and resettlement 
of refugees. These groups worked in Europe to prepare refugees for the admissions 
process – a sort of pre-screening clearance – and helped resettle them with jobs and 
homes once in the United States. This public-private partnership continued in the 
1960s and 1970s, as the Cubans and Indochinese arrived and refugee law and policy 
moved from ad hoc commitments to guaranteed annual admissions.38
The American experience with the forty years’ crisis created a peculiar refugee 
regime in two important respects. First, it gave American refugee admissions policies a 
Euro centric focus. In many ways, this focus was bound to occur, given American racial 
and ethnic attitudes at mid-century; the public’s and policymakers’ tendencies towards 
racial and ethnic discrimination assured that non-European refugees would not find 
succour in the United States. But discrimination was not the only impediment. The fact 
that a European crisis birthed a set of refugee policies and policy goals had the effect 
of cementing, at the creation, a bias towards offering help to European refugees and to 
providing less help to (and sometimes neglecting) non-white refugees. Only in 1965, 
with the civil rights movement in full swing and the national origins quota immigration 
system of the 1920s disgraced, did this Euro centric focus in admissions waver.
The second peculiarity, anti-communism, proved even harder to shake. American 
involvement in the forty years’ crisis – and the development of admissions policies 
– accelerated just as the Cold War deepened. This confluence created a link at the 
heart of American refugee admissions, one that assumed a refugee worthy of entry 
to the United States had to be a victim of communism and sometimes even an active 
opponent of communism. Of course, domestic factors – such as the rise of the Red 
Scare, anti-communist politics, and particular anti-communist notions of national 
identity in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s – also account for 
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this link. But, again, the forty years’ crisis – as a refugee problem in the heart of the 
European Cold War – offered fertile ground for these associations, which far outlasted 
the crisis itself. Thus, the Cubans, and to a lesser extent the Indochinese who followed 
them, were understood and defined by the United States as victims and opponents of 
communism. In this, at least in American eyes, they were much like their European 
predecessors of the post-war period. One could go so far as to argue that one important 
reason why the Cubans and Indochinese were welcomed with relatively open arms was 
that they cleared the anti-communist benchmarks established by European refugees 
after 1945. 39 Only in 1980, and with the human rights revolution in full swing, did the 
United States approve an apolitical and a non-ideological definition of refugee that was 
not grounded in anti-communism.
The United States and the shape of the forty years’ crisis 
In the broadest sense, and unsurprisingly, the vital American imprint on the forty 
years’ crisis came in the Second World War era and beyond, when the United States 
committed substantial resources and political and diplomatic capital to refugee affairs. 
Of course, however, the Americans did influence the European crisis in the earlier 
period. American resources were vital in the war and immediate post-war years in 
helping to ameliorate suffering. In the 1920s and 1930s, American passivity shaped the 
European refugee crisis. The end of European mass migration to the United States cut 
off a major resettlement opportunity, one that Zara Steiner notes had served Europeans 
– refugees or not – in the centuries before. Put another way, the immigration policy 
and law changes of the 1920s put the United States on the sidelines of the forty years’ 
crisis for about two decades – and that position did contribute to the perpetuation of 
the crisis.40 It is not difficult to imagine a different narrative to the European population 
problem if the United States maintained its open door in the 1920s. In that scenario, 
the United States obviously would not have provided the solution to the Continent’s 
refugee problems, but it likely would have lessened them to a decent degree – and an 
important life-changing degree for those migrants able to resettle in the United States.
In the post-war years, the Americans did admit hundreds of thousands of 
European refugees, most importantly 400,000 through the Displaced Persons Act, 
200,000 through the Refugee Relief Act, and another almost 40,000 in the wake of 
the Hungarian crisis. (Other programmes, of course, admitted smaller numbers.) 
These numbers were startling in light of the 1920s and 1930s – and minimal in light 
of the population crush in post-1945 Europe. Surely, the American post-war refugee 
admissions did shape the dimensions of the Crisis, but not so profoundly.
In two other areas, though, one might argue for a more forceful influence. First, 
to a large degree, the architecture of post-war aid and resettlement was devised and 
funded by the US government. The camps that arose in the immediate wake of the 
war owed much to the American military, the dominant – and most resource-rich – 
partner among the Allies. UNRRA and the IRO, the two international agencies tasked 
with alleviating the refugee problem, were led by Americans – and received much 
American government funding, resources and staff support. Moreover, as historian 
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Daniel Cohen notes, American religious, ethnic and social welfare groups between 
1943 and 1948 provided immense resources – in addition to what the US government 
was delivering.41 American leadership of international refugee aid organizations – and 
financial and economic support as well – was nothing new; James McDonald headed 
up the High Commission in the 1930s, after all, and the American government and 
public contributed resources to the refugee aid campaigns of the 1920s. 
The novelty of the post-war period came in the size and scope of American 
intervention, which touched nearly every aspect of the refugee experience in post-war 
Europe. Whether this intervention produced a distinctly American post-war refugee 
experience is difficult to determine. The historian Liz Borgwardt has argued that UNRRA 
embodied a particular notion of economic rights and stability born during the New 
Deal reforms initiated by President Roosevelt. To be sure, New Dealers played key roles 
in the American efforts to construct a post-war order, and they just as surely brought 
their experiences and biases with them. Yet, the liberal and progressive impulses towards 
social and economic justice and security that underlay the New Deal – and undergirded 
New Dealers’ conceptions of post-war refugee relief and rehabilitation – were not the 
province of Americans alone. Instead, they were shared by a large swath of refugee 
experts and advocates across Europe and the globe, and thus likely would have found 
voice – although perhaps less powerfully – in whatever post-war schemes developed.42 
Second, the United States played a major role in giving the forty years’ crisis a Cold 
War-inspired turn and direction. To be sure, European traditions of anti-communism 
and anti-Soviet policies, as well as the unique geo politics of the post-war moment 
that pitted West against East, likely would have shaped the population issue even if a 
Cold War had not developed and even if the United States was not at the centre of it. 
But, and here Zara Steiner (as well as Peter Gatrell in his grand narrative of refugees 
in the twentieth century) is on the mark, the whole of refugee affairs in the post-war 
world took on a Cold War focus – from the legal definitions of refugee, to the public 
perceptions of refugees, to determining which refugees deserved aid and resettlement, 
to the perceived diplomatic and public advantages of refugee admissions. The United 
States was vital in establishing that focus because of the combination of its central role 
in the coming of the Cold War and its essential role in refugee affairs as both a major 
refugee resettlement destination and a source of aid. In a sense, by being a key player 
in both arenas, the United States helped wed them.
*
Zara Steiner provocatively opens this book, both complicating and approving of the 
very idea of a ‘forty years’ crisis’ for Europe’s refugees and displaced. Her assessment 
is worth returning to, and especially with this question in mind: does the concept of 
a forty years’ crisis resonate with, and help explain, the American experience with 
refugees? The answer, of course, is yes, for the multitude of reasons discussed above. 
And yet, Steiner’s instinct to complicate is very useful in the American context as well. 
That is, from the perspective of the United States, the forty years’ crisis is a misnomer. 
For the United States, it was a fifteen or twenty years’ crisis, one that began sometime 
during the Second World War and ended around 1960. This difference in perspective 
– the ‘Twenty Years’ Crisis’ – is intriguing on two fronts. 
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First, the story of greater American action in the field of refugee affairs during and 
after the Second World War has attained a powerful – and perhaps too powerful – place 
in how historians write and the public remembers refugee history.43 For good reason, 
as this chapter argues, the war marked a turning point in how scholars understand the 
American narrative. Yet, the American narrative cannot and should not become the 
hegemonic one when writing the history of refugees. To do so would distort the history 
of refugees in the twentieth century by overly prioritizing Europe’s refugees, privileging 
the influence of American foreign policy and neglecting the longer pre-1940 history 
of refugees (which might, to borrow from Steiner, benefit from looking to the decades 
before 1919 to find the origins of modern refugee problems and international and 
nation-state solutions). Moreover, the American-centred story can dangerously cast 
the narrative with a triumphalist and moralist tone, something akin to how American 
memory emphasizes the Second World War as ‘The Good War’. To be sure, the war 
saw a vital effort to aid refugees and some praise is deserved, but those efforts were also 
curious and limited products of their time. 
Second, this understanding of the forty years’ crisis is a useful reminder of the 
importance of history itself. If a continent’s suffering and displacement lasted four 
decades (or more), but it only garnered the attention of a powerful nation like the 
United States for fifteen years, then one must look to the peculiarities of historical 
perspective, historical context and contingency to help explain the gap – and thus the 
shapes and fates of the lives of tens of millions. On this front, the United States played 
a vital role, along with others, in confronting – and avoiding, at times – a marker of the 
modern world: the refugee. 
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The Empire Returns: ‘Repatriates’ and 
‘Refugees’ from French Algeria
Claire Eldridge
From 1954 until 1962, France fought a protracted and brutal colonial war in an 
attempt to retain control over the territory of Algeria. There were many reasons 
why France sought to deny the forces of the National Liberation Front (FLN) the 
independence they were seeking, among them were Algeria’s geographical proximity; 
its unique status as an integral part of the nation since 1848 rather than just a colony; 
the importance of a global territorial reach to France’s post-1945 claims to great power 
status; and the presence of over one million Europeans who regularly and forcefully 
made clear their ardent wish that Algeria remain part of France. Infamous for the 
extreme tactics used by both sides, including the systematic use of torture by the 
French army, this politically destabilizing conflict brought down the Fourth Republic, 
occasioned the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle in 1958, and led to the 
creation of the Fifth Republic. Arousing strong emotions, the Algerian War pitted 
French men and women against each other in ways that transcended traditional 
political, religious and social cleavages, even prompting some to commit illegal acts 
in the name of their beliefs. Consequently, as Algerians celebrated their hard-won 
independence on 5 July 1962, the predominant feeling in France was one of relief that 
the conflict was finally over. 
For others, however, a new drama was beginning as one million people abandoned 
their homes in Algeria and crossed the Mediterranean to France.1 Dominated by 
the European settler population, or pieds-noirs, this migratory wave also included 
100,000 Jews and tens of thousands of Muslim Algerians who had served the colonial 
power in some capacity, notably the harkis who had been enrolled as auxiliaries in the 
French army. Summarizing the difficulties categorizing this diverse group of people, 
one journalist wrote at the time: ‘Repatriates, migrants, evacuees, the destitute, the 
dispossessed, they’re a bit of everything.’2 Forced to abandon their homes as a result of 
political events and amid a climate of intense violence, those who left Algeria in 1962 
can be regarded as part of an estimated twelve million refugees created in Africa alone 
as a result of decolonization.3 In this sense, they exemplify the changing character of 
the ‘refugee problem’, straddling the transition in international preoccupations from 
the European to the non-European world. 
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The reception of refugees in France
As the self-styled ‘land of liberty’, France had traditionally welcomed large numbers 
of refugees. Yet such decisions were often driven more by practicalities – a need for 
foreign workers – than principles. This is reflected in the fact that refugees were subject 
to the same legal regime as foreign workers with no special administrative measures 
attesting to their specific status. The criteria for obtaining a residence permit, for 
example, made no distinction between labour migrants and refugees. Assessments 
were based on the individual’s perceived suitability to reside in France rather than their 
need for humanitarian protection. In the early 1920s, refugees were thus addressed 
in terms of foreign labour and, since the economy was sufficiently buoyant to absorb 
and support additional workers, their presence was not a problem. However, as the 
economy faltered in the mid-1920s and into the 1930s, attitudes changed. Amid 
anxieties about jobs and security, as well as a resurgence of fears of national decline, 
those seeking refuge were increasingly cast as threats rather than assets – people to be 
excluded rather than embraced. The result was a progressive closing of French borders 
and a curtailment of refugee rights at the very moment that the numbers seeking 
asylum were rising dramatically across Europe.4 
Having decided that neither the French workforce nor the French population could 
accommodate additional refugees, in 1933 the government declared that it would offer 
only temporary passage rather than settlement to those fleeing fascist persecution. 
Although the left-wing Popular Front government signed the League of Nations’ 
provisional arrangement for refugees in July 1936, which recognized refugees as a 
specific legal category of people as well as committing France to existing international 
norms of protection, the nation’s borders remained closed to new arrivals. Entry 
restrictions were further tightened by successive decree laws in May and November 
of 1938, which also put in place additional measures to police those refugees already 
present in France.5 The hardening of attitudes and policies over the course of the 1930s 
was most starkly illustrated by the treatment of almost half a million Spanish refugees 
who streamed across the border into France in early 1939 as General Franco’s forces 
emerged victorious. The French state, for the first time ever, responded to this influx 
with a policy of mass internment, confining the Spanish refugees in a series of camps 
where men were separated from their families and which became notorious for their 
terrible conditions as overcrowding, malnourishment and disease all took their toll.6 
These same spaces would subsequently be used during the Second World War by the 
Vichy government to intern a variety of refugee populations including Germans, Jews, 
Spaniards and Hungarian gypsies, alongside French Jews, anarchists and communists.7 
The inadequacies of French responses to the various refugee populations of the 
1930s and 1940s were recognized at the end of the Second World War when the 
newly constituted Fourth Republic reaffirmed France’s commitment to human rights 
and willingness to participate in the creation of an international refugee regime.8 
Nonetheless, this support was tempered by a determination to retain as much control 
as possible over who was entitled to asylum in France so as not to open the nation to 
a ‘flood’ of post-war refugees. During negotiations over the 1951 Convention on the 
Status of Refugees, French delegates consequently insisted that the remit be restricted 
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to the pre-1951 era and to Europe. This stance was strongly influenced by a wider 
concern to keep the UNHCR and, by extension, the international community, out of 
France’s increasingly turbulent colonial affairs; something the government regarded as 
a purely domestic matter.9 
In 1954, not long after the 1951 Convention became law in France, the Algerian 
conflict erupted. This was also the year in which French Indochina – present-day 
Vietnam and parts of Laos and Cambodia – was ‘lost’ in the wake of the Battle of Dien 
Bien Phu, prompting the first in a series of large-scale population displacements as 
decolonization gathered pace. As the World Refugee Year got underway in June 1959, 
pressure mounted, particularly from the growing Third World block in the United 
Nations, to refocus the remit of the UNHCR on African and Asian refugees. At the 
same time as resisting such moves, France stepped up its attempts to retain control of 
Algeria through a carrot-and-stick combination of economic development initiatives 
and large-scale military repression. Less than two years later, however, Algeria was 
independent and France was faced with a one million strong migratory population 
that was simultaneously European and North African. 
Yet, although clearly connected to the evolving nature of the ‘refugee problem’, the 
novel context of decolonization and the unique characteristics of the Algerian situation 
meant that the one million migrants of 1962 also stood outside recent refugee history. 
In particular, those who left Algeria, irrespective of their religion or ethnicity, were 
French citizens. Following the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, settlers migrated 
to the new colonial territory from across Europe during the nineteenth century. 
Concerned about the loyalties of this multinational population, the state passed laws 
in 1889 and 1893, making these Europeans and their descendants into French citizens. 
This complemented the 1870 Crémieux Decree, which had unilaterally naturalized 
Algeria’s 34,500 Jewish inhabitants. Citizenship had notionally been open to Algeria’s 
Muslim population since 1865, but very few were able or wanted to take this step. Not 
until 1944 did the law affirm that ‘Muslims’ in Algeria were ‘French citizens’, although 
not with the same rights as other citizens. Full equality was only introduced with the 
1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which guaranteed the same rights and duties 
to all French citizens, whether in metropolitan France or the empire. The collective 
result of these legal developments was that those on the move in 1962 were defined not 
as refugees, but rather as ‘returning’ French citizens or ‘repatriates’, even though many 
had never previously set foot in metropolitan France.
The distinction between refugees and repatriates would prove crucial in shaping 
the response of the French state to the migrants from Algeria. Determined to avoid 
the negative socioeconomic consequences usually associated with refugee status, the 
government put in place an unprecedented raft of measures designed to integrate the 
repatriates into the national body as swiftly as possible. Here, Europe’s recent refugee 
history served as a warning, one the government sought to heed as it embarked upon a 
deliberately new and alternative path.10 At the same time, although framed with respect 
to universal values and notions of national solidarity, these measures were heavily 
driven by economic imperatives, continuing the traditional association in French 
policy between asylum and employment. However, when it came to dealing with those 
classed as ‘Muslim French repatriates’, primarily the harkis, a different strategy was 
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adopted. Despite theoretical equality with other repatriates, harkis increasingly found 
themselves referred to in official discourse in ways that emphasized their difference, 
including the use of the term ‘refugees’. More than just semantics, this differentiation 
translated into treating harkis not as individual citizens, but as a group apart who were 
confined to camps in isolated rural locations where they were deprived of basic rights 
and freedoms. The historical echoes of such treatment were particularly strong, given 
that many of these sites had earlier housed twentieth-century refugee populations such 
as Spanish Republican exiles and Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. It was also in keeping 
with the French practice of dealing with refugees instrumentally on a case-by-case 
basis, even going so far as to treat those with the same national origins differently 
according to when they arrived in France.
Prior experience of the ‘refugee problem’ therefore informed and framed the French 
state’s dealings with those repatriated from Algeria in the 1960s. In exploring these, 
often inconsistent, responses, this chapter will show how the end of empire prompted 
modes of thinking about large-scale population movements that broke new ground, 
while simultaneously referring back to established ideas and methods. The first half of 
the chapter will discuss ‘French repatriates’, that is to say the European settlers, while 
the second half will address the situation of harkis. By focusing on both official policies 
and the experiences of the migrants themselves, this case study allows for reflection on 
the often-blurred lines between the categories of ‘refugee’ and ‘repatriate’ at a crucial 
historical juncture when the ‘refugee problem’ was increasingly conceived of in global 
terms.
Resettling the settlers
The French repatriates from Algeria were only the latest in a series of citizens displaced 
by decolonization to arrive in France. Between 1952 and 1962, an estimated 1.3 million 
individuals migrated back to metropolitan France as a result of events in Indochina, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Guinea.11 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was 
no standardized repatriation policy in France. Rather, what one commentator called 
the ‘human factor’ of decolonization was dealt with by the French authorities in a 
piecemeal fashion that varied depending on the territory in question, the circumstances 
of departure, whether the repatriate was a government or private employee and 
the decisions of the relevant embassy or consular officials.12 Assistance consisted of 
emergency financial aid and limited support aimed at economic reintegration. As a 
result, charitable institutions played a considerable role in the resettlement process, 
providing a set of services similar to those they had historically offered to refugees.13 
By contrast, there was no involvement from the French Office for the Protection of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), the body in France responsible for ensuring 
the application of international measures protecting refugees. As these population 
movements were regarded as domestic matters, there was no international repatriation 
regime equivalent to the UNHCR. 
The rising number of repatriates placed an increasing strain upon these partial 
mechanisms, even after reforms in 1957 and 1958. With one eye firmly on developments 
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in Algeria, in 1961 existing measures were consolidated into a new and comprehensive 
regime to be overseen by a dedicated secretary of state. The legal cornerstone of this 
approach was the Boulin Law of December 1961. Named after the first Secretary of 
State for Repatriates, Robert Boulin, the law simplified and broadened the definition of 
those able to benefit from state aid to all Frenchmen and women ‘having or expecting 
to have to leave, as a result of political events, a land where they were settled and 
which was previously placed under the sovereignty, protectorate or administration of 
France’. The law also expanded the type of assistance available. In place of emergency 
aid, the state now promised ‘a collection of measures’ to ‘integrate French repatriates 
into the social and economic structures of the nation’ in conformity with the principle 
of ‘national solidarity’.14 What exactly repatriates were entitled to was clarified on 10 
March 1962 in a decree that also formally extended the provisions of the Boulin Law 
to the French of Algeria.15 Paradoxically, the generosity of the proposed provisions 
was designed to encourage the settler community to remain in Algeria by reassuring 
them that, if the worst came to pass, they would be taken care of. As Louis Joxe, 
Minister for Algerian Affairs, noted on 28 March 1961 during preparatory discussions 
for the Boulin Law, ‘The certainty given to the French who feel threatened in Algeria 
of finding in metropolitan France an efficient welcome, available housing and, above 
all, the possibility of professional reintegration would serve to calm the anxieties of 
most and remove the reasons for political agitation.’16 But such reassurances proved 
insufficiently convincing in the face of the escalating violence that marked the final 
months of the Algerian conflict and which, ultimately, pushed the majority of the 
European population to leave. 
In response to the unprecedented scale of the migration from Algeria, the 
foundational measures of the Boulin Law and the decree of March 1962 were 
supplemented by a further 323 legal texts between 1962 and 1970 as the state refined and 
expanded its support for the substantial numbers of ‘returning’ citizens now within its 
metropolitan borders. This support included a range of measures, but was principally 
centred on the three elements outlined by Joxe: an effective welcome, housing and 
economic integration. Perhaps the most significant innovation was the provision of a 
monthly cash subsidy of 350 francs, slightly above the minimum wage, for up to one 
year. This was designed to alleviate pressure on those seeking work, enabling them 
to search for employment commensurate with their skills and experience rather than 
being forced to take the first job that came along. This was in addition to regular forms 
of social aid for metropolitan French citizens that were made available to repatriates 
without the usual stipulations regarding residency periods and documentation. Extra 
financial aid was provided to those unable to work or in other vulnerable situations. 
By 1970, an estimated ten billion francs had been spent on monthly benefits and social 
aid, alongside another twelve billion francs on diverse grants and subsidies and a 
further four billion on aid loans. 17 
Underpinning these exceptional measures was the French citizenship of the 
repatriates. Above all, the authorities were concerned to protect the repatriates from 
the risks of pauperization that mass displacement inherently carried and to ensure 
that, as French citizens, they were not treated as if they were foreign immigrants or 
refugees. The importance of nationality becomes apparent when the situation of the 
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repatriates is compared to that of the 60,000 individuals from Algeria who did not 
possess French citizenship. These ‘foreign repatriates’ were entitled to benefits for three 
months, but, beyond this temporary aid, were reduced to the same restricted levels of 
assistance provided to non-French immigrants.18 While willing to support the most 
socioeconomically vulnerable, the state did not want thousands of ‘dependent’ citizens 
on its hands, hence the emphasis on inserting repatriates into appropriate positions 
in the workforce as quickly as possible. This was not only for the sake of national 
prosperity. The French state equally wanted to limit any dissent or protest on the part 
of the repatriate population. Such fears were well grounded: during and immediately 
after the Algerian War, radical settlers had vented their anger at decolonization in the 
form of terrorist violence against the state, most famously through the Secret Army 
Organization (OAS) who were determined to keep Algeria part of France at all costs. 
Finally, government assistance was seen as a way to hasten the assimilation process, 
helping to overcome any lingering collective cultural particularities.
The French state was fortunate that, in contrast to the 1930s, the last time France 
had been called upon to absorb large numbers of migrants, the economy was booming 
in the early 1960s, enjoying average growth rates of 5.7 per cent a year between 
1955 and 1968.19 This prosperity helped allay many of the anxieties surrounding 
the incorporation of the French from Algeria, not least by providing much of the 
finance for government schemes. Moreover, the state was keen to emphasize the ways 
in which the repatriates represented an asset to the nation as opposed to a drain on 
its resources. One of the most frequently drawn parallels was with post-1945 West 
Germany whose successful absorption of over twelve million refugees and expellees 
was seen to lie at the heart of the ‘German miracle’ of economic growth in the 1950s.20 
Boulin’s successor, Alain Peyrefitte, used this example when seeking to persuade a 
somewhat sceptical President de Gaulle that ‘one million repatriates’ could also ‘be 
an opportunity for an expanding France’, providing that their integration was actively 
managed and supported by the state.21 Consequently, although the state drew to some 
extent on philosophies that had been applied to previous migrant populations – such 
as the importance of economic integration as a motor for broader assimilation – the 
treatment of repatriates from Algeria was distinct. In particular, the level of cross-party 
political will behind the project was unique, driven by the status of the repatriates as 
French citizens as opposed to ‘foreigners’. This, in combination with the vast numbers 
involved, compelled the state to create a repatriation policy that was unparalleled in 
its reach. In spite of gaps and problems, especially in early years when the demands 
placed upon these new structures were at their most acute, the state succeeded in its 
fundamental aim of avoiding the marginalization of the repatriates; within a decade 
there was no discernible socioeconomic difference between a repatriate from Algeria 
and a metropolitan French person. 
Experiential continuities
At the cultural level, however, the sense of otherness, of not quite belonging in spite 
of their legal status as Frenchmen and women, lingered long after socioeconomic 
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data indicated assimilation had occurred. This legacy created experiential similarities 
between the repatriates and refugee communities. Of course, French repatriates from 
Algeria were at no point denied the protection of the nation-state to which they 
belonged. Nor were they ever outside the territory of their nation, thus excluding them 
from contemporary international definitions of refugee status. However, many did flee 
their homes owing – in the words of the 1951 Convention – to a ‘well-founded fear 
of being persecuted’ since, ironically, levels of violence in Algeria actually increased 
following the signature of ceasefire accords at Evian on 19 March 1962. This was 
due primarily to the scorched earth policy undertaken by the OAS in a bid to derail 
ongoing independence negotiations between France and the FLN. After 19 March, 
OAS violence became more indiscriminate, targeting both French and Algerian 
civilians as they sought to provoke the FLN into retaliatory acts that would nullify 
the peace deal, while also terrifying the settlers into remaining, as a way of displaying 
their authority over the community. In the post-ceasefire period, more Europeans 
were killed in Algeria than in the previous seven years of conflict. Coming on the 
back of years of violence which had already strained settler nerves to breaking point, 
this climate of terror left the community feeling as if their only choice was, to use the 
common phrase of the time, ‘the suitcase or the coffin’. 
After the decision to leave had been taken came the arduous process of physically 
departing. The sheer scale of the population movement, which saw 355,000 people 
leave in June 1962 alone, meant queuing, often over several days, to secure passage 
to France and doing so under constant fear of attack, particularly as by this point the 
OAS was targeting ports and airports.22 Each passenger was restricted in the amount 
of luggage they could take, leaving families trying to cram entire lives into two allotted 
suitcases. Photographs show people bundled up in jumpers, hats, scarves and winter 
coats even though it was the height of summer as they sought to wear what they could 
not pack. The Algerian-born writer Jules Roy gave a particularly vivid account of the 
toll departure took on his fellow settlers when he stated:
Dazed, silent, despondent, they can’t grasp what is happening to them with this 
brutal uprooting. Mothers no longer have the energy to watch their children, old 
men remain immobile, their suitcases at their feet, as if they have nowhere to go 
and their life has stopped there … tears run down their leathery and wrinkled 
cheeks which they don’t even bother to brush away with their hand.23
Those who flew to France were at least assured of a seat since there was a strict passenger 
limit for each aircraft. Those who travelled by boat, however, faced unpleasant and 
dangerous levels of overcrowding as they crossed the Mediterranean. On 7 June 1962, 
seven ships docked in Marseille, disembarking a total of 10,437 passengers. This 
included the El Djezaïr, which carried 1,627 people, in spite of an official capacity of 
only 984, and the Kairouan, whose 2,630 voyagers were more than double the ship’s 
stipulated 1,172 places.24 
The iconography of this well-documented population movement, which included 
long queues and large crowds of visibly distressed men, women and children clutching 
their meagre possessions, inevitably recalled previous waves of refugees into France. 
Keen to avoid historical comparisons and thus any link in the public imagination 
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between the repatriates from Algeria and refugee populations such as the Spanish 
Republican exiles of 1939, officials consistently downplayed the significance of what 
was happening. This strategy included claiming that rather than an exceptional and 
permanent displacement, the number of departures was in line with normal patterns 
of summer travel. Speaking to the council of ministers at the end of May 1962, Boulin 
asserted that press reports of ‘a flood of pathetic refugees, destitute and without shelter’ 
were untrue. Supporting his argument with statistics, Boulin compared the 100,000 
departures from Algeria registered that month with 71,500 in May 1960 and 99,500 
in May 1961. His claims prompted the Education Minister Pierre Sudreau to ask: ‘Are 
they holidaymakers, as the Secretary of State would have us believe, or refugees, or 
repatriates?’25 Boulin’s denials formed part of a broader governmental mindset which 
proved unwilling to accept that, contrary to their initial plans and hopes, the majority 
of settlers were not going to remain in Algeria and, having largely been spared the mass 
migrations of the post-1945 era, France would now face a substantial and disruptive 
influx of people.
These denials were also a political tactic whereby the loss of Algeria was reconfigured 
not as a humiliating blow to national prestige, but rather as an opportunity for France 
to divest itself of cumbersome colonial commitments so as better to turn its attention 
to modernization and Europe. Within this schema, the governments of Michel 
Debré (January 1959 to April 1962) and Georges Pompidou (April 1962 to July 1968) 
interpreted the migration of the repatriates from Algeria as ‘the logical integration of 
a population into its country of origin’ and therefore of limited political and national 
consequences.26 For the French repatriates, however, ‘return’ was experienced as 
a ‘rupture’, especially given that a large proportion had no ancestral connection to 
metropolitan France, nor had they spent much time there, if any. Although the legal 
designation of repatriate brought with it protection and the promise of financial 
assistance, it was also not a label that sat easily with individuals who felt themselves to 
have been ‘expatriated’ in 1962. ‘I don’t use the term “repatriates,”’ explained former 
settler Nicole Giraud, ‘because we are not repatriates, we are the de-patriated and 
refugees.’27 In common with other ‘exiled’ communities, repatriate accounts stressed 
the trauma of losing their emotional and material bearings, of suddenly being 
deprived of everything that had constituted the daily fabric of their lives. More than 
simply having been forced from a land they considered their own, what repatriates 
found particularly destabilizing was the sense that, with Algerian independence, their 
country of birth no longer existed.
In seeking to assuage the grief of this irreversible loss, many repatriates looked 
to their metropolitan compatriots for support. Writing in the weekly newspaper of 
ANFANOMA, one of the largest repatriate associations of the time, Paul Coste-Floret 
argued for the union of all French people so that the ‘difficult world’ of the exodus could 
‘transform into a fraternal and heart-warming welcome’.28 His appeals were echoed by 
the government and by the mainstream press, both of which repeatedly emphasized 
the ‘Frenchness’ of the repatriates and their right to solidarity and hospitality on this 
basis. Raised ‘with the idea that Algeria is France, like Brittany or Alsace’, repatriates 
like Philippe Mendes equally had expectations regarding how they would be received.29 
The problem with homecomings is that the imagined return almost always falls short 
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of the reality, not least in terms of the reactions of those to whom one is returning.30 
For repatriates, this sentiment was exacerbated by the gap between the language of 
‘return’ and their actual sense of belonging and attachment, which lay outside of 
France. Equally, for the metropolitan population, there was a disjuncture between 
people they were told were French, just like them, and the repatriates in front of them 
whose appearance, accents and behaviour they found to be distinctly foreign. 
Consequently, in spite of government propaganda, the dominant sentiment among 
repatriates in 1962 was one of rejection. Everyday treatment revealed the hollowness 
of the rhetoric of national solidarity as repatriate status repeatedly proved insufficient 
to grant full access to public hospitality.31 Instead, as the repatriate Monsieur Ferreira 
explained, ‘We felt rejected as if we were foreigners.’32 The scale of the migration from 
Algeria magnified all the usual fears associated with an influx of unknown ‘foreign’ 
peoples. This was particularly true in Marseille, which bore the brunt of the arrivals, 
stretching local resources and tempers to breaking point. Suddenly forced to compete 
with thousands of additional people for access to shops and services, residents of 
Marseille resented the disruption caused by the repatriates, especially when this was 
manifested in rising prices and crime rates. The vocal expression of these frustrations 
left repatriates feeling distinctly unwelcome, if not actively victimized. ‘They blame 
everything on us,’ complained one man. ‘If there’s a robbery, it’s a repatriate, if traffic is 
difficult, it’s because of repatriates. If rents go up and the cost of a weekly shop becomes 
unaffordable, again, it’s because of us.’33 In a bid to ameliorate tensions, the local press 
reportedly suppressed stories of clashes between the two communities. However, 
as France-Observateur noted, that did not stop the inhabitants of Provence and the 
Languedoc ‘passing on by word of mouth stories about the cheeky, loud, rude, always 
dissatisfied “pieds-noirs.” They complain about their insolence; they complain about 
their forwardness with women; above all, they complain about their presence.’34 
In the face of local hostility, repatriates came together in informal groups in places 
such as the Place de la Bourse in Marseille. Although comforting, assembling in this 
way only heightened their visibility, strengthening the hand of those questioning the 
ability and willingness of the repatriates to integrate. For Aline M., suspicions about 
her Frenchness translated into her classmates repeatedly asking her to take off her 
shoes so they could see if she really did have ‘pieds-noirs’ (black feet).35 Even more 
forthright was an anonymous, handwritten pamphlet distributed in the Bouches-du 
Rhône area and attributed, by the repatriate association ANFANOMA, to the local 
Communist Party: 
Out of France … foreign scum
Fuck off back where you came from
We don’t want you here.36
Anxieties surrounding the presence of repatriates were enhanced by the connection 
drawn in metropolitan minds between the French from Algeria and the OAS, the 
terroristic remnants of which were still active on both sides of the Mediterranean. 
Earlier in the year, a survey revealed that 57 per cent of the metropolitan French 
believed that over half the settlers were affiliated to the OAS.37 It is true that many 
within the settler community initially supported the organization’s fundamental aim, 
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which was to keep Algeria as part of France. However, this largely symbolic support 
waned as the violence of the OAS intensified and became more indiscriminate in the 
spring and summer of 1962. Nonetheless, as Sung Choi notes, ‘The political climate 
was hardly propitious to receive the very same individuals most metropolitans believed 
were involved in threatening the lives of the French on the continent.’38 
The sense of rejection by their fellow countrymen, on top of their own sense of 
displacement, disorientation and loss, led to significant psychological trauma among 
the repatriates. There were numerous accounts of people committing suicide on the 
voyage to France by throwing themselves into the sea, while Daniel Leconte claims 
that obituary notices for repatriates during the winter of 1962–63 failed to specify that 
many of these deaths were self-inflicted.39 Academic studies conducted at the time 
also drew explicit parallels between psychological symptoms displayed by repatriates 
– severe anxiety, depression, paranoia and delirium – and conditions observed among 
refugee populations in the aftermath of the Second World War.40 These challenges 
notwithstanding, there was still an important difference between repatriates from 
Algeria and refugees. The French state could not erase the emotional trauma of exile, 
but the legal protection afforded by repatriate status and the far-reaching measures 
accompanying this did shield the French of Algeria from the worst material hardships 
of displacement. This, in turn, lessened the psychological toll imposed by migration. 
Marginalizing ‘Muslim repatriates’
The relatively privileged position of the French from Algeria becomes particularly 
apparent when their fate is compared to that of the ‘French Muslim Repatriates’, 
especially the harkis and their families. Recruited systematically by the French army 
from February 1956 into mobile units to undertake offensive military operations 
against the FLN, the number of harkis had reached 61,600 by January 1961. As the 
Algerian War progressed and France drew more heavily upon indigenous manpower 
in both civilian and military capacities, harki became a generic term signifying all 
native auxiliaries, which is the sense in which it is used here. The number of harkis 
so defined fluctuated throughout the war, peaking at 210,000 in 1958, but falling 
considerably in the final months of the conflict.41 Principally of rural origin, illiterate 
and unskilled, harkis were motivated to enrol in the French army by a combination 
of factors including financial necessity, fear of FLN violence, family loyalties, and 
coercion or entrapment.
When the ceasefire was proclaimed, harkis were given three options: engage in 
the regular French army, which would mean going wherever the army went, resign 
with a small financial payment, or enrol for six months on a civilian contract. Even 
amid considerable concern for their safety in a soon-to-be FLN ruled Algeria, harkis 
were reluctant to leave their lives and families. Clauses in the Evian Accords offering 
general guarantees of safety for civilians, in combination with the substantial number 
of French troops still present and promises of protection from senior military officials, 
proved sufficiently reassuring for 21,000, or 81.2 per cent of those still in active service, 
to accept their final pay and hand over their uniforms.42 Never having wanted to get 
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caught up in the war in the first place, these men were keen to return to the lives 
they had been forced to suspend. Sadly, such hopes were quickly shattered as waves of 
terrible revenge violence broke out across the country, much of it believed to be carried 
out by marsiens, last-minute FLN recruits. Beginning in April 1962, the massacres 
of the harkis and their families were most intense during July and August. Between 
60,000 and 75,000 are believed to have been killed, although the exact death toll will 
never be known.43
In the face of such persecution, harkis sought refuge in France. This should have 
been relatively straightforward since the harkis possessed French nationality and, as the 
Evian Accords promised, no French person would be deprived of citizenship against 
that person’s wishes. The April decree that extended the provisions of the Boulin Law 
to inhabitants of Algeria further stipulated that ‘anyone in Algeria wishing to return 
to metropolitan France, will be able to benefit from repatriate status.’44 In practice, 
however, legal equality was progressively undermined by government rhetoric and 
policy, which cast the harkis as different, both from other repatriates and from the 
metropolitan French.45 One of the clearest signs of this was the disappearance of the 
phrase ‘Muslim repatriates’ along with that of ‘citizens’ from official documentation 
and its replacement with terms such as ‘refugees’ or ‘harkis’, labels with no obvious 
link to either citizenship or Frenchness. Even de Gaulle asserted on 25 July 1962 that 
‘obviously’ the term ‘repatriate’ did not apply to ‘Muslims’, adding ‘in their case, we 
are dealing only with refugees’.46 Todd Shepard regards this change in language was 
an attempt by the government to bring the legal situation into line with the popular 
and official belief that ‘Muslims’ from Algeria could not be French, even though this 
position contradicted the Evian Accords, the Boulin Law and long-standing colonial 
rhetoric.47 On 21 June 1962 these semantic practices were codified in a new law which 
differentiated between ‘French of European origin’ (FSE) – essentially the settlers and 
the naturalized Jewish population – and ‘French of North African origin’ (FSNA). The 
former were allowed to keep their nationality following Algerian independence, while 
the latter were stripped of their citizenship. Now classed as Algerians, harkis were 
informed that if they wished to reclaim French nationality they would have to request 
this before a judge in France.48 As a result, rather than ‘returning’ citizens possessed of 
equal rights, by the summer of 1962, the harkis were presented as ‘outsiders whom the 
French Republic welcomed and assisted only out of charity and only in unavoidable 
circumstances’.49 
The practical consequences of this differentiation were far-reaching. The most 
immediate impact in the summer of 1962 was to make it difficult for harkis to flee 
the violence sweeping Algeria. Correspondence reveals that officials were well aware 
of the dangers faced by harkis with reports in June describing the ‘tragic’ situation 
whereby ‘kidnappings, summary executions, ostracism, forced labour in prison camps 
have made [the harkis] into pariahs’.50 But the need to help those who had rendered 
the nation considerable service and who were now in danger was balanced against the 
French state’s desire to control the flow of harkis into France and their hope that the 
majority would remain in Algeria. Directives were thus issued to ensure that those 
who came to France did so only via official channels and were ‘genuinely’ in danger, 
as opposed to extremists, of either FLN or OAS persuasion, who might pose a threat 
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to domestic security, or opportunists looking for ‘work that Algeria cannot provide’.51 
Individual officers who, out of a sense of loyalty and responsibility, attempted to bring 
harkis to France on their own initiative were warned on 12 May through a top-secret 
telegram from Louis Joxe that ‘all auxiliaries landing in the metropole outside of 
the official repatriation programme will be sent back’.52 It was this perceived need to 
maintain order in France that prevailed over humanitarian concerns, especially as the 
numbers of harkis seeking refuge in France rose rapidly. In any case, humanitarian 
concerns and the responsibility to intervene were limited by the fact that those in 
danger were now regarded as Algerians being menaced by their fellow countrymen 
rather than French citizens.53 When deciding which harkis to admit to the metropole, 
officials also took into account factors such as age, fitness and perceived ability to 
assimilate. For historian François-Xavier Hautreux this indicates that, in addition to 
an operation to welcome refugees, the state saw the transfer of the harkis to France as 
an economic migration whose costs and benefits to the nation needed to be factored 
in.54 Moreover, the existence of any explicit selection process belies the ways in which 
the treatment of the harkis differed from that of other repatriates. As Shepard pointedly 
notes, the authorities were much more concerned about OAS infiltration within the 
settler population than among harkis, yet there was never any suggestion that certain 
Europeans should be refused right of entry on grounds of national security.55 
As with the number of harkis killed, it is not possible to determine exactly how 
many made it to France; estimates range from 65,000 to 100,000.56 Whereas the goal of 
the state with respect to the European repatriates was to integrate them into the wider 
French population as quickly as possible, the harkis and their families, especially those 
who came via official channels, were grouped together and kept apart. Initially, harkis 
were placed in two former military camps: Larzac (Puy-de-Dôme) and Bourg-Lastic 
(Auvergne). Both these spaces quickly exceeded their maximum capacities, prompting 
the creation, in autumn 1962, of four ‘accommodation camps’ in the isolated, rural 
locations of Rivesaltes (Pyrénées-Orientales), Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise (Gard), Bias (Lot 
et Garonne) and La Rye Vigéant (Vienne). Several of these sites had long histories of 
housing those the Republic deemed ‘undesirable’, often ‘foreign’ populations that the 
state wished to keep separate from the rest of society. The Rivesaltes camp, for example, 
opened in May 1939. Over the next two decades it housed Spanish Civil War exiles, 
German and Jewish refugees, Jews awaiting deportation, German POWs, FLN prisoners 
and, finally, the harkis. Placing them in such spaces symbolically connected the harkis to 
these previous populations, strengthening the idea that they were refugees rather than 
citizens. On the basis that ‘one must adapt them gradually to a totally different way of 
life’, camps were advocated by officials so that the harkis might ‘continue to benefit from 
a certain supervision [encadrement] in their work and accommodation’. As a result, the 
aid to which the harkis were entitled was not distributed to them on an individual basis 
as it was to other repatriates. Instead, it was retained by the authorities and used to pay 
for running the camps, including the costs associated with social and cultural education 
programmes to hasten the assimilation process.57 
Historical parallels with other refugees extended beyond geographical 
coincidences. Unprepared for the large influx of harkis, conditions in the camps were 
rudimentary at best. Georgette Berthes, a social assistant who had accompanied 
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harki families from Algeria to France, was shocked to discover upon arrival at Larzac 
that ‘nothing has been prepared for receiving our brave people. The huts were in a 
pitiful state, windows broken, doors missing, brambles climbing the walls.’58 At first, 
however, most harkis were housed not in permanent structures but in tents even 
as autumn approached and the weather worsened. Conditions in the barracks into 
which the harkis were moved by January 1963 were little better, with neither heat 
nor electricity. Even after funds were unlocked for renovations, significant issues 
still remained. One persistent problem was overcrowding. All camps held more than 
their maximum capacity at certain points. In January 1963, 5,542 inhabitants were 
resident in Rivesaltes, a space designed for no more than 4,000.59 As with previous 
populations, overcrowding inevitably led to insanitary conditions, ill health and the 
rapid transmission of diseases such as TB.60 
The organization and administration of the camps subjected the harkis to constant 
surveillance and interference from state agents, reminiscent of the measures used to 
control refugee populations in these same spaces. Equipped with everything from 
schools and medical facilities to post offices, the camps were self-enclosed worlds. 
Military discipline, including being present for the raising of the flag in the morning, 
was combined with set times for meals and showers, electricity only between specified 
hours, and post being opened and read by camp staff. Permission was required to leave 
the camps, even temporarily, while the barrack-like accommodation surrounded, in 
some cases, by barbed wire served as constant reminders for their harkis of the lack of 
control over their lives. Contact between harkis and wider French society was strictly 
regulated, inhibiting the integration process the camps were supposed to be effecting. 
Upon discovering conditions at Rivesaltes, Dalila Kerchouche’s parents were among 
several harki families prompted to ask: ‘Why have they put us in prison? What crime 
have we committed?’61 
In total, an estimated 42,500 people passed through harki camps between 1962 
and 1969.62 Although most camps were closed in the mid-1960s, Saint-Maurice-
l’Ardoise and Bias remained open until the mid-1970s. In 1974, more than a decade 
after arriving in France, 16,000 people were still resident on these two sites.63 The 
number of harkis who spent a sustained period of time in one or more camps 
was small. However, often departure simply signalled a transfer to alternative 
institutional environments such as forest hamlets, temporary estates or purpose-
built social housing. Although each of these settings had different purposes, all 
adhered to the principle of treating the harkis as a collective entity and keeping them 
physically and socially separate from mainstream society. In particular, the forest 
hamlets maintained similarly strict rules and monitoring processes to the camps. 
Typical was the experience of the Kerchouche family who passed through a number 
of sites including Bourg-Lastic, Rivesaltes and the forest hamlet of Lozère, before 
finally moving into their own home in 1974.64 The repercussions of these initial exilic 
and isolated years in France continue to this day, particularly among descendants of 
harkis, many of whom have struggled to integrate in spite of their French citizenship. 
This explains the sustained campaigns waged by harki children, who have demanded 
material assistance alongside official recognition of the history of their community, 
particularly the sacrifices made by their fathers for France.65
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The placement of the harkis within the prison-like spaces of the camps underlines 
the extent to which they were viewed as ‘aliens’ and outsiders whose status most closely 
resembled that of refugees. Yet the harkis were never formally granted refugee status, 
which would at least have afforded them certain rights and protections under the 
aegis of the UNHCR.66 Instead, they were left stranded in a no man’s land between the 
categories of repatriate and refugee. By comparison, although questions were posed 
about the ‘Frenchness’ of the former settlers, the hostility that greeted this community 
in 1962 was primarily connected to the scale and suddenness of their arrival and the 
disruption it caused. Even outside of government and press exhortations to welcome 
the repatriates as fellow countrymen, there was sufficient racial and cultural similitude 
for assimilation to never really be in doubt. Nor, crucially, was their legal status as 
citizens ever disputed. Instead, this privileged position gave them access to exceptional 
levels of state support that were denied to the harkis. Official and popular distinctions 
made between European repatriates and the harkis thus split the ‘exodus’ from Algeria 
into two components, assigning different, often racialized, attributes and values to each. 
The ways in which the harkis were first rhetorically and then legally detached from 
their French citizenship was both a cause and consequence of reservations about 
their ability to assimilate. These reservations were indicative of wider anxieties about 
the prospect of large numbers of formerly colonized peoples migrating to France 
as decolonization globalized conceptions of the ‘refugee problem’. For while the 
Algerian case was unique in many ways, France was not the only imperial power to 
be faced with the ‘return’ of sizeable numbers of its overseas citizens alongside other 
inhabitants from the ex-colonies. Although settlers in the British territories of Kenya 
and Rhodesia largely opted to remain after independence or to relocate elsewhere 
within Africa, Europeans in both Dutch and Portuguese colonies overwhelmingly 
made their way back to their respective metropoles. Between 1975 and 1976, for 
example, half a million retornados (returnees) from Angola and Mozambique swelled 
the Portuguese population by approximately 7 per cent, the largest increase of any 
postcolonial repatriation.67 Like the repatriates from Algeria, these men and women 
also felt rejected by their fellow countrymen who bristled at the additional burdens 
their sudden arrival placed upon the already scarce national resources.68 Moreover, a 
distinction was made by the state and the general population between white retornados 
who were able, through considerable personal effort, to integrate themselves back into 
the national fold, and returnees with African heritage whose ‘Portugueseness’ was 
denied. Instead, they were marginalized, placed within the same category as black 
immigrants from ex-colonial territories such as Cape Verde who had no citizenship 
rights. This, Stephen Lubkemann argues, was part of a process of postcolonial identity 
construction whereby Portugal sought to stake a claim to influence and leadership over 
the wider Lusophone world without acknowledging the impact of its former colonies 
upon its own national composition and identity.69 
In many respects the Algerian case study stands at odds with the narrative set out 
by Zara Steiner in her chapter in this volume, not least because the men and women 
concerned were never legally defined as refugees. At a moment when international 
structures and regimes were becoming increasingly formalized, migration from 
Algeria was treated by the French as a purely domestic matter. However, keen 
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international interest in the unfolding situation in Algeria, combined with astute 
diplomatic manoeuvring by the FLN, enmeshed the War of Independence, and those 
who were displaced as result of it, in the politics of both decolonization and the Cold 
War, highlighting the overlap between these two pivotal historical processes.70 The 
pieds-noirs and harkis furthermore serve as an exception to Steiner’s observation 
that, at least at first, those on the move in Africa as empire ended ‘barely affected 
Europe’. In the wake of decolonization, ‘returning’ citizens from across the European 
empires, dubbed ‘invisible migrants’ by Andrea Smith, emerged as sites of negotiation, 
even contestation, in their respective metropoles.71 Their presence provoked similar 
anxieties and debates within European nations that were forced to grapple anew with 
questions of identity, belonging, exclusion and diversity as they sought to redefine 
themselves as postcolonial entities. The Algerian case study is therefore not alone in 
demonstrating that, during the closing stages of the ‘forty years’ crisis’, it was not only 
the composition of the populations on the move that had undergone a shift but also the 
priorities – social, political, economic, cultural and racial – of the European nations 
who were attempting to come to terms with the realities of a reconfigured postcolonial 
international system and their own place within this. 
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Colonialism, Sovereignty and the History of the 
International Refugee Regime
Glen Peterson
Approaching the history of the international  
refugee regime1
Why is it that, with a few carefully delineated exceptions, there were no non-European 
‘refugees’ until the post-Second World War era?2 This chapter attempts to answer this 
question by examining the origins and evolution of the international refugee regime 
from a global rather than a strictly European perspective. Refugees, we are sometimes 
told, are the ‘inevitable consequence of the modern system of nation-states’ that results 
when there is a ‘breakdown in the state-citizenship relationship’.3 Building upon 
recent scholarship in the history of international law, I suggest that this perspective is 
incomplete and, in certain key respects, ahistorical because it fails to take into account 
why some states were excluded from the modern international system to begin with 
and why some non-European nation-states, even though nominally sovereign, could 
not produce ‘refugees’ in the juridical sense that was reserved almost exclusively for 
European refugees in international law. During the twentieth century, assigning or 
withholding the ‘refugee’ label came to involve complex processes of inclusion and 
exclusion based on multiple legal, bureaucratic and political calculations. I argue that 
these processes of inclusion and exclusion cannot properly be understood by focusing 
exclusively on the evolution of refugee policies and practices, while taking concepts 
like the ‘modern system of nation-states’ and the ‘modern international system’ at face 
value as unproblematic, historical givens. Instead, as Mark Mazower has reminded us, 
we need to take seriously the ideological contexts in which the ‘modern international 
system’ and the ‘international community’ were imagined and constructed in the first 
place, and, especially, what their architects at the time believed they were doing.4 The 
goal of this chapter is to propose an outline for an alternative history of the international 
refugee regime, one in which the non-European and colonial worlds are not invisible 
or peripheral but rather central to the main narrative.
Let us begin with an anecdote from the early 1950s. On a hot summer evening on 24 
June 1952, a crowd of more than a thousand gathered at the Municipal Sports Stadium 
in the southern Chinese port city of Guangzhou to denounce the persecution and 
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atrocities allegedly committed by British colonial troops in Malaya against members of 
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and their sympathizers. According to the rally’s 
organizers, these included simulated drowning, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, 
pulling out of fingernails with iron forceps, trussing up prisoners so that they were 
forced to walk on all fours, and hanging prisoners up naked in public places for hours 
at a time. The rally was organized by the city’s recently established ‘Committee for 
Handling Returned Overseas Chinese Refugees’ (归国难侨处理委员), and those 
attending included a large number of Malayan Chinese who had recently arrived in 
Guangzhou.5 They were among the thousands of Malayan Chinese British subjects 
who were ‘deported’ to China during the more than decade long Malayan Emergency 
(1948–60), when British colonial authorities attempted to crush an insurrection led by 
the ethnic Chinese-dominated MCP.
The anecdote just described – involving ethnic Chinese who were persecuted by a 
colonial state and ended up in revolutionary China – is significant because it highlights 
the limitation of conventional refugee narratives. During the Cold War conventional 
wisdom in the West held that communist states were producers of refugees, while 
Western states offered sanctuary to those fleeing communist persecution.6 Yet in 
this instance the roles were curiously reversed. The source of persecution was not 
communist totalitarianism but a European colonial state employing armed force 
and terror against its own subjects. Likewise, the refugees who found themselves in 
communist China were not moving towards ‘freedom’, at least not in the conventional 
sense in which that term is generally understood in the West. And they were welcomed 
not only as ‘refugees’ (难民 ) in need of succour, but also as ‘patriotic overseas Chinese’ 
(爱国华侨) who were ‘returning’ to their motherland – even if it was a motherland that 
many of them had never known or experienced, having been born and lived overseas 
for generations.7 However, if we forsake the conventional narrative for an approach in 
which histories of empire and colonialism figure as prominently as Cold War politics, 
then the anecdote just described starts to make sense.
Scholars have approached the history of the international refugee regime from 
several angles. Here I identify what I consider to be two main approaches emerging 
from recent scholarship. One approach is to view the history of the international 
refugee regime in terms of the origins and development of a coordinated humanitarian 
response to displacement. The other views the international refugee regime as an 
intergovernmental response to the disruptive effects that refugees pose for established 
modes of territorial governance. After briefly outlining each of these perspectives, I will 
propose an alternative approach, one which sees the international refugee regime as 
involving elements of both of the above, but which is also deeply informed by histories 
of colonialism, racial exclusion and Western constructions of non-European ‘Others’.
Early histories of the international refugee regime tended to approach the subject 
in terms of an unfolding intergovernmental response driven by humanitarian and 
legal considerations.8 Emphasizing the role of humanitarian crisis as a key driver 
of the creation and maintenance of an international refugee regime is a perspective 
that emerges readily from the sources produced by refugee agencies themselves and 
their implementing partners ‘on the ground’. Observing the sixtieth anniversary of 
the establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) 
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on 14 December 2010, UNHCR’s website emphasized that the organization was not 
about to wind up operations anytime soon because ‘humanitarian needs are unlikely 
to disappear’.9 Viewed from this perspective, the history of coordinated international 
action on behalf of refugees is almost invariably framed in terms of a narrative of 
gradual, if halting, progress and improvement. The first such coordinated action 
involved the creation in 1921 of the League of Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (LNHCR) as a temporary agency whose mandate was restricted to assisting 
Russian refugees. This was followed by a succession of reluctant and too-little-too-late 
international responses to racial persecution and the escalating refugee crises of the 
Second World War in Europe. The year 1950 saw the establishment of UNHCR as 
yet another temporary agency with a three-year mandate to mop up the remnants of 
Europe’s wartime refugee problem. Since then UNHCR has evolved into the world’s 
‘rapid response unit’ for people displaced by conflict with an annual budget in 2012 
of $3.59 billion – the largest of any UN agency – and a scale of operations that is 
genuinely global in scope.
The role of humanitarian action in refugee history is indeed a central one. Recently, 
however, Nevzat Soguk has challenged the view that the international refugee regime 
was borne out of the objective necessity of interstate collaboration to assist refugees. 
Rather than arising out of the need for coordinated international assistance for refugees, 
Soguk sees the international refugee regime as a ‘statist’ response to the disruptive 
effects that refugees posed for territorial governance. The international refugee regime, 
he maintains, is best understood as a politico-legal response to the social and political 
dangers represented by forcibly uprooted populations who have become ‘detached’ 
from the structures of the sovereign state. The sudden appearance of millions of 
displaced and stateless people across central and eastern Europe in the years following 
the First World War signalled a crisis in ‘sovereign territorial governance’, one which 
threatened to undermine the ‘all encompassing hierarchy of citizen/nation/state’. In 
Soguk’s view, the creation in 1921 of the LNHCR was intended, not only to provide 
assistance to refugees, but more importantly to ‘produce, stabilize, and empower 
contingent images, identities, subjectivities, relations, and institutions of sovereign 
statehood’.10 The international refugee regime under LNHCR was the means by which 
refugee movements and the people who populated them were to be brought under 
control through a series of legal manoeuvres in the form of international conventions, 
protocols and procedures agreed by sovereign states and overseen by the world’s first 
genuinely international organization, the League of Nations. Thus, the regime was 
focused on such statist concerns as the legal definition and protection of refugees; their 
registration and documentation; their confinement within certain prescribed sites and 
spaces (the institution of the ‘refugee camp’); their relief and ‘rehabilitation’; and their 
eventual return to the ‘normal’ status of citizens of a sovereign state – whether the 
previous sovereign (through repatriation) or a new one (through local integration or 
third country resettlement). 
Soguk’s view of the international refugee regime as a statist response to the 
politically disruptive effects of human displacement complicates our understanding 
and represents a significant challenge to approaches that view the evolution of the 
international refugee regime in terms of a gradually widening realm of humanitarian 
Refugees in Europe, 1919–1959216
intervention or which see the international refugee regime as a politically neutral 
institution dictated by the practical necessities of interstate collaboration to assist 
refugees. However, one weakness of Soguk’s approach is that it offers little basis for 
conceiving a history of displacement that takes account of the world beyond Europe. 
Indeed, to the extent that Soguk’s work can be read as a history of the international 
refugee regime writ large, rather than simply a series of events in interwar Europe, 
its underlying telos is the gradual spread of sovereignty and its corollary, the nation-
state system, from Europe to the rest of the world. That is to say, as formerly colonized 
countries acquire sovereignty and join the ‘family of nations’, they become eligible for 
membership in the institutions created to maintain order among sovereign states – 
including, among other things, the international refugee regime. To be fair, Soguk 
himself is quite aware of the Eurocentric limitations of his approach. He is careful to 
note that his study ‘focuses on Euro-Mediterranean experiences in history’, and that 
the book ‘should therefore be taken as to be a study of statecraft in European histories’. 
Observing that ‘no substantial body of literature exists on early human displacement in 
non-European spaces’ and that ‘most of the studies on refugees in non-European, non-
Western spaces … deal with contemporary histories’, he admits to an ‘insurmountable 
difficulty in incorporating [the non-west] into this study without diffusing the study’s 
core interest in the instrumentality of human displacement in statecraft’.11 Most studies 
of refugee history remain profoundly Eurocentric. Typically, studies begin with the 
religious persecution and expulsion of the Huguenots from France in 1685 (when the 
English language term ‘refugees’ was first popularized) and then proceed to the French 
Revolution before focusing on the implications of the rise of nationalism and of the 
nation-state system in Europe.12 With few exceptions, before 1945 the world beyond 
Europe is, quite literally, outside of history. Is an alternative approach possible? Is there 
a way to bring the non-Western world into the history of the international refugee 
regime other than through the telos of a globalizing humanitarian response or of the 
nation-state system? What would a genuinely global history of human displacement 
and refugees look like? 
Colonialism, sovereignty and the origins  
of international law
In attempting to think through these issues, I have found especially helpful the work 
of scholars such as Antony Anghie and Edward Keene. Their work is concerned not 
with refugee history as such, but rather with the broader historical question of the 
relations between colonialism, international law and the construction of the modern 
world order. Building on the works of these and other scholars on colonialism and the 
origins of international law, my argument can be summarized as follows. From the 
early decades of the nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War, the 
world was understood by the self-proclaimed members of ‘international society’ to 
be composed of two distinct international realms, underpinned by different visions 
of the nature of the legal and political order. One realm was reserved for Europe and 
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what were frequently described as ‘white man’s countries’ (i.e. current and former 
settler colonies including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States).13 
The second realm was understood to encompass the colonial and semi-colonial world 
that lay beyond Europe and its settler outposts. Importantly, this bifurcation was not 
only ideational (rooted in racial and culturalist claims) but was also ‘hard-wired’ into 
international political and legal institutions and structures. As Keene explains, one 
realm of international legal and political order was organized around ‘the pursuit 
of peaceful coexistence between equal and mutually independent sovereigns, which 
developed within the Westphalian system and the European society of states’, while 
the other was concerned not with relations among European states but with the 
entirely different question of the nature of relations between Europeans and non-
Europeans.14 As is well known, the treaties of Westphalia that were concluded in the 
1640s territorialized political power and established the principle that states have the 
sovereign right to exclude external forms of authority.15 However, the ‘Westphalian 
system’ was established in an age of European imperial expansion. This meant that the 
principle of a state’s sovereign right to exclude external authority had to be reconciled 
with European colonization of overseas lands. The contradiction between the two 
was resolved in the nineteenth century by the elaboration by international jurists of a 
distinction between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states and peoples. The two realms of 
international legal and political order that developed and claimed legitimacy on the 
basis of this distinction were not only coincident in time; the same international jurists 
also provided the legal framework and jurisprudence for both.16 Moreover, this vision 
of a world made up of a European-based ‘International Family’ of civilized nations, on 
the one hand, and an uncivilized world beyond Europe, on the other, persisted well 
into the twentieth century, and was even enshrined in the founding covenant of the 
League of Nations. 
In order to understand how the binary categories of civilized versus uncivilized 
influenced conceptions of the modern ‘refugee’, we need to look more closely at the 
origins of this dichotomy and its implications for the development of international law. 
According to conventional wisdom, the field of international law – of which refugee 
law is a central component – originated in response to the problem of how to maintain 
order among sovereign states. Proponents of this view have traditionally pointed 
to the Westphalian treaties, which called for the relations among sovereign states 
to be regulated by a system of international laws, treaties and diplomatic exchange. 
However, the legal scholar Antony Anghie questions this view of the intra-European 
origins of international law. As Anghie points out, ‘A focus on the problem of order 
among sovereign states cannot illuminate the prior question of how certain states were 
excluded from sovereignty in the first place.’17 The answer, according to him, lies in 
‘the colonial origins of international law’. Colonialism, according to Anghie, played 
a central role in the development of the norms and practices of sovereignty. From its 
inception in the seventeenth century, international law was concerned not only with 
relations among states but also with the imperial project of governing non-European 
peoples. Thus, sovereignty doctrine was not something that was developed in Europe 
and then simply transferred to the non-West at some point in the mid-twentieth 
century as a consequence of decolonization. Rather, the concept of sovereignty was 
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forged in the context of colonial confrontation: in the legal, political, intellectual and 
military project of extending domination over non-European peoples.18
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, European juridical discussions, shaped 
by the rising influence of legal positivism, coalesced around the notion of a ‘standard 
of civilization’ as the basis for an international society made up exclusively of European 
states that had deemed themselves to be ‘civilized’.19 In the absence of a supranational 
sovereign authority, nineteenth-century legal positivists turned instead to the notion 
of a ‘family’, a ‘community’ or a ‘society’ as the legitimating basis for international law. 
This marked a crucial shift away from earlier natural law principles because ‘implicit 
in the idea of society is membership’. What were the criteria for admission? As Anghie 
notes, the concept of an international ‘society’ and the range of ideas associated with 
it enabled jurists to link legal status with cultural distinctions. The key distinction 
drawn by legal positivists was between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states. Once such 
a distinction was drawn, ‘completely different standards could be applied to the two 
categories of people’. Anghie quotes Henry Wheaton, whose 1866 book, Elements of 
International Law, would become one of the foundational texts of modern international 
law: ‘Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all 
the nations and states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always 
been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those 
of European origin.’20 In this way, a particular sociological vision rooted in notions of 
cultural difference and the binary categories of ‘civilized’ versus ‘uncivilized’ became 
the foundation for international law, rather than sovereignty per se. By positing a gap, 
understood primarily in cultural terms, between ‘civilized’ Europe and the ‘uncivilized’ 
world beyond it, nineteenth-century legal theorists established a basis both for 
excluding the non-European world from the realms of sovereignty and international 
law – including, as we shall see, refugee law – and for legitimizing the ‘grand redeeming 
project’ of bridging that divided by civilizing the uncivilized.21 As Edward Keene puts 
it, the concept of civilization ‘performed two roles in international legal thought: it 
defined the border between the two patterns of modern international order, and it 
described the ultimate purposes that the extra-European order was for’.22 
What do the colonial origins of international law mean for writing a global history 
of human displacement? Anghie argues that the civilized-uncivilized binary ‘animated 
the development of many of the central institutions of international law’.23 Did it also 
influence the development – or non-development – of international refugee law and the 
understanding and representation of human displacement in non-Western contexts? 
A first observation is that instances of forced migration and displacement, including 
what would otherwise be regarded as refugee-producing events, are often hidden in 
the colonial archive. In some cases they have been erased entirely; in many cases, 
however, they are registered under different signs: as instances of mutiny, rebellion, 
hiding, absconding, banishment, deportation, unauthorized flight and various forms 
of illicit residence and unauthorized movement.24 A second observation is that most 
international jurists emphatically believed that the treatment of colonial subjects 
was quite simply beyond the pale of law. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had 
been widely held that ‘international law has no place for rules protecting the rights of 
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backward peoples’. Rather, the prevailing view was that any ‘such international rights 
as backward peoples have been recognized to possess’ were ‘moral and not legal’.25 
Thus, John Westlake’s seminal 1894 book, Chapters on the Principles of International 
Law, devotes a separate section to ‘The Position of Uncivilised Natives with regard to 
International Law.’ In it Westlake explicitly rules out the possibility that international 
law might have any role to play in protecting the legal ‘rights’ of uncivilized natives. 
‘Even those who, in accordance with the modern tendency, make rights instead of law 
their starting point, can hardly avoid admitting that the rights which are common 
to civilized and uncivilized humanity are not among those which it is the special 
functional of international right to develop and protect.’ But if that were the case, what 
protection did the colonized have against the arbitrary use of political power? In western 
Europe, the question of how to guard the individual and society against despotism had 
animated the evolution of legal and constitutional thought for centuries. For Westlake, 
however, when it came to ‘backward peoples’, it was sufficient to rely on the paternal 
benevolence of the colonizer. ‘Becoming subjects of the power which possesses the 
international title to the country in which they live,’ Westlake wrote, ‘natives have on 
their governors more than the common claim of the governed, they have the claim of 
the ignorant and helpless on the enlightened and strong; and that claim is the more 
likely to receive justice, the freer is the position of the governors from insecurity and 
vexation.’ ‘International law,’ Westlake asserted, ‘has to treat natives as uncivilized’ and 
therefore ‘leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the state to which the 
sovereignty is awarded’.26 
What this meant in practice was that colonial states were prepared to sanction – 
in the name of ‘civilization’ – the use of political violence and compulsion in their 
colonies in ways and to the extent that would have been considered unthinkable – 
and illegal – at home. Thus, for example, when the ‘civilized’ members of the nascent 
‘international society’ met at The Hague in 1899 to establish international laws of 
warfare, the signatories agreed to outlaw the dropping of bombs from airborne 
balloons – but only among themselves. In subsequent years, bombing from the air 
became an accepted and ‘low-cost’ means for colonial powers to suppress native 
resistance. Three decades later the practice was defended by the American ‘counter-
insurgency specialist’, Eldridge Colby, on the grounds that, whereas to a European the 
bombing of a cathedral would be regarded as a ‘lawless act of the enemy’ arousing 
international wrath, ‘to the fanatical savage, a bomb dropped out of the sky … is 
a sign and a symbol that God has withdrawn his favour’ and an ‘indication of the 
relentless energy and superior skill of the well-equipped civilized foe’. ‘Was there not 
some mysterious alchemy at work,’ asks Mark Mazower, ‘in a set of arguments that 
turned the civilized soldier into a substitute for God – yoking together omnipotence 
and virtue, and sowing death from the heavens – and all this in the name of progress 
and international law?’27 What this also meant was that colonial states, whatever they 
did, could not produce refugees in international law. There was, it seems, a widely held 
assumption that colonial states could do as they wished with the people under their 
control. So if what colonial powers do is inherently permissible, then the uncivilized 
are inherently incapable of being ‘refugees’.
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The International Labour Organization 
and the question of universality
The League of Nations, established in 1919 as the world’s first international governing 
body, in retrospect had a double-edged effect in both reinforcing and revising the 
principle that sovereignty and international law were reserved for the European ‘family 
of nations’. On the one hand, the League’s founding covenant affirmed the concept 
of a world divided into ‘civilized’ and ‘backward’ nations and people. But through 
its pronouncements, its institutions, and in the forms of expertise embodied by its 
technical personnel the gulf separating the two was gradually redefined in increasingly 
economic rather than racial and culturalist terms, as a problem of ‘development’.28 This 
change did not in itself spell the end of colonialism; on the contrary, as Frederick Cooper 
and others have shown, in the short term it provided colonialism with the discursive 
means to defend and redefine itself as a progressive, globally minded enterprise 
necessary for achieving the economic uplift of the ‘backward’ portions of humanity. 
This was a twentieth-century reincarnation of the civilizing mission, recast in scientific 
terms as a global challenge of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’.29 What persisted, in 
other words, was the notion of European guardianship. The notion received its fullest 
expression in the institution of ‘mandated territories’ (former German and Ottoman 
possessions governed after the First World War by an international regime created 
and supervised by the League of Nations), which the League defined as a ‘sacred trust 
of civilization’ exercised over territories ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves.’30 On the other hand, however, the mandate system also introduced the 
principle of international oversight for the first time, and compelled the mandatory 
powers (mainly Britain and France) to submit annual ‘progress’ reports to the League 
on their efforts to prepare the inhabitants of their territories to ‘stand on their own’.31
The International Labour Organization (ILO) performed a similarly significant 
role in focusing international light on colonial labour practices and making them, 
for the first time, subject to a limited form of regular international scrutiny. The ILO 
drew its authority to scrutinize colonial practices from Article 421 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which required member states to extend the application of international 
labour conventions that they had ratified at home ‘to their colonies, protectorates and 
possessions’. However, Article 421 also sanctioned the right of colonial powers not 
to extend such conventions to their colonies when ‘local conditions’ rendered them 
inapplicable, and to make their extension to colonial jurisdictions ‘subject to such 
modifications as may be necessary’.32 It was the tension between these two provisions 
that formed the basis for the ILO debate over forced and indentured labour.
In 1926 the League instructed the ILO to formally take up the question of forced 
labour and ‘conditions analogous to slavery’ in colonial territories.33 The reaction of the 
colonial powers was said to be ‘hostile’.34 Forced labour was defended on the grounds 
that it was both economically necessary, in the public interest, and furthermore in 
accordance with ‘local custom’. The question was considered by an ILO-established 
‘Committee of Experts on Native Labour’ to which were appointed – in an effort 
to legitimize the process by including in it representatives of the colonial powers – 
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experienced colonial administrators from various countries, and at the ILO’s Annual 
Labour Conference which, according to the ILO’s unique organizational structure, 
included delegates representing governments, employers and workers. On one 
occasion, the Dutch delegate proclaimed that the ‘ruling motive in the mind of every 
member’ was a ‘desire to secure an amelioration in the lot of peoples subject to the 
burden of forced labour, and particularly of those whose progress towards civilization 
is as yet little advanced’.35 However, progress in this regard could never be achieved 
by extending metropolitan laws to the colonies, whose people were ‘not ready for it’. 
A Belgian employers’ delegate demanded a measure of ‘elasticity’ in efforts to restrict 
the use of forced labour, in order to permit ‘compulsory cultivation’ for the purpose 
of producing export crops, which, it was claimed, was intended to reduce the risk 
of famine.36 In the end, Britain and France, as the major colonial powers, played the 
leading role in drafting the 1930 Geneva Convention on Forced Labour. Although 
the Convention pledged to ‘suppress the use of forced labour in all its forms within 
the shortest possible period’, its immediate aim was to ‘regulate’ its use in colonial 
territories. The convention acknowledged the acceptability of forced labour in the 
colonial world when it was used ‘in the public interest’.37 
Moreover, the question of indentured labour was deliberately avoided during 
the negotiations leading to the 1930 Convention, on the grounds that such labour 
was, according to the colonial powers which relied upon it, voluntary and ‘free’.38 A 
Dutch East Indies employer’s delegate claimed that since ‘every care [was] taken’ to 
ensure those who signed long-term contracts were aware of the terms before signing, 
there could be no analogy to ‘forced labour’.39 The transnational use of indentured 
labour had been a prominent feature of colonial economic strategy since the abolition 
of the slave trade. As early as 1842, a British Commission of Inquiry recommended 
the introduction of measures to promote the migration of ‘native labour’, subject to 
controls designed to distinguish such ‘free’ labour from slavery. Other colonial powers 
soon followed suit, and by the late nineteenth century there was a vast global movement 
of indentured labourers, primarily from China and India, to the Caribbean, Pacific 
Islands, Africa and Southeast Asia. 40 The period from 1900 to 1930 witnessed the 
rapid development of economic infrastructure across the colonial world, in the form 
of railways, roads, dams, bridges, as well as the large-scale cultivation and extraction 
of raw materials – all of which required an expanding supply of labour. While many 
of these development schemes were privately run, colonial governments played a 
critical role in furnishing the labour for such projects; China and India were major 
sources of recruitment. In 1935 the Indian workers’ delegate to the 19th Session of the 
International Labour Conference, Ramaswamy Mudaliar, proposed an amendment 
that migrant indentured labourers be accorded property rights and basic civil and 
political rights in their (often long-term and permanent) countries of residence, 
including equal status in courts of law. Mudaliar’s defeated amendment was met with 
unabashed hostility from government and employer delegates, who dismissed it as a 
‘political amendment’. Mr Moeller, the Belgium employers’ delegate, declared that the 
colonial powers had a ‘mission of guiding their subject peoples through the difficult 
conditions of modern life’, including the ‘duty of protecting the natives from influences 
which are all the more dangerous because the people in question are primitive and 
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easily led’; amendments such as the one proposed by Mudaliar ‘would only create 
disorder in the minds of people unable to assimilate such ideas’.41 A few years earlier, 
in 1929, the Chinese delegate to the League of Nations conference on minority rights 
called on the League to extend the twenty-four minority rights treaties that had been 
created for countries in central and eastern Europe after the First World War globally, 
in order that minority rights would become ‘essentially international and world-
wide, and the laws of each country … provide effective and equal protection for all its 
citizens without distinction of language, race, or religion’.42 
Histories of labour migration and racial exclusion are critical for understanding 
the ways in which individual states and the ‘international community’ viewed Chinese 
refugees. Prior to 1945, Chinese (as well as Indian) migration took place primarily 
within the global circuits of European empires, for the purpose of supplying cheap 
labour for the rapidly expanding extractive and plantation economies in non-settler 
colonies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific, and for the ‘opening up’ of the western 
frontier of North America.43 By the turn of the twentieth century, white settler nations 
around the Pacific Rim had erected what amounted to a gigantic administrative 
cordon excluding Chinese from their borders on racial grounds.44 As a result of these 
experiences, Chinese migrants had become deeply familiar with experiences of mass 
expulsion, legalized discrimination and persecution on racial grounds, even organized 
pogroms. Instances of ‘paihua’ (排华) or ‘Chinese exclusion’ – a term that referred to 
both border exclusions and forced expulsions – were reported on regularly by Chinese 
newspapers and periodicals.45 However, these events took place beyond the realm 
of international refugee law. The latter simply could not prevail against the powerful 
alternative identities ascribed to Chinese migrants during this period. The real driving 
identity ascribed to the migrant Chinese (and the indentured Indians) throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century was that of economic actor-labourer (hence the 
histories of indentured labour migration) and security threat (hence expulsions and 
exclusion).
Let us return, finally, to the example with which we began this chapter. The British 
practice of deporting ethnic Chinese troublemakers had a long history in Malaya. The 
first Banishment Act was introduced as early as 1864. Up until the 1930s, banishment, 
in combination with various labour ordinances, had functioned as a kind of ‘makeshift 
immigration control’ for deporting persons whom colonial authorities labelled as 
political agitators, criminals and secret society members.46 The practice of banishing 
political ‘subversives’ to China increased in the 1920s with the rise of Chinese 
Nationalist and Chinese Communist Party activities in Malaya. It grew exponentially 
during the ‘Emergency’, when more than 10,000 ethnic Chinese were deported to 
China in 1950–51 alone, according to Chinese sources.47 Upon their arrival in China 
the ‘banishees’ (as Malayan colonial authorities described them) were welcomed by 
the communist government as ‘overseas Chinese refugees’ (难桥) who had ‘returned’ 
to their ancestral motherland. Their plight was completely overlooked by the newly 
established UNHCR, despite the fact that the latter had taken an avid interest in the 
contemporaneous problem of the Chinese refugees from communist China who had 
sought asylum in British-ruled Hong Kong. British expulsion of the Chinese from 
Malaya could not be taken into account by the international refugee regime because 
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in the early 1950s the dominant view of Chinese migrants was still that of economic 
actors-labourers and/or security threat, and because underlying this view was the 
continued assumption and acceptance of British authority to simply add and subtract 
migrants to their colonial possessions based on economic and security calculations.
Epilogue
From the late nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War, 
international approaches to human displacement were shaped by a series of 
assumptions about the nature of international society and distinctions that were 
drawn between states and peoples in terms of race, degree of ‘civilization’ and 
other markers of difference. These inclusions and exclusions were elaborated – 
and contested – in multiple realms of social, political and cultural life, and formed 
a kind of matrix for interpreting the nature and shape of the broader human 
world. As we have seen, these forms of inclusion and exclusion were also ‘hard-
wired’ into international political and legal institutions and structures. By the 
late 1940s, however, such distinctions and the institutional practices associated 
with them were increasingly difficult to sustain. It is here that we can perhaps 
begin to connect the themes discussed in this chapter with the notion of the forty 
years’ crisis and events in Europe. Throughout the interwar period, liberalism, 
universalism and racial particularism not only went hand in hand; they were 
mutually constitutive.48 The ‘European’ refugee regime, in effect, functioned as a 
means of containing and excluding other forms of asylum seekers. However, the 
horrors of the Second World War in Europe – what Zara Steiner in this book calls 
the ‘descent into barbarism and the implosion of European civilization’ – changed 
this forever. It was not just that Hitler’s policies ‘gave racist ideologies and racist 
theories a bad name’.49 It was also because ‘the Nazi utopia of a dynamic, racially 
purified Germanic empire … was also a nightmarish revelation of the destructive 
potential in European civilization – turning imperialism on its head and treating 
Europeans as Africans’.50 Understandably, the United Nations in its early years 
emphasized the need to enshrine the principle of universal human rights – even if, 
behind the scenes, the various powers with interests at stake worked overtime to 
ensure that such rights were merely aspirational, and not binding.51 Nonetheless, 
by the late 1940s colonial administrators were finding the legal and moral 
justifications that had underpinned colonialism for more than a century dissolving 
before their eyes. A case in point involved the issue of racial discrimination in 
colonial possessions, which arose in the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. The British Colonial Office was ‘extremely nervous’ over the 
possibility of colonial subjects lodging human rights complaints against a colonial 
power with an international body – much less the prospect of colonial subjects 
having an international right to asylum on account of such violations.52 Thus, in 
January 1947 the British Secretary of State for the Colonies issued an empire-wide 
circular, requiring colonial governments to compile and submit lists of all of their 
discriminatory legislation based on race. The Singapore government, to take one 
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example, listed examples of discriminatory legislation in labour and employment 
laws, policing and military legislation, penal segregation and other areas. Other 
departments proudly proclaimed themselves to be free of discriminatory legislation 
and practice, save for ‘small’ things like separate canteen facilities for Europeans 
and natives.53 That the entire edifice of colonial rule rested on a set of principled 
distinctions based on race and that a defining feature of British rule in Malaya 
involved the separate treatment of Malays, Indians, Chinese and Europeans were 
ironies that could, for the time being, continue to be overlooked.
The first refugees from colonial rule to be viewed as such by an international refugee 
organization occurred in 1953. When French forces reoccupied Vietnam at the end 
of the Second World War, approximately 50,000 Vietnamese fled into neighbouring 
Thailand, where they remained in a state of legal limbo for years under the watchful 
eyes of the Thai government. A UNHCR official in the commission’s Bangkok 
regional office, convinced that UNHCR could not look the other way when it came 
to colonial matters, described the Vietnamese stranded in Thailand as ‘refugees from 
French rule’ and told his superiors in Geneva it was ‘as clear as day-light’ that the 
Vietnamese refugees fell within UNHCR’s mandate. As persons with a ‘well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of … political persecution’, they were ‘certainly as much 
open to persecution on account of their political beliefs as are anti-communists in 
communist countries’.54 Comments like these would have been unthinkable in an 
international refugee organization only a few years earlier. By the late 1950s, when 
Europe’s internal refugee problems were supposedly all but solved, the focus of world 
attention was clearly shifting towards the recognition of a global refugee problem. The 
shift was exemplified by the UN decision to designate 1959 as World Refugee Year 
(WRY). As Peter Gatrell has observed, while there had been plenty of earlier initiatives 
to mobilize popular and governmental support for refugees, they had always been led 
by diasporic groups and charitable organizations dedicated to soliciting support for 
particular groups of refugees. Unlike these earlier efforts, WRY was the first movement 
to build upon notions of a common, global citizenship.55
But if 1959 was a turning point, there was still a long way to go. The year 1959 
was also one in which a prominent UK official proposed resettling several hundred 
thousand Chinese refugees in Hong Kong as labourers on sugar plantations in the 
British Honduras – a proposal that linked emerging post-war ideas about global 
refugee resettlement with older, colonial understandings of the transnational 
deployment of Asian labour for the development of colonial export economies.56 
One of Anghie’s key arguments is that non-European states can never fully realize 
equality of status in the international system because the ‘dynamic of difference’ – 
that which serves to distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized – is something that 
is constantly regenerated and reinscribed under different historical circumstances.57 
As evidence of this ongoing inscription and reinscription of difference, consider 
the following excerpt from a 1962 US Congressional Report on Chinese refugees 
in Hong Kong. After commenting on the scale and significance of the refugee 
problem in Hong Kong (‘the single largest concentration of anti-communist refugees 
anywhere in the world’), the report went on to caution that ‘the same standards and 
classifications which have been adopted for European and western refugees cannot 
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automatically be applied in the Far East’. ‘Indeed,’ the report continued, ‘the average 
Chinese refugee, if approached and asked why he left Red China, would not be 
able in an intellectual sense to answer questions about Communist oppression. He 
would state that he did not like the kind of life he had been forced to live and … 
the economic and personal restrictions placed upon him. But coming for the most 
part from an oriental peasant background, he would not state that he had fled in 
order to escape political persecution’ (emphasis added).58 In this way, the ‘dynamic 
of difference’ continued to inform official and popular understandings of the refugee 
well into the post-war era. 
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